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Abstract
Recognition memory is thought to depend on two processes. Whereas
familiarity refers to a simple feeling of knowing a stimulus, recollection
enables us to remember associative information such as the place of a
particular episode in which the stimulus has occurred. Accordingly, rec-
ollection, which relies on the integrity of the hippocampus, is generally
required to remember arbitrary associations. In contrast, a familiarity
signal, presumably arising in the perirhinal cortex, is sufficient to recog-
nize single items. However, it was shown that the integration of separate
items into a single configuration (unitization) leads to reduced involve-
ment of recollection and greater reliance on familiarity. Of special inter-
est is the formation of novel units from previously arbitrary associations
during a single encoding episode as this accomplishes the unique ability
of episodic memory to remember associative information that relates to
a specific event. This thesis reports four experiments in which retrieval
processes for novel units were compared to those involved for arbitrary
associations, pre-existing units and single items. Experiment 1 and 2
revealed behavioral and fMRI evidence that retrieval of arbitrary word
pairs involves flexible recollection whereas retrieval processes relied on
the exact configuration when word pairs were studied as novel concep-
tual units (e.g., vegetable bible = a book consulted by hobby gardeners).
Hippocampal engagement during retrieval of novel units was reduced in
contrast to arbitrary word pairs. Moreover, brain regions specific to the
retrieval of novel units and single items were dissociated. Experiment 3
could not replicate previously reported familiarity-related ERP effects for
novel conceptual units as well as pre-existing units (e.g., tea cup). Con-
textual factors influencing familiarity-based retrieval are discussed. The
results from Experiment 4 provide preliminary evidence that arranging
two unrelated objects as a scene can enhance familiarity for associations
suggesting that not only contiguous entities can be perceived as units.

Mit Dir, Papa.
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Introduction
Imagine we would not be able to store and retrieve associations between
persons, objects, locations, and situations. The constant experience of
our life would be an incoherent mixture of familiar and novel situations.
The ability to remember associations is essential for episodic remember-
ing. Episodic memory refers to the part of our memory system which is
able to remember personal events such as when we were in the zoo to
watch the lions for the last time. It lets us recall all kinds of event details
as for example that it was rainy that day, what an awful smell it was in
the lion house and what joy it was that there were lion babies. Episodic
memory can also relate different events to each other such as knowing
that the zoo visit was shortly after returning from the summer holidays
two years ago. Thus, episodic memory gives us the opportunity to men-
tally travel back into our past (Tulving, 1985). In contrast, semantic
memory covers knowledge about the world stored in a depersonalized
way. For instance, we can tell that a lion naturally lives in Africa with-
out having to remember where or when we have learned this information.
Even more basically, semantic memory stores concepts (such as knowing
what at all a lion is) and relates conceptual knowledge to each other (e.g.,
a lion and a tiger are both cats).
Just as episodic memory, semantic memory also involves remember-
ing associations. However, it does this in a different way. Whereas in
episodic memory associations have to be formed during a single episode
(e.g., zoo and rain on a particular day), associations in semantic mem-
ory become manifest over time (e.g., lions and tigers occur consistently
together in different contexts) (e.g. McClelland & Rogers, 2003). More-
over, remembering episodic associations is thought to necessarily engage
the hippocampus (e.g., Aggleton & Brown, 2006) whereas semantic asso-
ciations are assumed to be accessible by-passing the hippocampus (e.g.,
McClelland & Rogers, 2003; Moscovitch, Nadel, Winocur, Gilboa, &
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Rosenbaum, 2006). This property of episodic memory transfers also to
recognition memory, i.e. the ability to realize that we have encountered
a stimulus before. Accordingly, the hippocampus is needed in order to
recognize that we have encountered an arbitrary (i.e. not semantically
related) association before (e.g., Turriziani, Fadda, Caltagirone, & Car-
lesimo, 2004). However, it was suggested that recognizing associations
which were formed during a single episode does not rely on the integrity
of the hippocampus when they are integrated into a single whole, i. e.
are unitized (Quamme, Yonelinas, & Norman, 2007). The focus of this
thesis is to follow-up this hypothesis comparing the processes involved
in recognition memory for different kinds of associations using different
behavioral and neuroimaging methods.
In Chapter 1, I give an overview of the research on recognition memory
which is relevant to the research questions of this thesis. The focus lies
on characterizing the two processes presumably subserving recognition
memory: familiarity and recollection. I describe behavioral and elec-
trophysiological methods to assess the two processes as well as findings
regarding their neural grounding. The chapter ends with the attempt
to relate recognition memory to the semantic and episodic memory sys-
tems. The second chapter provides the background in research on asso-
ciative recognition memory including an elaboration on different kinds
of associations in order to establish a basis for the question when asso-
ciative memory can be independent of the hippocampus. Special focus
is placed on the effects of unitization arguing that it is important to
distinguish between different kinds of unitization, especially as different
kinds of unitization seem to be differentially associated with semantic
and episodic memory. Hence, Chapter 3 covers considerations in which
way the mnemonic processing differs for these different types of associa-
tions. Before Experiments 1 to 4 are reported, I describe the deduction
of the general research question of the present work in Chapter 4.
2
CHAPTER 1
Recognition Memory
Recognition memory refers to the ability of a ”judgment of previous
occurrence” (Mandler, 1980, p. 252). Thus, it is our constant task to
realize whether we have encountered a specific person, object, smell, etc.
ever before. Research on recognition memory has grown tremendously
in the last decades. While many details of the underlying mechanisms
of this ability are still controversial, there is also a lot of uncontroversial
insight into this phenomenon. First of all, recognition memory (outside
and inside of laboratories) is nothing else than performance of a task in
which the participant has to decide whether he or she has encountered
the presented stimulus before. By this, it is neither necessarily tied to
one memory system nor to one specific psychological process. Moreover,
it is generally regarded as a conscious product of memory meaning that
it is an explicit cognition to recognize something or consider it as novel.
Although further characterization is a matter of debate, this chapter gives
a summarizing picture of current models of recognition memory. I start
by explaining the basic set up of a recognition memory experiment.
1.1 Investigating Recognition Memory
A typical recognition memory experiment comprises a study phase and
a test phase. In the study phase, participants learn a list of items either
incidentally while completing a non-memory task on the items or inten-
tionally encode the items for a subsequent memory test. In the test phase,
the study list (old items) is intermixed with a list of unstudied items (new
items). For each single item, the participant has to decide whether the
item was presented during the study phase or not (old/new or yes/no
3
judgment). Responses are then classified as hits (old items classified as
‘old’), misses (old as ‘new’), correct rejections (CR, new as ‘new’) and
false alarms (FA , new as ‘old’). Besides hit and correct rejection rates,
the Pr value (Pr = p(hits)−p(FA)) is commonly reported as it reflects a
measure of memory performance which is independent of response prefer-
ence. Chance performance is described by Pr = 0. Response tendencies
are quantified by the bias measure Br (Br = p(FA)/(1 − PR)), values
below 0.5 indicating conservative responding (a tendency to say ‘new’)
and values above 0.5 indicating rather liberal responding (Snodgrass &
Corwin, 1988). From this basic experimental concept, an almost endless
number of variations evolved, many of which occur in the following. Each
variation is specifically useful to provoke a different composition of the
contributing processes and memory systems.
1.2 Familiarity and Recollection
There is broad consensus that recognition memory involves two phe-
nomenological aspects: recollection and familiarity (e.g., Wixted & Squire,
2011; Yonelinas, 2002). Recollection can bring to mind episodic details
of an item’s occurrence in the past whereas familiarity lacks such addi-
tional information and is just the feeling of knowing that an item has been
encountered before. The currently prevailing dual-process view is that
these two psychological phenomena are the expressions of two dissociable
processes in the brain (for a review see Yonelinas, 2002). In contrast, the
single-process account claims that it is one single process that underlies
recognition memory, namely the assessment of a single (accumulated)
memory signal which can result in different phenomenological experi-
ences (e.g., Kirwan, Wixted, & Squire, 2008; Slotnick & Dodson, 2005;
Squire, Wixted, & Clark, 2007). However, as becomes apparent in the
following sections, the evidence in favor of the dual-process account of
recognition memory is strong. Thus, the focus in the following is placed
on the nature of the distinct processes of recollection and familiarity,
their behavioral expressions and their underlying neural networks.
1.2.1 Familiarity and Recollection in a Nutshell
Familiarity is understood as an automatic process, the products of which
are readily and rapidly available. Along these lines, it is characterized as
minimally strategic and controllable. Mostly, familiarity is believed to
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operate only on single representations. Moreover, it is thought to be best
described by signal-detection theory (D. M. Green & Swets, 1966). This
means, each item has its own specific familiarity strength value whereby
the distribution of the old item values is on average higher than the new
items distribution. The distributions are assumed to be overlapping in
most cases. A criterion determines whether a specific familiarity value
leads to an ‘old’ or ‘new’ decision. The higher the familiarity value, the
more confident the recognition decision. The distance between the old
items and new items distribution is described by the parameter d’which
can be used an indicator of the discriminability and the difference in fa-
miliarity between the two classes of items (see Figure 1.1.A). In contrast,
recollection is generally described as a non-automatic more slowly op-
erating effortful cognitive process. It is therefore considered to be more
strategic and controllable. Its core function is to establish memory traces
which link two or more separate elements. According to the dual-process
signal detection model (e.g., Yonelinas, 1994, 1997), recollection is un-
derstood as an all-or-none threshold process. Having gathered a specific
amount of evidence for the oldness of an item, a highly confident ‘old’
judgment is made. Otherwise, recollection completely fails and the item
is rejected. Commonly, the form of the old item and new item distri-
butions are not further specified. However, great variance above the
threshold is normally not assumed. Thus, strong variations in confidence
are not expected (see Figure 1.1.B). Mostly, familiarity and recollection
are assumed to be independent implying that they can occur solo but
also in parallel (Yonelinas, 2002; Yonelinas, Aly, Wang, & Koen, 2010).
1.2.2 The Assessment of Familiarity and Recollection with Behav-
ioral Measures
In the following paragraph, I give a brief and non-exhaustive overview
of the most common methods to assess familiarity and recollection on a
behavioral level. These methods can be used in order to derive param-
eter estimates of how large the contributions of the two processes are
under specific experimental conditions. Moreover, they are essential to
investigate the neural networks underlying familiarity and recollection.
Receiver-Operating-Characteristic Curves
Receiver-Operating-Characteristic (ROC) curves depict the probability
of a hit as a function of the probability of an FA at different levels of deci-
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Figure 1.1.: Characterizing familiarity and recollection. (A) Familiarity as a signal
detection process with two Gaussian distribution of familiarity strength
for old and new items. The mean of the old distribution is higher than the
mean of the new distribution (d’ corresponds to the distance between the
means). (B) Two possible types of distributions for the threshold process
recollection. (C) ROCs for pure familiarity-based recognition. (D) ROCs
for pure recollection-based recognition. (E) ROCs for recognition based
on familiarity and recollection. This figure is reproduced from Yonelinas
et al. (2010, p. 1180) with permission from John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
sion confidence. Increasing FA rates correspond to an increasingly liberal
bias. In humans, these measures are obtained by asking participants to
indicate their confidence levels with each response on a 6- or 10-point
scale whereby one half covers ‘old’ responses and the other half ‘new’ re-
sponses. Values range from ‘very confident old’ to ’very confident new’.
Thus, a conservative bias can be mimicked by difining only ’very sure old’
responses as ’old’ and all other responses as ’new’. The more categories
are considered as ’old’ responses, the more liberal the bias. The form of
the resulting function (curve) can inform something about the properties
of the underlying processes. When a threshold process is assumed, there
is a certain probability of a hit for very high confident judgments. How-
ever, as signal strength is not assumed to vary much above threshold, true
memory with lower confidence is not expected. Due to low confidence
guessing, hit and FA rates increase simultaneously resulting in a linear
ROC curve (Figure 1.1.D). When a signal-detection process is assumed,
hit rates increase faster than FA rates at the ‘high confidence old’ end. At
the other end (’new’ responses) FA rates increase faster than hit rates.
Due to the Gaussian memory strength distributions the curve is sym-
metrical (Figure 1.1.C). Thus, pure recollection-based responding would
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result in a linear ROC curve, whereas pure familiarity-based responding
would yield a perfectly symmetrical curve over the diagonal. Recogni-
tion memory as proposed by dual-process models results in skewed ROC
curves which incorporate a linear and a symmetrical component (Figure
1.1.E) (Yonelinas, 1994). Thus, by estimating the proportion of each
component, parameter estimates for familiarity (the degree of curvilin-
earity) and recollection (the intercept) can be derived. One critical issue
is that reliable estimates can only be obtained with a relatively large
number of responses for each class of stimuli (Yonelinas & Parks, 2007).
Moreover, in order to base conclusions on the parameter estimates it is
necessary to ensure that other models (assuming different parameters)
do not better fit the data.
The Remember/Know Procedure
Using the remember/know (R/K) procedure (Tulving, 1985), partici-
pants are asked to subjectively judge whether they remember (R) any
study details or they just know (K) that the item has occurred in the
study phase without having explicit memory for the study episode. The
probability of recollection equals simply the probability of a correct ‘re-
member’ response to an old item. However, it is assumed that familiarity
and recollection while being independent can occur concurrently. There-
fore, the fact that participants can only respond ‘know’ when they have
not recollected leads to an underestimation of familiarity when equal-
ing it to the probability of a ‘know’ response. Thus, this number has
to be qualified by the total number of items for which no recollection
has occurred (P (F ) = P (K)/(1 − R)) (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995). In
some applications, the procedure allows also for a ‘guess’ response in or-
der to avoid that guessing artificially increases the ‘know’ response rate
(Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1998). When applying the
R/K procedure, it is essential that participants have perfectly under-
stood the difference between the two response options as this method
completely relies on the subjective judgments of the participants. How-
ever, it can be assumed relatively – although surely not completely –
process pure (Migo, Mayes, & Montaldi, 2012).
Source Memory Tasks
Source memory tasks tap into the unique ability of recollection to re-
trieve details from the study episode. In a classic example, participants
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study items presented on different background colors constituting the
study sources. Old and new test items are presented without background
color. In a two-step procedure, participants have to make an old/new
judgment and if they respond ‘old’, they have to indicate on which back-
ground the item was presented during the study phase. It is assumed
that correct source judgments can only be based on recollection whereas
correct old/new judgments followed by an incorrect source judgment rely
on familiarity without recollection.
Although source memory has the advantage that the participants’ task
is straightforward and is not subject to individually different task inter-
pretations, it also has its caveats (as listed by J. R. Taylor & Henson,
2012). One problem which arises when only a small number of sources or
response options are used (e.g., a blue and a red background) is guessing.
In the example case, a correct source judgment has a 50 percent probabil-
ity even without any recollection. On the other side, an incorrect source
judgment does not necessarily imply a complete lack of recollection as
non-criterial recollection of other study details such as self-generated as-
sociations can occur (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1996). Moreover, if source and
stimulus are encoded in a unitized manner, the source might be correctly
remembered because the arrangement of item and source is familiar as
a whole (Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2008; Staresina & Davachi,
2008). This latter issue is discussed in more detail in chapter 2.3.
Response-Deadline Procedure
As already described above, familiarity signals are assumed to be avail-
able earlier than those of recollection. Thus, if participants are forced
to respond in a very limited time, it can be assumed that responses rely
primarily on familiarity. Evidence comes from studies showing that per-
formance in tasks relying more on familiarity is better than in tasks re-
quiring recollection when responses have to be given under time pressure
(e.g., Gronlund & Ratcliff, 1989; Hintzman & Curran, 1994). Although
no parameter estimates can be derived from the response-deadline pro-
cedure, it is a quite strong method to investigate familiarity as it does
not require any subjective judgments and the likelihood of a contamina-
tion by recollection is relatively small (e.g., Mecklinger, Brunnemann, &
Kipp, 2010). A related method is the familiarity-only instruction, where
subjects are trained to distinguish between familiarity and recollection
similar to the remember/know procedure but are instructed to avoid rec-
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Box 1.1: Lesion studies and imaging methods
In order two understand the cognitive processes happening in human brains, neuro-
science methods have proved to be inevitable. The three methods which are relevant
to this thesis are briefly summarized in this box. The reasoning in classical neu-
ropsychology relied for a very long time mainly on lesion studies. The rationale
behind them is to show that a patient who suffers from a lesion in a specific brain
region is unable to perform a specific cognitive function in order to link the brain
region to the function. To date, lesion studies are still the only means to draw
causal inferences about locations of functions. It has to be kept in mind, however,
that lesions can also lead to re-organization in the intact part of the brain. When
investigating healthy subjects, one can capitalize on the circumstance that electri-
cal activity in the brain is still measurable at the surface of the head. By means of
electrodes placed on someone’s scalp continuous electroencephalogram (EEG) can
be recorded. The EEG is measured as a voltage difference between two electrodes
reflecting the sum of all electrical activity on these specific locations on the head
surface. Event-related potentials (ERPs) can be extracted when several signals are
averaged time-locked to a specific class of stimuli whereby specific activity is iso-
lated from the unspecific random activity. An ERP is characterized by its positive
and negative peaks which can be linked to different cognitive functions. ERPs are
the only means of real-time measuring cognitive processes albeit with a relatively
coarse spatial resolution. A higher spatial resolution (normally 2-3 mm3) can be ob-
tained by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) which can identify regions
which are more activated in one condition compared to another condition. Magnetic
resonance (MR) signals emerge from the radiation emission of hydrogen nuclei. Ac-
tivation is indicated by different blood-oxygen-level-dependent MR signals. This is
based on the rationale that brain activation leads to an increased demand for blood
supply and thus for more oxygen which alters the MR signal.
ollection. Trials for which participants report unintentional recollection
are excluded from analysis (e.g., Migo, Montaldi, Norman, Quamme, &
Mayes, 2009). This method rests more on participants’ understanding
and compliance than the response-deadline procedure but allows greater
inter-individual variance in general processing speed.
1.2.3 Assessment of Familiarity and Recollection by Event-Related-
Potentials
Adding to the behavioral methods described above, one of the most com-
pelling evidence that familiarity and recollection are two separable pro-
cesses in the brain comes from event-related-potential (ERP, see Box 1.1
for basic information about methods in cognitive neuroscience) research
(Donaldson & Curran, 2007). In recognition memory tests, hits gener-
ally elicit more positive-going waveforms than correct rejections which is
labeled the ERP old/new effect. Familiarity and recollection are associ-
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Figure 1.2.: ERP old/new effects. Hits typically elicit more positive going waveforms
than FAs. In the middle, the scalp locations are indicated where the
effects are usually maximal. Familiarity is associated with the mid-frontal
old/new effect occurring 300-500 ms after stimulus onset. Recollection is
associated with the left parietal old/new effect occurring in a later time
window between 500 and 800 ms.
ated with two different ERP old/new effects (Mecklinger, 2000; Rugg &
Curran, 2007). Importantly, the two ERP old/new effects were shown
to occur independently of each other (Ja¨ger, Mecklinger, & Kipp, 2006).
Familiarity is associated with the mid-frontal old/new effect which is
maximal over bilateral frontal electrode sites and occurs between 300
and 500 ms after stimulus onset. The putative ERP correlate of rec-
ollection is the left parietal old/new effect which occurs 500 to 800 ms
after stimulus onset and has a left-lateralized posterior distribution (see
Figure 1.2).
An impressive number of studies has shown that experimental ma-
nipulations affect the two effects in a way that parallels the outcomes
for behavioral measures of familiarity and recollection. The left parietal
effect was shown to be larger for items encoded in a deep semantic encod-
ing condition compared to a shallow encoding condition in line with the
assumption that deep encoding can accumulate more study details which
can subsequently be retrieved (Rugg et al., 1998). In a source retrieval
task, Wilding and Rugg (1996) demonstrated that the left parietal ef-
fect was larger for items for which the source was remembered correctly
in contrast to when it was not remembered correctly. In a similar vein,
the effect is sensitive to the amount of recollected information. The more
study details are remembered during retrieval, the larger is the associated
left parietal effect (Vilberg, Moosavi, & Rugg, 2006). Moreover, reports
of R responses in R/K paradigms are associated with a greater positivity
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than reports of high confident K responses (Woodruff, Hayama, & Rugg,
2006; Yu & Rugg, 2010). In line with recollection being relatively slowly
available, the left parietal effect is attenuated by imposing a response
deadline on a recognition test (Mecklinger et al., 2010).
In contrast, the mid-frontal old/new effect is not influenced by the
aforementioned variations of memory for study details (Rugg et al., 1998;
Vilberg et al., 2006; Wilding & Rugg, 1996) nor by response deadline
manipulations (Mecklinger et al., 2010). Furthermore, it is comparable
in size for hits and FAs to similar new items (e.g., rat vs. rats) which is in
line with the notion that familiarity is not influenced by specifics from the
study episode but is rather sensitive to the gist (Curran, 2000). Moreover,
the mid-frontal effect is not larger for R responses than high confident K
responses and varies with familiarity strength as indicated by confidence
judgments (Woodruff et al., 2006; Yu & Rugg, 2010). Moreover, the mid-
frontal old/new effect was dissociated from ERP correlates of implicit
memory (e.g., Rugg et al., 1998).
Although the mid-frontal effect is consistently and exclusively observed
in recognition memory studies and behaves as one would expect, the no-
tion that it is a process-pure ERP correlate of familiarity was challenged
by the claim that it reflects conceptual priming, i.e. facilitated conceptual
processing for studied vs. unstudied items (see Paller, Voss, & Boehm,
2007). One of the core arguments brought up in favor of this view is that
there seems to be no mid-frontal effect whenever the to-be-remembered
stimuli lack meaning such as in the case of kaleidoscope images (Voss &
Paller, 2009). For extremely rare words with unknown meanings and line
drawings of non-objects, it was shown that the mid-frontal effect only
occurs for items which are subjectively perceived as meaningful (Voss,
Schendan, & Paller, 2010; Voss, Lucas, & Paller, 2010). Moreover, Voss
and Federmeier (2010) claimed that the mid-frontal old/new effect is in-
distinguishable from another ERP component, the N400 (see Box 1.2),
which is associated with semantic processing, when they are compared
within one experiment. However, the latter finding was recently refuted
in a study where a semantic priming paradigm and a recognition memory
task were separated more clearly resulting in significantly different scalp
distributions of the corresponding ERP effects (Bridger, Bader, Kriukova,
Unger, & Mecklinger, 2012). The findings that meaningless stimuli do
not elicit a mid-frontal effect are not necessarily at odds with a famil-
iarity account as it is possible that familiarity and conceptual priming
have overlapping neural generators (see Bridger et al., 2012, for full argu-
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Box 1.2: The N400 - A neural marker of semantic integration
The N400 is an ERP com-
ponent with a negative de-
flection between 200 and
600 ms after stimulus on-
set. Typically, it has a
slightly right centro-parietal
distribution over the scalp
although this may vary de-
pending on the stimulus ma-
terials (Kutas & Federmeier,
2000, 2011). The N400
was discovered by Kutas and
Hillyard (1980) who showed that the negative deflection was larger for incongruent
compared to congruent sentence endings (e.g., He shaved off his mustache and city.).
In the meantime, changes in the magnitude of the N400 have been observed with
numerous semantic manipulations such as fit within different kinds of context, se-
mantic priming, and semantic category membership. Moreover, it occurs automat-
ically without any specific task demands. The N400 effect refers to the difference
between the amplitudes in two conditions. The figure shows that implausible words
within a specific context elicit a larger N400 than plausible ones, but that this effect
can be reduced if the implausible word belongs to the expected category. Although
the exact nature of underlying processes is still under debate, the N400 is generally
assumed to signal ease of semantic processing. Greater ease is reflected by smaller
amplitudes (Kutas & Federmeier, 2000, 2011). The discussion of the neural gener-
ators is also still on-going with a network of contributing brain areas being most
likely. This network probably includes the inferior frontal gyrus, the anterior tempo-
ral lobe, the angular gyrus and the posterior middle temporal gyrus (Lau, Phillips,
& Poeppel, 2008). The figure is reproduced from Kutas and Federmeier (2000, p.
466) with permission from Elsevier.
ment) and that meaningfulness is a prerequisite for familiarity to occur.
However, as the findings by Bridger et al. clearly demonstrate (see also
Greve, Rossum, & Donaldson, 2007; Ku¨per, Groh-Bordin, Zimmer, &
Ecker, 2012), there must also be components specific to familiarity. This
might be the act of relating the current processing experience to an event
in the past (Hayes & Verfaellie, 2012).
On the one hand, ERPs provide unequivocal support for the existence
of two independent processes contributing to recognition memory. On the
other hand, given that conceptual priming can be ruled out as a confound,
the mid-frontal and the left parietal old/new effect can now serve as
independent online measures of familiarity and recollection, respectively,
without need for specific response requirements. In the following section,
I turn to the assumed neural grounding of familiarity and recollection.
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1.3 Neural Grounding of Recognition Memory
Models on the neural basis of recognition memory predominantly cen-
ter around the role of the medial temporal lobes (MTL). Accordingly,
this chapter starts with models focusing on the MTL alongside relevant
neuropsychological and functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) findings
(see Box 1.1). Thereafter, I turn to other regions distributed over the
whole brain which are specifically or generally linked to familiarity and
recollection.
1.3.1 Recognition Memory and the MTL
Models of the MTL Memory System
The MTL memory system is often described in a hierarchical manner
with the hippocampus heading the system. It receives input mainly from
the underlying neocortical areas within the MTL (see Figure 1.3). Infor-
Figure 1.3.: The medial temporal lobe memory system. Indicated are the locations of
the perirhinal, parahippocampal, and entorhinal (extending medially along
perirhinal and parahippocampal cortex) cortex, as well as the hippocam-
pus. Flow chart depicts specificity of the different regions with regard to
the stored representations as suggested by the BIC model. Arrows imply
direction and amount of information flow. This figure is reproduced from
Ranganath (2010, p. 1265) with permission from John Wiley & Sons,
Inc.
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mation flows from uni- and polymodal association areas to the perirhinal
(PrC) and parahippocampal cortices (PhC) which correspond to the an-
terior and posterior part of the parahippocampal gyrus. From there it
is passed on via the entorhinal cortex (EC) to the hippocampus (e.g.,
Squire, Stark, & Clark, 2004). The single-process view on the MTL
memory system postulates that an episodic memory judgment is based
on one single memory signal. Thereby evidence is accumulated in the hip-
pocampus which receives and relates input from different sources (Squire
et al., 2007). Activity variations in the parahippocampal gyrus as well
as the hippocampus are assumed to be predictive of variations in fa-
miliarity and recollection (Kirwan et al., 2008; Wixted & Squire, 2011).
However, according to the dual-process view of the MTL memory sys-
tem, there is a division of labor between the structures of the MTL.
The hippocampus proper is thought to be essential for the binding of
separable parts of an event and is thus the core structure of the neu-
ral network subserving recollection. Conversely, the parahippocampal
gyrus can only deal with representations which are non-relational in na-
ture (Aggleton & Brown, 2006; Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007;
Henke, 2010; Montaldi & Mayes, 2010; Opitz, 2010b; Ranganath, 2010;
Mayes, Montaldi, & Migo, 2007; Yonelinas et al., 2010). Whereas all
these models converge on the aforementioned general notions, there are
also differences between the proposed frameworks. Most of the models
assume that the PrC signals familiarity for an item. However, only the
binding-of-item-and-context (BIC) model specifies a particular role for
the PhC. It predicts that the PhC deals with representations of con-
texts and is therefore more involved in recollection (Diana et al., 2007;
Ranganath, 2010). The BIC model views recognition memory generally
as an episodic task and thus familiarity and recollection are regarded
as episodic processes. In contrast, Aggleton and Brown (2006) clearly
limit episodic memory functions to the hippocampus. Only recollection
is thought to be mediated by this episodic system because contextual
details are one of the defining properties of episodic memory. Familiarity
arising in the parahippocampal gyrus subserves recognition memory in
a non-episodic manner (see also Aggleton, 2012). The models proposed
by Henke (2010) and Opitz (2010b) are more general in the sense that
they extend the principal of a representational parahippocampal gyrus
and a relational hippocampus to unconscious memory or other cognitive
domains such as language, respectively.
14
Whereas the models described above make predictions about the map-
ping of familiarity and recollection to brain regions, Norman and O’Reilly
(Norman & O’Reilly, 2003; Norman, 2010; O’Reilly & Norman, 2002)
outline the computational principles underlying the two processes. This
model is based on the complementary-learning-systems (CLS) approach
proposed by McClelland, McNaughton, and O’Reilly (1995). The CLS
assumes one learning system (the neocortex) which extracts regularities
from incoming information (Where is the best butcher’s shop in town?)
at a rather slow learning rate. Another learning system (the hippocam-
pus) is assumed for quick learning of specifics (Where did I buy this
yummy steak last week?). In the hippocampal system, during learning
the input layer of EC projects incoming information to region CA3 (cor-
nus ammonis region 3) of the hippocampus (directly and indirectly via
the dentate gyrus), where pattern-separated, i.e. mostly non-overlapping,
representations are assigned to different elements of the input. This is
possible because only a few units are active for each representation. The
representations are connected to each other by Hebbian learning which
results in an episodic trace. This ensemble in turn is re-represented in
region CA1 which has connections back to the output layer of EC. This
loop provides the possibility that a partial cue of the study episode re-
activates the whole episodic trace in CA3 and the missing part of the
episode can be re-instantiated in the output layer of EC via CA1. In the
context of recognition memory, the hippocampal system is well suited
to mediate recollection. In the neocortical model, novel items lead to a
rather weak activation of a larger number of units in the MTL cortices
(MTLC). With repeating presentations, the activation pattern becomes
sharper through Hebbian learning and inhibitory competition, i.e. in the
end only a selected set of units is strongly activated. In contrast to the
hippocampal model, similar inputs lead to overlapping representations.
Therefore, small details may not be sufficient to discriminate between
two items. Moreover, for strong and distinct familiarity signals multi-
ple repetitions are needed. The CLS framework provides an anatomi-
cally plausible description of the computational principles of recognition
memory from which novel predictions can be derived and independently
tested (e.g., Migo et al., 2009).
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Neuropsychological and fMRI Evidence for the MTL Memory System
In support of the models sketched in the preceding paragraph, patients
with circumscribed hippocampal lesions (HC-patients) show a selective
deficit in recollection accompanied by spared familiarity. For instance,
several studies have revealed greater problems for HC-patients in recall
tasks than in item recognition (Baddeley, Vargha-Khadem, & Mishkin,
2001; Holdstock, Mayes, Gong, Roberts, & Kapur, 2005; Yonelinas et
al., 2002). While recall tasks are assumed to rely primarily on recol-
lection (Baddeley et al., 2001), item recognition can be based on an
intact familiarity partly compensating for the recollection deficit. Ad-
ditionally, comparing HC-patients to patients with lesions affecting the
hippocampus plus the underlying cortices (MTL-patients) as well as to
healthy controls, Yonelinas et al. (2002) showed that parameter estimates
of recollection derived by two different methods (R/K and ROCs) were
smaller for both patient groups compared to the controls. However, fa-
miliarity estimates were only reduced for the MTL-group whereas the
HC-group exhibited normal familiarity levels. Moreover, in a single case
study, Holdstock et al. (2005) found a greater impairment in ‘remember’
responses than in ‘know’ responses in a patient with a circumscribed hip-
pocampal lesion (but see Manns, Hopkins, Reed, Kitchener, & Squire,
2003). This is in line with the notion that the hippocampus is essen-
tial for recollection but not familiarity. Further support comes from two
ERP studies showing an elimination of the left parietal old/new effect in
HC-patients who at the same time exhibit a normal mid-frontal old/new
effect (Addante, Ranganath, Olichney, & Yonelinas, 2012; Du¨zel, Vargha-
Khadem, Heinze, & Mishkin, 2001). However, an important piece in the
neuropsychological picture of two independent processes in recognition
memory is the complementary finding that lesion to the parahippocampal
gyrus harms familiarity but leaves recollection intact. Bowles et al. (2007)
provided this piece of evidence by examining the memory performance of
patient N.B. whose left PrC and EC were largely resected. N.B. showed
normal levels of recollection whereas familiarity estimates obtained in
R/K and ROC paradigms were considerably lower than those of the con-
trols. Moreover, under speeded response conditions she performed sig-
nificantly worse than the controls. Taken together, neuropsychological
evidence suggests that familiarity and recollection operate independently
from each other in separated brain regions within the MTL.
16
fMRI studies provide a valuable complementary means to neuropsycho-
logical studies as they tell us about memory function in healthy brains. In
the following brief review, I focus only on studies examining the retrieval
phase in recognition tasks. Combining fMRI with the R/K method,
the evidence consistently suggests that R responses are accompanied
by stronger activation in the hippocampus than K responses (Eldridge,
Knowlton, Furmanski, Bookheimer, & Engel, 2000; Montaldi, Spencer,
Roberts, & Mayes, 2006; Yonelinas, Otten, Shaw, & Rugg, 2005). Acti-
vation modulation in the PrC is not always observed, however, one study
showed that increasing levels of K confidence are associated with a lin-
ear decrease of activation in the PrC (Montaldi et al., 2006). Moreover,
Henson, Cansino, Herron, Robb, and Rugg (2003) summarized the find-
ings from four independent experiments which showed that activation
in the PrC is reduced for hits compared to CRs irrespective of memory
for contextual details. This is in line with a sharpening process in the
PrC where activation for novel stimuli is diffuse and a second presen-
tation of an item leads to stronger activation, but in considerably less
units. This results in a lower net activity. A comparable deactivation
pattern was shown to be insensitive to depth of encoding implicating
that it is not influenced by recollection (Henson, Hornberger, & Rugg,
2005). Another way to extract process-specific activation is modeling the
fMRI signal with a function of confidence judgments (1 - 6). For recol-
lection the function is flat for 1 to 5 and sharply increases from 5 to 6
in line with a high threshold process whereas for familiarity the function
linearly increases or decreases from 1 to 5 and levels out from 5 to 6.
Applying this rationale, Daselaar, Fleck, and Cabeza (2006) showed that
activation in the hippocampus follows the recollection function, whereas
activation in the PrC is best modeled by a decreasing familiarity func-
tion. Summing up the fMRI findings, hippocampal activation increases
during recollection-based recognition whilst when modulation of activa-
tion in the PrC is observed during recognition memory it is mostly an
activation decrease which is associated with enhanced familiarity.
1.3.2 Recognition Memory Outside the MTL
With the advent of fMRI the conception of which role other brain regions
outside the MTL play in recognition memory has moved closer to the
center of interest. Evidence from lesion studies is rare probably because
deficits due to the mostly unilateral lesions can be compensated for by the
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contra-lateral hemisphere (Vilberg & Rugg, 2008). First of all, old/new
effects (activation differences between hits and CRs) can be found all
over the brain. However, only some of them can probably be linked to
specific memory processes. Others might rather be implicated in general
control processes. Yet, there have been attempts to localize activation
specifically related to familiarity and recollection all over the brain, the
general implication being that it is the lateral and medial surfaces of the
prefrontal (PFC) and the parietal cortex (but also lateral temporal lobe)
which are mostly involved in the two processes (see for example Figure
1.4). Old/new effects are very consistently found in the posterior parietal
cortex (PPC) and different sub-regions of the PPC have been associated
with different aspects of recognition memory (for reviews see Nelson et
al., 2010; Vilberg & Rugg, 2008; Wagner, Shannon, Kahn, & Buckner,
2005). Activation in the ventro-lateral PPC seems to be associated with
recollection. For instance, activation in these regions is sensitive to the
depth of processing during study (Henson et al., 2005), higher for R than
high confident K responses (Eldridge et al., 2000; Henson, Rugg, Shal-
lice, Josephs, & Dolan, 1999; Wheeler & Buckner, 2004; Yonelinas et
al., 2005), related to the amount of recollected information (Vilberg &
Figure 1.4.: fMRI correlates of familiarity and recollection. Regions following the rec-
ollection function (a, c, e) and regions following the familiarity function
(b, d) in the study by Yonelinas et al. (2005). Parameter estimates as a
function of response type are shown for peak voxels of each region. This
figure is reproduced from Yonelinas et al. (2005, p. 3005) with permission
from the Society of Neuroscience.
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Rugg, 2007), follows the oldness function of recollection (Daselaar, Fleck,
& Cabeza, 2006), and does not vary with the old/new ratio (Vilberg &
Rugg, 2008). The latter point refers to the issue that some old/new ef-
fects seem to be related rather to the perceived targetness (the targets are
usually the old items which changes with varying old/new ratio) than to
memory status per se. The function of the ventro-lateral PPC might be
that of a module which directs attention to the recollected information.
Moreover, it is proposed to be one of the neural generators of the left
parietal old/new effect (Vilberg & Rugg, 2008). A region more superior
and medial to the recollection-related PPC region in the vicinity of the
intra-parietal sulcus was related to familiarity-based memory because it
shows greater activation for hits than CRs irrespective of depth of encod-
ing (Henson et al., 2005), activation increases with increasing confidence
but is not greater for R than high confidence K judgments (Yonelinas et
al., 2005) and follows the familiarity oldness function (Daselaar, Fleck,
& Cabeza, 2006). However, it has not always been exclusively activated
only for familiarity (e.g., Wheeler & Buckner, 2004) and seems to be
associated with targetness (Herron, Henson, & Rugg, 2004; Vilberg &
Rugg, 2008).
Old/new effects have also been observed on the medial surface of the
parietal cortex for both recollection and familiarity whereby a dissocia-
tion for different regions according to the different processes is less ob-
vious than in the lateral PPC. However, the posterior cingulate and the
retrosplenial cortex were associated with recollection (Daselaar, Fleck,
& Cabeza, 2006; Yonelinas et al., 2005; but see Montaldi et al., 2006)
and were postulated to be part of the extended hippocampal system
of episodic memory (Aggleton & Brown, 2006). More posterior parts
like precuneus and cuneus were more often associated with familiarity
(Daselaar, Fleck, & Cabeza, 2006; Yonelinas et al., 2005). Activations in
the PFC are typically related to top-down control on memory (Simons
& Spiers, 2003) which is why they have traditionally been linked to rec-
ollection which demands more strategic involvement. Lateral PFC acti-
vation was observed for R judgments (Eldridge et al., 2000) and follows
the recollection function (Daselaar, Fleck, & Cabeza, 2006). However,
other evidence suggests that lateral PFC follows the familiarity function
(Montaldi et al., 2006; Yonelinas et al., 2005). Moreover, a recent study
showed that lateral PFC lesions lead to a selective impairment of famil-
iarity (Aly, Yonelinas, Kishiyama, & Knight, 2011). Findings regarding
the involvement of the medial PFC are also mixed and might be related
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to control processes common to familiarity and recollection (Montaldi et
al., 2006; Yonelinas et al., 2005). A clear dissociation of the sub-regions
of the lateral and medial PFC has still to be determined (for a detailed
discussion of differential PFC contributions to familiarity and recollection
see Aly et al., 2011).
After this overview on recognition memory and its underlying pro-
cesses, the chapter closes with a short discussion on the relationship of
recognition memory to the semantic and episodic memory systems.
1.4 Relating Recognition Memory to the Semantic and
Episodic Memory Systems
Episodic and semantic memory are regarded as two separable memory
systems in the brain (e.g., Tulving, 1985). Accordingly, semantic de-
mentia implicates deficits in classical semantic neuropsychological tasks
such as category fluency but spares episodic recall (e.g., Davies, Gra-
ham, Xuereb, Williams, & Hodges, 2004). In contrast, circumscribed
hippocampal lesions dramatically affect episodic memory but do not pre-
clude new semantic learning (Baddeley et al., 2001; Vargha-Khadem et
al., 1997; Verfaellie, Koseff, & Alexander, 2000). However, both systems
are highly interacting. For example, much semantic content is presum-
ably initially encoded as episodic information (Moscovitch et al., 2006)
which is probably why hippocampal patients’ semantic learning occurs
at a lower rate and much slower than in healthy controls (Baddeley et
al., 2001; Verfaellie et al., 2000; but see Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998,
for the view that episodic memory always implies semantic memory).
Generally speaking, recognition memory is a form of explicit mem-
ory (although there might also be influences from implicit memory) and
can be related to semantic and episodic memory. Frequently, recogni-
tion memory is characterized as an expression of episodic memory (e.g.,
Davachi & Wagner, 2002; Greve, Donaldson, & Rossum, 2010). Others,
however, stress that recognition memory can involve episodic memory
but is not subsumed by it (e.g., Aggleton & Brown, 2006). Moreover,
there is also evidence for the impact of semantic memory on recognition
memory (e.g., Greve et al., 2007; Opitz & Cornell, 2006).
The best way of looking at recognition memory is probably to acknowl-
edge that the semantic and episodic system can both be involved and the
degree of involvement of one or the other is strongly moderated by the
exact nature of the recognition task. For instance, meeting a person on
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the street always prompts one to make a recognition decision and one
can reach this decision by recruiting one or the other or both systems.
First, if you can immediately tell that this person is your friend’s sister,
you recognized this person by accessing your semantic memory. Second,
you might remember that you have once been to the cinema together
which triggered the memory that your friend was also there. This in
turn triggered the memory that your friend told you that she was his
sister. In this case, your episodic memory told you that you have seen
this person before. Third, it might be a mixture of both. For example,
you immediately have to think of your friend because he is connected to
her in your semantic memory, but your episodic memory tells you what
your friend told you who she was. Hence, whenever recognition memory
is investigated in the laboratory, it is important to be clear about which
memory system is addressed. By this, the respective contributions of
familiarity and recollection might vary accordingly as the two processes
have been associated with the two systems in different ways.
Being per definition episodic in nature, the question is rather uncon-
troversial for recollection as hippocampal lesions impair autobiographic
episodic memory and recollection (see Aggleton & Brown, 2006, for a
review). Moreover, remembering autobiographic episodes and recollec-
tion activate common brain regions (Cabeza et al., 2004). How to relate
familiarity to the two memory systems is more controversial. However,
research in recent years strongly suggests an important role of the se-
mantic system in familiarity-based recognition memory. For instance,
the mid-frontal old/new effect was shown to be modulated by semantic
manipulations. Opitz and Cornell (2006) found an enhancement of the
mid-frontal old/new effect for words which were previously encoded in
an associative context (Which one of four words does not fit in the con-
text?: e.g., oasis – camel – chair – desert) in contrast to a size relational
context where an early mid-frontal effect seemed to be absent. Integra-
tion into a semantic context enhanced the mid-frontal effect also in an-
other study where corresponding category labels were provided for word
pairs (e.g., animal: rabbit – mouse) during an associative recognition
task (Greve et al., 2007). Interestingly, in both studies the left parietal
old/new effect was unaffected by the semantic manipulation. Moreover,
greater semantic integration efforts during study (enlarged N400) are
correlated with enhanced familiarity during later testing (increased mid-
frontal old/new effect) but not with stronger recollection (Meyer, Meck-
linger, & Friederici, 2007; for a related finding with behavioral methods
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see Wang & Yonelinas, 2012). Thus, since relating study stimuli to exist-
ing semantic knowledge can enhance familiarity-based decisions in recog-
nition memory, a connection between familiarity and semantic memory
stands to reason. Moreover, the similarity in topographical distribution
and timing of the N400 and the mid-frontal old/new effect suggests at
least overlapping neural generators which is evident in the controversial
discussion about the contamination of the mid-frontal old/new effect by
conceptual processing (Bridger et al., 2012; Paller et al., 2007; Voss & Fe-
dermeier, 2010, see also Section 1.2.3). A possible candidate for a double
contribution to semantic processing and familiarity-based memory is the
anterior medial temporal lobe including the PrC. As already described in
detail in section 1.3.1, the PrC seems to be crucial for familiarity-based
remembering (Bowles et al., 2007; Montaldi et al., 2006). It has, how-
ever, also been implicated in semantic tasks. For example, patients with
semantic dementia who have severe problems in semantic categorization
suffer from damage to the anterior medial temporal lobe (e.g., Davies et
al., 2004). Moreover, a patient group with maximal lesion overlap in a
region within the PrC showed significantly reduced implicit conceptual
memory in two different tasks (exemplar generation and a semantic deci-
sion task). In addition, activity levels in the very same region in healthy
participants predicted subsequent behavioral conceptual priming effects
(Wang, Lazzara, Ranganath, Knight, & Yonelinas, 2010). Meyer, Meck-
linger, and Friederici (2010) established a connection between the PrC
involvement during semantic processing and familiarity-based recogni-
tion. They showed that enhanced semantic processing during study is
accompanied by increased activation in the anterior MTL and subse-
quently leads to a greater familiarity-related reduction of activation in
an overlapping region. Although it is yet unclear how large the overlap
is between familiarity and the semantic system, there is strong evidence
that semantic memory plays a crucial role in familiarity-based recogni-
tion.
This becomes even more evident in the next chapter on associative
recognition memory where semantic integration turns out to be one of
the key factors if familiarity contributes to recognition memory in the
first place.
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CHAPTER 2
Associative Recognition Memory
One of our main memory tasks is to store and retrieve associations be-
tween different pieces of information such as somebody’s face and the
occasion where we met that person. Thus, the ability to remember asso-
ciations is essential for episodic remembering. One way to investigate this
ability is the associative recognition memory paradigm in which partici-
pants have to recognize that they have encountered a specific association
or combination of items in the study phase. Essential to this paradigm
is that participants have to discriminate between pairs reappearing in
the same pairing as during prior study and new combinations of studied
items, i.e. recombined pairs. Both types of pairs comprise constituents
that were previously encountered and thus are equally familiar. There-
fore, they can only be discriminated from each other on the basis of
associative information.
2.1 Types of Associations
In order to gain a comprehensive picture of the processes involved in
memory for associations, clear definitions of the different types of associ-
ations are a prerequisite. Mayes et al. (2007) carefully describe a classifi-
cation system which is widely accepted. The broadest distinction is made
between inter-item and intra-item associations. Inter-item associations
are associations between at least two separate items such as the word
pair tree-dog. Within this category, Mayes and colleagues distinguish
between within-domain and between-domain associations. The former
refer to pairs or groups of items belonging to the same domain whereas
the latter refer to pairs or groups of items from different domains. Two
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items belong to the same domain if they “are likely to be represented by
activity in closely adjacent and interacting neocortical neurons” (Mayes
et al., 2007, p. 126), i.e. have overlapping representations. The examples
provided include word-word and face-face pairs. Intra-item associations
fit into an entity-defining framework (Mecklinger & Ja¨ger, 2009) or a
given template (Mayes et al., 2007). For instance, the different compo-
nents of a face (eyes, nose, etc.) are perceived and encoded within a
face template. In other words, intra-item associations are associations
between components of one single whole, i.e. the components form a
unit. Therefore intra-item associations can also be labeled unitized as-
sociations. The term unitized association is effectively more general as
it can be applied more intuitively to novel units which are formed from
previously separate items (e.g., novel compound words). Units feature
emergent properties, i.e. properties which cannot be inferred by sum-
ming up the properties of their constituents. For instance, the degree of
symmetry of a face that cannot be deduced from the properties of the
single face parts (Ceraso, 1985; Graf & Schacter, 1989). Moreover, the
exact configuration is an important characteristic of units (Horowitz &
Prytulak, 1969). In summary, three different kinds of associations are
distinguished: between-domain inter-item associations, within-domain
inter-item associations, and intra-item or unitized associations.
Although the system described by Mayes et al. (2007) seems to be a
functional framework for the description of different types of associations,
the problem that objective criteria to categorize associations are missing
is yet unresolved. As Mayes and colleagues state themselves, it is hard to
say when unitization has occurred, but measurable negative effects on the
constituents might be an objective criterion for unitization. In order to
mitigate this problem, a reasonable proposition by Yonelinas et al. (2010)
suggests that unitization should be regarded as a continuum rather than
a dichotomy, i.e. different conditions are differentially likely to lead to a
unitized representation of an association. Thus, it is always important
to contrast two conditions one of which makes unitization more and the
other one less likely. The objection of subjectivity, however, remains. A
similar problem holds for the within- and between-domain distinction.
For example, the word pair cup-democracy consists of two words (same
domain) but these two words denote a concrete and an abstract concept,
for which overlapping representations seem unlikely.
In addition to the terminology described by Mayes et al. (2007), the
term ‘arbitrary associations’ is used frequently. ‘Arbitrary’ means that an
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association was formed more or less randomly and was not predetermined
by already existing links. For example, the word pair tree-computer con-
stitutes an arbitrary pairing whereas the frequent joint occurrence of
desks and computers makes the pair desk-computer a non-arbitrary as-
sociation. According to the common usage of the term, only inter-item
associations can be arbitrary because as soon as an association is inte-
grated into a single whole it is not arbitrary anymore. Arbitrary asso-
ciations, as probably most inter-item associations, are considered to be
flexible, i.e. the exact configuration of the association is irrelevant (e.g.,
desk-computer and computer-desk are treated similarly by our memory).
2.2 Arbitrary Associations
According to traditional dual-process models of recognition memory
(Yonelinas, 2002), recollection is required to retrieve the link between
distinct items, whereas familiarity is sufficient in order to recognize sin-
gle items. This is especially claimed for arbitrary associations. Evidence
for this notion is presented in the following section.
2.2.1 Evidence for a Predominant Role of Recollection
The notion that recollection is essential for associative recognition seems
to be so evident from the definition of recollection that the direct compari-
son between item and associative memory has only rarely been made with
behavioral paradigms in healthy participants. However, an increased
need for recollection in associative memory tasks was confirmed by the
findings of Yonelinas (1997). He showed that in contrast to the curvilin-
ear ROC curves for single word recognition, ROC curves for recognition
of word pairs are linear without a quadratic component implicating that
a diagnostic familiarity signal is missing in the case of associative mem-
ory (for further evidence that associative recognition memory relies on a
high-threshold process see Parks & Yonelinas, 2009, but see Mickes, John-
son, & Wixted, 2010, for counter evidence). In line with this, Hockley
and Consoli (1999) found that old/recombined discrimination for word
pairs is only better than chance when based on R responses but not on K
responses. Moreover, one ERP study on word pair recognition revealed
a left parietal old/new effect in association with successful recognition
of associative information whereas there was no evidence of the putative
ERP correlate of familiarity (Donaldson & Rugg, 1998).
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Lesion studies have provided compelling evidence for the inevitability
of the hippocampus in memory for arbitrary associations implicating the
need for recollection. Early studies with amnesic patients, for whom,
however, the exact etiology is unclear, already showed that memory for
arbitrary associations is severely impaired (e.g., Winocur & Weiskrantz,
1976). Two later studies examined the performance of groups of patients
with lesions restricted to the hippocampus and found that associative
recognition was disproportionately impaired compared to item recogni-
tion for word pairs (Giovanello, Verfaellie, & Keane, 2003), face-face pairs
and face-name pairs (Turriziani et al., 2004).
Evidence from fMRI mainly comes from memory encoding studies.
Generally, they are consistent with the notion that recollection related
regions are especially important for associative memory. The hippocam-
pus was more strongly activated by picture-picture associative encoding
than by encoding of a single picture (Achim & Lepage, 2005). Similarly,
the hippocampus is more involved when encoding emphasizes the rela-
tional nature of the to-be-encoded stimuli in contrast to item-focused
encoding (Blumenfeld, Parks, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2010; Davachi &
Wagner, 2002). Moreover, hippocampal activation was shown to be cor-
related with subsequent associative memory performance (Park & Rugg,
2011; Davachi & Wagner, 2002), i.e. activation was higher for subse-
quent hits than for subsequent misses. Importantly, similar results were
not obtained for the adjacent MTL cortices for which activation was only
predictive of subsequent item memory (Davachi & Wagner, 2002). Be-
side the hippocampus, other regions implicated in recollection such as
the ventral PPC and the posterior cingulate cortex showed subsequent
memory effects for arbitrary associations (Achim & Lepage, 2005; Park
& Rugg, 2008, 2011). One of the most consistently found regions be-
ing especially important for associative encoding, however, is the lateral
PFC including the middle and inferior frontal gyri. It shows stronger
activation for associative than item encoding (Achim & Lepage, 2005)
and when instructions emphasize relational in contrast to item informa-
tion (Murray & Ranganath, 2007; Blumenfeld et al., 2010). Moreover,
this region shows subsequent associative memory effects (Park & Rugg,
2008, 2011; Murray & Ranganath, 2007). Note that regions which are en-
gaged during encoding are not necessarily also involved during retrieval,
especially regions outside the MTL.
Retrieval studies for associative recognition are rare, especially those
directly comparing same and recombined pairs. One of the few exceptions
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is the study by Giovanello, Schnyer, and Verfaellie (2004) who compared
activation during item and associative retrieval of words and word pairs,
respectively. They found stronger activation in the hippocampus, the
cingulate gyrus, the inferior PPC and the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG)
during associative than item recognition (but see Achim & Lepage, 2005,
for contrary results for the hippocampus). Thus, this strongly suggests
a predominant role of the recollection network when associative informa-
tion has to be retrieved from memory. Two later studies which found
hippocampal activation in a same/recombined contrast (Ford, Verfaellie,
& Giovanello, 2010; Giovanello, Schnyer, & Verfaellie, 2009) reinforced
the importance of the hippocampus for recognition of arbitrary word pair
associations.
2.2.2 Flexibility of Memory for Arbitrary Associations
As described in section 2.1, one important feature of arbitrary associ-
ations constitutes their flexibility in the sense that they are not stored
in an exact configuration. Evidence in favor of this notion is described
in the following. The question of flexibility has primarily been investi-
gated by cued recall tasks in which one part of the association serves as
a cue and the other part has to be recalled from mind. Cued recall is
assumed to rely solely on recollective processing and the integrity of the
hippocampus (e.g., Baddeley et al., 2001). Therefore, it is often used
as an indicator of pure recollection in contrast to item recognition tasks
(Yonelinas, 2002).
Due to the flexibility of arbitrary associations, cued recall of pairs
(e.g., A B) is assumed to be symmetrical. This means that performance
in recall with forward cues (A ) and backward cues ( B) is highly cor-
related (Kahana, 2002). Under the assumption that recall predominantly
relies on the integrity of the hippocampus, symmetry of recall would be
predicted by the CLS (O’Reilly & Norman, 2002). The computational
principles proposed for the hippocampus predict that each element of a
study episode can serve as a cue in order to re-instantiate the whole mem-
ory trace. This hypothesis is corroborated by a study with rats showing
that associative memory is symmetrical in intact rats whereas this ability
is lost in rats with circumscribed hippocampal lesions (Bunsey & Eichen-
baum, 1996). In humans, Giovanello et al. (2009) showed that activation
in the anterior hippocampus is independent of the order of the test cue
in an associative recognition test. Thus, recollection-based retrieval sub-
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served by the hippocampus seems to be flexible with respect to the order
of the test cue.
2.3 Non-Arbitrary Associations
As described in the preceding section, most theories of episodic memory
assume that the hippocampus is highly implicated in encoding and re-
trieving associations and by this recollection is assumed to be essential
for associative recognition memory. Moreover, as familiarity is thought
to arise only in response to a single item, it is not useful for distinguish-
ing between same and recombined pairings. However, a growing litera-
ture suggests that under specific circumstances familiarity can support
memory for associations. This is in opposition to models of recognition
memory which posit an item-association dichotomy for familiarity and
recollection (Aggleton & Brown, 2006) or which postulate the require-
ment for multiple learning episodes for associations to be recognizable
based on familiarity (Norman & O’Reilly, 2003; O’Reilly & Norman,
2002). The following section is intended to give a thorough overview
of current theories on and empirical evidence for associative recognition
memory based on familiarity.
2.3.1 Familiarity for Associations: Theories
Unitization Hypothesis of Recognition Memory
The unitization hypothesis states that “familiarity is not expected to
support associative memory for two distinct items, unless the two items
can be unitized or treated as a single larger item (e.g., in the way that a
nose, mouth, and eyes can form a face)” (Yonelinas, 2002, p. 447). First
postulated by Yonelinas (Yonelinas, Kroll, Dobbins, & Soltani, 1999;
Yonelinas, 2002) and then incorporated into the BIC model (Diana et
al., 2007; Ranganath, 2010; Yonelinas et al., 2010), it integrates findings
of familiarity-based associative memory with the notion that familiarity
can only arise for single items whereas recollection is required to remem-
ber associations. In accordance with the model of Norman and O’Reilly
(2003), Yonelinas and colleagues claimed that the hippocampus, with its
ability to link non-overlapping representations, is particularly well suited
to establish representations for inter-item associations, whereas the PrC
extracts more general representations and thus produces a familiarity
signal for single items or unitized associations. In agreement with Mayes
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et al. (2007), Yonelinas et al. (2010) notice that it is impossible to deter-
mine whether a specific individual has processed a specific stimulus as
one single whole or as an assembly of several items. Therefore, they see
unitization as a continuum rather than a dichotomy, i.e. different con-
ditions are differentially likely to lead to a unitized representation of an
association (see Section 2.1). It is important to note that according to
their view, unitization is theoretically possible for any kind of associa-
tions be it within one domain or between domains.
In a related view, Henke (2010) assigns one processing mode to fa-
miliarity and priming which can generally operate on single or unitized
items on a one-trial learning basis. In line with Yonelinas and co-workers,
she assigns a crucial role in familiarity to the perirhinal cortex. In con-
trast, rapid encoding of arbitrary and flexible associations requires the
hippocampus. Both systems, however, can operate independent of con-
sciousness.
Domain-Dichotomy View
The domain dichotomy (DD) view (Mayes et al., 2007) and its advance-
ment, the Convergence, Recollection, and Familiarity theory (CRAFT
Montaldi & Mayes, 2010) are not fundamentally different from the uni-
tization hypothesis as they also postulate a dissociation of hippocampus
and PrC according to the ability of remembering inter-item and intra-
item (unitized) associations, respectively. Crucially, however, Mayes and
colleagues also claimed that overlapping PrC representations of similar
items (i.e. within-domain inter-item associations) can result in one global
familiarity signal whereas this is not possible for between-domain associ-
ations. This is, however, only the case when they are presented without
a mediator such as a sentence frame because mediators necessarily lead
to the requirement of recollection. Thus, there is one main difference in
the predictions which can be derived from the DD/CRAFT model and
the unitization hypothesis/BIC model: the DD view predicts familiarity-
based memory for non-mediated and non-unitized within-domain inter-
item associations (see also Mecklinger, in press, for a comparison of these
two models).
2.3.2 Familiarity for Associations: Empirical Evidence
Although many of the studies principally address both theories described
above, they can nonetheless be sorted according to their focus on one or
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the other view. I start with the DD view and will afterwards come back
to the unitization hypothesis. Although the question of what exactly
means within- and between-domain is still unresolved (see Section 2.1),
note that the studies described below considered the type of stimulus
material as a domain. This operational definition follows the examples
provided by Mayes et al. (2007).
Empirical Evidence Addressing the DD View
The main finding on which the peculiarity of the DD view, namely fa-
miliarity for non-unitized within-domain inter-item associations, is em-
pirically grounded is the case of the adult-onset amnesic patient Y.R.,
who suffered from a relatively circumscribed hippocampal lesion (Mayes
et al., 2004). Besides spared item recognition, Y.R.’s performance on
associative recognition for intra-item associations (e.g., face parts) as
well as for word-word and face-face pairs was not significantly below
the control group’s mean in contrast to her severely impaired memory
for between-domain associations. It should also be mentioned that the
three patients with early onset-amnesia investigated by Vargha-Khadem
et al. (1997) exhibited a pattern of performance which is comparable
to Y.R’s performance. However, due to the very early brain damage of
these patients, functional reorganization within the brain is much more
likely and inferences on functionality in healthy brains are even harder
to make than for adult-onset patients. These findings are opposed by the
study of Turriziani et al. (2004) who examined a group of six patients
including five who also had focal lesions in the hippocampus. These
patients exhibited as severe deficits for within-domain associations (face
pairs) as for between-domain associations (face-occupation pairs). Thus,
neuropsychological data on this question are inconclusive.
The results from a study comparing associative memory of younger
and older adults might also be of interest within this context (Bastin &
van der Linden, 2006) as aging is known to reduce hippocampal volume
while leaving PrC volume relatively unaffected (Raz et al., 2005). In line
with the Turriziani et al. (2004) study, Bastin and van der Linden (2006)
found a disproportionate decline of associative compared to item memory
which was equal in size for the two kinds of inter-item associations.
Evidence from behavioral studies regarding the DD view with healthy
young participants is rare. Bastin, van der Linden, Schnakers, Mon-
taldi, and Mayes (2010) employed a familiarity-only instruction during
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test and found that familiarity estimates for face-face pairs were higher
than for face-name pairs. However, Harlow, MacKenzie, and Donald-
son (2010) highlighted two problematic issues with this study. First, in
order to match item performance in the standard recognition instruc-
tion task, pairs in the face-face condition were presented for a longer
duration during study. Thus, it is possible that familiarity for face-
face pairs increased due to longer study time. Second, the comparison
of between-domain and within-domain associations was confounded by
stimulus type as there were no name-name pairs in the within-domain
condition. It might be that specific characteristics of names contributed
to the difference between the conditions. Carefully avoiding this con-
found in their own study, Harlow and colleagues could not find higher
familiarity estimates for within-domain (picture-picture and name-name)
than for between-domain (picture-name) pairs, neither when using the
familiarity-only procedure nor when using the ROC method.
An fMRI study by Park and Rugg (2011) directly compared subse-
quent memory effects for word-word, picture-picture and word-picture
pairs. During encoding participants had to make a size comparison of
the two denoted or depicted concepts. Park and Rugg identified domain-
specific in addition to domain-general subsequent memory effects. How-
ever, activation within PrC could only be identified with a very liberal
threshold and this was not specific to within-domain associations. Worth
mentioning here is one other study investigating subsequent associative
memory effects for word pairs by Jackson and Schacter (2004) which re-
vealed greater PrC activity for subsequent hits in contrast to subsequent
misses. Importantly, Jackson and Schacter asked their subjects to form
a mental image of the two objects denoted by the word pair in which the
two objects interact with each other. Rhodes and Donaldson (2008b)
proposed that interactive imagery is a means to foster unitization. In a
similar vein, an ERP study by Speer and Curran (2007) showed a mid-
frontal old/new effect for pairs of fractals in a condition which was not
intended to promote unitization. However, the fractals were presented
next to each other without a gap in-between leading to a physical appear-
ance of one single object. Moreover, such fractals lack a pre-experimental
meaning and therefore do not encourage participants to perceive them as
separate entities. These two factors render an unintentionally unitization
very likely (see Zimmer & Ecker, 2010, for a similar argument). Thus,
so far no neuroimaging study could convincingly support the DD view.
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Summarizing the results which can speak to the critical aspect of the
DD view, the evidence to date suggests that belonging to the same do-
main is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for familiarity-based
associative recognition memory to occur. Yet, the critical factors for pa-
tient Y.R.’s normal performance on within-domain associations despite
her impaired hippocampus have to be determined.
Empirical Evidence Addressing the Unitization Hypothesis
In recent years the number of studies aiming to investigate the role of
unitization in associative recognition memory has grown relatively large
using a broad range of behavioral, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging
methods. The ways of approaching the concept of unitization have also
been manifold. However, the discussion about the implications of the
results has mainly neglected this diversity. Here, I present the existing
literature sorted according to whether unitization was achieved by pro-
viding an entity-defining template, by the existence of a pre-experimental
relationship between the to-be-associated information, by the integration
of item and source information, or by the use of an encoding strategy
which combines previously unrelated item-item associations to a single
whole. The aim is to integrate all the findings which were derived by
using different methods for each of these approaches and to provide an
explanation on how unitization might differentially be effective in these
approaches.
Unitization by Means of a Given Entity-Defining Frame In a semi-
nal study, Yonelinas et al. (1999) investigated contributions of familiarity
and recollection to recognition memory for combinations of single face
parts. At test, participants had to discriminate between studied com-
binations and recombined versions of the studied faces (i.e. the external
features such as hair, head shape, ears, and visible clothing of one studied
face were recombined with the central features such as eyes, eyebrows,
nose, mouth, and facial markings of another studied face). The criti-
cal manipulation in this design was that the faces were presented either
upright or upside down. As humans are very experienced in processing
upright faces as a single whole, upright presentation of a face provides
an entity-defining frame whereas a face which is presented upside down
lacks this frame and is thus perceived as a collection of discrete face parts.
Deriving process estimates from ROC curves, Yonelinas and colleagues
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revealed that familiarity contributed significantly to recognition memory
for upright faces but not for upside down faces. The contribution of rec-
ollection, however, was equal for the two conditions. Hence, this study
provided the first evidence that familiarity can contribute to associative
memory when a collection of items is processed in a holistic manner.
Extending the entity-defining frame from mere faces to entire persons,
Ja¨ger et al. (2006) based their study on the rationale that an original
and a slightly morphed picture of a face would be perceived as belonging
to the same person and therefore as unitized (intra-item). This should
naturally not be the case for two pictures of two different persons (inter-
item). After studying face pairs, participants had to recognize single
faces with a subsequent forced choice test about the study phase partner.
As predicted, a mid-frontal old/new effect was elicited for faces from the
intra-item condition when the study phase partner was subsequently also
correctly recognized but not when this associative information was not
retrieved. In contrast, inter-item associations did not elicit a mid-frontal
effect. The two studies with facial stimuli strongly suggest that if one can
make use of a pre-existing template such as a face or a person to integrate
to-be-associated information into one, familiarity supports recognition of
these associations.
Unitization of Source Information Memory for source information of
an item, i.e. memory for the context during study, does not constitute
item-item binding; however, it is associative in the sense that source
memory requires binding of item and context. Therefore, it is commonly
assumed to rely on recollection. Indeed, the presence or absence of source
memory has often been used as an operational definition of recollection
(e.g., Ranganath et al., 2003, see section 1.2.2). However, in doing so
one needs to make sure that source information is encoded as a separate
context and not as an integrated feature. Ecker, Zimmer, and Groh-
Bordin (2007) showed that type of context matters. For instance, the
authors argued that color information of objects, which has sometimes
been understood as source information, is an intrinsically bound feature
whereas background information is an extrinsic attribute. Put another
way, item and color can be unitized whereas item and background are
processed as two separate entities. In line with the unitization hypothe-
sis, Ecker and colleagues showed that a color change from study to test
significantly reduced the mid-frontal old/new effect compared with ob-
jects repeated in the same color. In contrast, a change in background did
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not have the same effect. Complementary behavioral evidence suggests
that in addition to the type of source the way of encoding the source
can influence memory processes (Diana et al., 2008). ROC estimates
revealed that familiarity estimates for source memory are higher when
color was encoded as a feature of the critical object, i.e. unitized (e.g.,
a green elephant), compared to when it was encoded as the feature of
a context object (e.g., an elephant next to a green dollar bill). More-
over, source memory in a speeded response task (a condition which is
assumed to eliminate recollection-based retrieval) was only above chance
performance when source information was an intrinsic feature but not
when it was encoded extrinsically (see Diana, Boom, Yonelinas, & Ran-
ganath, 2011, for related ERP findings, and Staresina & Davachi, 2008,
for related fMRI findings).
In sum, the above presented evidence strongly supports the possibility
that remembering source information, a classic case of recollection, can
be based on familiarity under conditions which promote unitization.
Semantic Associations and Pre-Existing Conceptual Units Stronger
reliance on familiarity for pre-existing unitized word pairs such as com-
pound pairs in contrast to semantically unrelated word pairs is one of
the most extensively studied phenomena within this research area.
In an ERP study, Rhodes and Donaldson (2007) compared word pairs
that shared only an associative relationship (e.g., traffic-jam), an asso-
ciative and semantic relationship (e.g., lemon-orange), or only a semantic
relationship (e.g., cereal-bread). Two words are associatively related if
one word calls to mind the other word due to frequent common occur-
rence in language use. A semantic relationship exists if two words have
overlapping features as for example ‘four legs’ as a feature of many an-
imals. In other words, semantically related words belong to the same
category. While the three types of pairs equally elicited a left parietal
old/new effect, a mid-frontal old/new effect was evident only for the as-
sociatively related word pairs. This finding was expected because the
pre-experimental ratings had revealed that association word pairs are
perceived as more unitized than the other pair types. Moreover, the asso-
ciation words pairs could actually be regarded as compound words which
as a whole denote one meaning. In a related study, Giovanello, Keane,
and Verfaellie (2006) let amnesic patients with damage to the hippocam-
pus perform an associative memory task with compound words (e.g.,
pin-wheel) and unrelated word pairs. Being forced to rely primarily on
34
Figure 2.1.: Larger activation differences in the PrC for pre-existing unitized word
pairs in contrast to unrelated word pairs during an associative recognition
memory test in the study by Ford et al. (2010). This figure is reproduced
from Ford et al. (2010, p. 3022) with permission from Elsevier.
familiarity, these patients showed significantly better associative memory
performance for compounds than for unrelated word pairs. In an addi-
tional remember/know study with healthy participants, Giovanello and
colleagues showed that the familiarity estimate for correctly recognized
compounds was significantly higher than for unrelated pairs whereas the
recollection measure did not differ. An fMRI experiment employing the
same paradigm (Ford et al., 2010) also suggests a shift in the relative
contribution of familiarity and recollection in healthy participants. This
study showed an enhancement of perirhinal involvement for pre-existing
unitized compared to unrelated word pairs (see Fig. 2.1).
The studies described so far in this section claimed to target familiarity-
based associative memory. This is certainly the case in the sense that the
task is an associative task (Rhodes & Donaldson, 2007) as participants
have to distinguish between studied pairs (pin-wheel, needle-point) and
recombined pairs (pin-point). However, the stimuli which were used in
these experiments are seemingly all compound combinations which are
associated with a single meaning. Thus, when pin-wheel is presented
during study, there is no need to establish a new link between the repre-
sentations of pin and wheel and thus, the task resembles very closely a
simple item recognition task.
The study by Greve et al. (2007), which was already mentioned in
section 1.4, used pairs which were not associated with a single mean-
ing, but were semantically related. They found an enhanced mid-frontal
old/new effect for these pairs which were preceded by a coherent cat-
egory label in contrast to unrelated pairs which were preceded by an
incoherent category label. At the same time, they found no difference
35
for the late parietal old/new effect. Along these ERP findings, Greve
and colleagues obtained behavioral estimates supporting the notion that
familiarity, but not recollection, was enhanced for semantically related
pairs. Applying the same paradigm with fMRI, Greve, Evans, Graham,
and Wilding (2011) showed that processing of these types of word pairs at
test is associated with different activation clusters within the MTL dur-
ing study: related word pairs induced more perirhinal activation than
unrelated word pairs. Kriukova (2012) further explored the influence
of different kinds of pre-existing relationships on associative recogni-
tion memory. She compared categorically (semantically) related word
pairs (e.g., singer-actor) with thematically (associatively) related word
pairs (e.g., singer-stage) and found that both types elicited a mid-frontal
old/new effect. However, the late parietal old/new effect was reduced
for the thematically related pairs. Interestingly, in an additional behav-
ioral forced-choice R/K recognition test, she could also show that correct
recognition is more likely based on familiarity for thematically related
pairs than for categorically related pairs.
Kriukova (2012) argued that thematically related pairs can more read-
ily form a holistic scene (due to frequent co-occurrence) which is prob-
ably imagined and encoded as such by the participants during study.
Although her data suggest that a categorical relationship seems to be suf-
ficient in order to induce familiarity-based associative recognition, they
also imply that the availability of a holistic representation emphasizes
familiarity- over recollection-based recognition. In contrast, categori-
cally related pairs are assigned to overlapping representations because
they share many features. Kriukova’s explanation for her and Greve and
co-workers’ (Greve et al., 2007, 2011) findings fit in a sense with the
idea promoted by the DD-view (Mayes et al., 2007; Montaldi & Mayes,
2010). Both agree on the view that due to shared features related pairs
have overlapping representations and can thus be recognized based on fa-
miliarity (although the findings for semantically related pairs by Rhodes
and Donaldson (2007) described above are incompatible with this no-
tion). However, it seems that belonging to the same domain does not
necessarily imply shared features. This is probably the case for two un-
related words. While they both belong to the domain of ‘words’, feature
overlap might be minimal because words are presumably processed for
the most part conceptually. The shared features explanation for famil-
iarity is implemented in the CLS approach to recognition memory. The
neocortical system is thought to be able to remember associative infor-
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mation with overlapping features after multiple repetitions which is the
case for semantically related word pairs (e.g., Norman & O’Reilly, 2003).
The key point to take from this section is that familiarity seems to
be able to support associative recognition memory when it can take ad-
vantage of a quick reactivation of a well-established connection within
semantic memory, be it categorical or thematic. Up to this point, the re-
viewed literature on the effects of unitization on associative recognition
memory provides strong evidence that associative recognition memory
can be based on familiarity when the association can be fit into a pre-
existing frame (as in the case of faces), is encoded as a single item (as in
the case of intrinsic feature binding and pre-existing compounds), or has
already been established in semantic memory (categorical and thematic
word pairs). This is in line with findings that suggest a strong relation-
ship between familiarity and the semantic system (see section 1.4).
However, as already pointed out in the beginning of this chapter, as-
sociative recognition memory paradigms are commonly assumed to tap
into a core competence of episodic memory, namely establishing new con-
nections between previously discrete items during a single learning event.
Thus, it remains an interesting question whether a shift from recollec-
tion to familiarity and from hippocampal to perirhinal involvement can
also be found when an association is built during the event of study. In
the following paragraphs, I turn to familiarity-based memory for novel
associations.
Unitization as Encoding Strategy The formation of novel units as an
encoding strategy and the mechanisms by which these novel units are
retrieved constitute a special case as these processes are not confounded
with any pre-existing associations. Instead, the link between the con-
stituents is formed during one specific episode. It was suggested that
one learning occasion is sufficient for unitization leading to subsequent
familiarity-based remembering subserved by the PrC (e.g., Henke, 2010).
Two different approaches have been applied so far. One approach is the
interactive imagery study instruction. In this task, subjects have to form
a mental image in which the parts of a pair interact with each other.
This condition is contrasted with an item imagery task in which two sep-
arate images for each of the parts have to be imagined. The rationale
of this manipulation is that an interactive image can be remembered as
one thing whereas two item images have to be remembered through an
additional link. The other approach is the formation of a novel concept
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during study. Participants learn pairs of previously unrelated words to-
gether with a definition which combines the two words to a novel concept
(definition encoding: CLOUD-LAWN = A yard used for sky-gazing).
A suitable and often used control condition with a comparable depth
of semantic processing is the sentence encoding condition in which two
words have to be inserted as distinct lexical items into a sentence frame
(CLOUD-LAWN: He watched the float by as he sat on the ).
Using the interactive imagery approach, Rhodes and Donaldson (2008b)
compared the ERP old/new effects during the retrieval of association
word pairs and semantic word pairs (see Rhodes & Donaldson, 2007,
above). A mid-frontal old/new effect was elicited for association word
pairs equally after item and interactive imagery encoding. However, for
semantic word pairs the mid-frontal old/new effect was enhanced after
interactive imagery. Thus, word pairs which are not pre-experimentally
unitized can also be encoded in a holistic manner and retrieved based
on familiarity. In addition to this finding, this study reveals an inter-
esting point about the associative pairs: it seems hard to break up the
pre-existing unit as item imagery could not reduce the mid-frontal effect
for these word pairs. This supports the notion that these word pairs are
single items rather than true associations.
Studies using the definition encoding paradigm generally support the
aforementioned implications from the interactive imagery study, but ren-
der the whole picture slightly more complicated. A neuropsychological
study by Quamme et al. (2007) showed that the hippocampus is not in-
evitable for recognition of arbitrary pairings when unitization is used as
an encoding strategy. This study found that amnesic patients with dam-
age limited to the hippocampus, who exhibit severe recollection deficits,
are much more likely to remember unrelated word pairs when the two
words are combined to form a novel conceptual unit compared to when
the two words are studied as distinct lexical items within the context of
a sentence. In contrast, patients with damage to the hippocampus plus
the surrounding MTLC performed equally poorly in both conditions.
This suggests an increased contribution of MTLC mediated familiarity-
based remembering for novel conceptual units. Using the same paradigm,
Haskins, Yonelinas, Quamme, and Ranganath (2008) showed by means
of fMRI that it is indeed the PrC being more engaged when previously
unrelated word pairs are encoded as novel conceptual units. Moreover,
activity variations in this region during encoding were associated with
levels of subsequent familiarity as indexed by confidence judgments. This
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suggests an important role of the PrC for familiarity-based associative
memory, which is comparable to familiarity for single items.
As described in the preceding paragraphs, the evidence in favor of
familiarity-based recognition of novel conceptual units is quite strong.
However, processes being engaged during retrieval might still not be the
same as those during single item recognition as suggested by two re-
cent ERP studies. Using the definition vs. sentence encoding paradigm,
my colleagues and I (Bader, Mecklinger, Hoppsta¨dter, & Meyer, 2010)
found a significant difference in the contribution of early and late re-
trieval processes likely reflecting differential involvement of familiarity
and recollection. The early old/new effect (350 – 500 ms) was greater
than the late old/new effect (500 – 700 ms) in the definition encoding
group, whereas the reversed pattern was found in the sentence encoding
group. Notably, however, the early old/new effect, although being in
the expected time window for a familiarity-related neural correlate, did
not exhibit the typical mid-frontal distribution and was maximal over
centro-parietal electrode sites. In order to test if this effect is indeed spe-
cific to novel conceptual units, Wiegand (2009) compared familiarity for
novel conceptual units and single items directly in one experiment. After
having studied word pairs in the definition encoding condition, partici-
pants were presented with either exactly the same versions of the studied
pairs or pairs in reversed order. The rationale of this manipulation was
that reversing the word pair disrupts the newly created unit as the exact
configuration is a key feature of units (Haskins et al., 2008; Horowitz
& Prytulak, 1969). Hence the effects of unitization were assumed to
be present for same pairs only, while pure item recognition mechanisms
should be diagnostic for reversed pairs. As expected, same and reversed
pairs elicited two different topographical distributions. While same pairs
were again associated with the early parietal old/new effect, reversed
pairs elicited a mid-frontally distributed old/new effect in the same time
window (see Fig. 2.2). Thus, familiarity for novel conceptual units and
familiarity for single items exhibit different underlying neural correlates.
Likely associated psychological processes are discussed in Chapter 3.
The core lesson from the current chapter is that familiarity-based as-
sociative recognition is possible. Moreover, this area of research has
reconciled dual-process models of recognition memory with unexpected
findings of perirhinal contribution to associative memory (e.g., Staresina
& Davachi, 2006) by providing unitization as an explanation. However,
although unitization has proven to be a sufficient condition for boost-
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Figure 2.2.: ERP waveforms for correctly recognized old, reversed, and new responses
at test when word pairs were encoded as novel conceptual units in the
study by Wiegand (2009). Data are shown for frontal (F3, Fz, F4) and
parietal (P3, Pz, P4) electrodes as indicated on the depicted electrode
layout. This figure is reproduced from Wiegand et al. (2010, p. 110) with
permission from Elsevier.
ing familiarity for associations, the findings for the semantically related
word pairs suggest that it is not a necessary condition as it was pro-
posed by Yonelinas (2002). High feature overlap might also be one factor
as predicted by the DD view (Mayes et al., 2007). However, domain-
membership per se is not the critical factor. Moreover, whether the
retrieval processes for novel units are the same as for pre-existing units
and single items is an unanswered question.
Detrimental Effects of Unitization on Recollection Before closing
this chapter, this paragraph emphasizes that although research on the
effects of unitization on associative recognition memory has primarily
focused on familiarity, an effect on recollection has also been observed
not in all but in a couple of studies. First and foremost, unitization in-
fluenced recollection in a negative way. For instance, in the study with
morphed faces by Ja¨ger et al. (2006), only inter-item associations but not
intra-item associations elicited a left parietal old/new effect. The authors
argued that the hippocampal system breaks down if the constituents of
an association are too similar. This explanation might apply for this
specific case but is not appropriate for unitized associations in general as
they mostly do not consist of similar parts. The left parietal old/new ef-
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Figure 2.3.: Reduction of hippocampal activation for pre-existing unitized word pairs
in contrast to unrelated word pairs during an associative recognition mem-
ory test in the study by Ford et al. (2010). This figure is reproduced from
Ford et al. (2010, p. 3023) with permission from Elsevier.
fect also disappeared for novel conceptual units and thematic word pairs
(Bader et al., 2010; Kriukova, 2012). Although the thematically related
word pairs from Kriukova (2012) are associated in terms of their frequent
co-occurrence, they do not share a lot of features. The word pairs used
in our study (Bader et al., 2010) were even completely unrelated. Ford et
al.’s (2010) fMRI experiment suggests that it is not just the absence of the
left parietal old/new effect, but that even the core structure of the recol-
lection network, namely the hippocampus, does not discriminate between
studied and non-studied unitized pairs (see Fig. 2.3). Evidence that the
absence of recollection is presumably not a failure of the hippocampal
system (Ja¨ger et al., 2006) which is caused by stimulus properties comes
from studies where unitization did not have a detrimental effect on rec-
ollection (Giovanello et al., 2006; Rhodes & Donaldson, 2007; Wiegand,
2009). While these studies used stimuli which were very similar to the
ones used in the aforementioned studies, it is possible that recognition
test conditions especially promoted recollection. In the Wiegand (2009)
study, word pairs were presented twice during study, a condition which
is known to increase recollection (Jacoby, Jones, & Dolan, 1998; Opitz,
2010a). While Rhodes and Donaldson (2007) employed very short study-
test cycles, Giovanello et al. (2006) collected R/K judgments. Both con-
ditions might affect recollection positively, the former by shortening the
retention interval (Yonelinas, 2002) and the latter by explicitly pointing
to the possibility of remembering. Thus, it is possible that recollection is
recruited to a lesser extent when familiarity already provides a very reli-
able signal in order to make recognition judgments and its contribution
is only enhanced when it is triggered by the study or test conditions.
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CHAPTER 3
Multiple Familiarity Signals?
As described in Chapter 2, the results from two ERP studies on recog-
nition memory for novel conceptual units suggest that familiarity signals
can be determined in multiple ways (Bader et al., 2010; Wiegand, 2009).
Whereas pre-existing items were associated with a standard mid-frontal
old/new effect, novel conceptual units elicited an early parietal old/new
effect in the same time window. In this chapter, I shed light on the
possible associated psychological processes.
3.1 Absolute and Relative Familiarity
As Mandler (1980) already elaborated on, each item has a raw familiar-
ity or integration value at the time of encounter. This is the baseline or
absolute familiarity of a specific item. For example, frequently encoun-
tered items exhibit a higher baseline familiarity (e.g., high frequency
word house) than rarely encountered items (e.g., low frequency word
epee). However, Mandler also claimed that a familiarity-driven recogni-
tion judgment is usually not based on this raw baseline familiarity value,
but takes into account that the encounter during a specific episode leads
to an increment in familiarity relative to baseline. This is a conceivable
conclusion. Take the example of the word house which you might be
tested on during a recognition memory experiment. Assessment of the
baseline familiarity value would be quite meaningless because baseline
familiarity would be quite high anyway due to the frequent occurrence
of the word. An additional occurrence during the study phase of the
experiment has only little impact.
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3.1.1 Relative Familiarity
In support of the relative familiarity hypothesis, Stenberg, Hellman, Jo-
hansson, and Rose´n (2009) established an association between the incre-
ment of familiarity and the mid-frontal old/new effect. In this study,
the factors frequency and fame of names were manipulated orthogonally
in order to compare ERP old/new effects for common vs. rare names as
well as famous vs. non-famous names. The authors argued that baseline
familiarity is basically determined by the frequency (and not fame) of
the names implying that for less frequent names the increment should
be greater. Although it could be argued that famous names should also
occur more frequently than non-famous names, the general expectancy
for a rare name belonging to a famous person such as Barack Obama is
– especially in the context of a recognition memory experiment – still
lower than that for a frequent name of a famous person such as George
Bush. In line with this rationale, recognition judgments for famous and
non-famous names were associated with a comparable early mid-frontal
old/new effect whereas rare names elicited a larger mid-frontal effect
than frequent names. Thus, these findings implicate that the mid-frontal
old/new effect constitutes an index of the increment in familiarity.
3.1.2 Absolute Familiarity
Although the increment in familiarity might be the best indicator of prior
occurrence during a recognition memory experiment, it is doubtful that
it is similarly useful when encountering someone on the bus (see Yovel &
Paller, 2004, for a similar argument). In order to know whether you are
supposed to say “Hello” to this person, a global absolute familiarity sig-
nal is most informative as it is completely irrelevant whether you got to
know this person just this morning or last summer. The same considera-
tions hold for recognition of novel units. In order to decide whether you
have learned the novel concept cloud-lawn it is sufficient and highly effec-
tive to check whether you know the meaning of cloud-lawn or not. This
turns recognition memory into a semantic rather than an episodic task.
This implication is consistent with the properties of the early parietal
ERP old/new effect found for novel conceptual units (Bader et al., 2010;
Wiegand, 2009). Interestingly, in topography and timing the early pari-
etal old/new effect closely resembles the N400 effect, which commonly
exhibits a similar mid/right centro-parietal distribution and occurs in
the same time window (see Box 1.2). It might be that studied novel
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concepts elicit a reduced N400 compared to new words at test because
they have been semantically integrated during the study phase by means
of the definition provided. Crucially, the facilitated semantic processing
reflected by the reduced N400 is diagnostic in this test as new pairs have
not been semantically integrated before.
A similar reasoning can be applied to the aforementioned example of
encountering someone on the bus. In an attempt to investigate this phe-
nomenon in an experimental setting, participants have to study novel
faces along with a name or an occupation. Test trials in which par-
ticipants recognize the face but not the accompanying information are
taken as the operational definition of pure familiarity (without recollec-
tion). In such a study, Yovel and Paller (2004) did not find evidence
for an early old/new effect related to familiarity but only a later effect
which was indistinguishable from the recollection related effect. How-
ever, MacKenzie and Donaldson (2007) found an early old/new effect for
face familiarity which exhibited a parietal maximum comparable to the
results for novel units (Bader et al., 2010; Wiegand, 2009). Importantly,
this effect was topographically dissociated from the later recollection ef-
fect which had a more anterior maximum. MacKenzie and Donaldson
explained the two diverging findings by the higher electrode density they
applied which is probably better suitable to identify subtle topographic
differences. Moreover, the face pictures they used were freed from any
contextual details such as hair, clothes, and background emphasizing on
familiarity processing. MacKenzie and Donaldson interpreted the early
parietal old/new effect as an index of absolute familiarity. They also
noted that task demands might be a critical determinant for the type
of familiarity assessed during a recognition test. For example, Nessler,
Mecklinger, and Penney (2005) found a more frontally distributed ef-
fect for the comparison of famous and non-famous faces in a continuous
recognition paradigm which has different strategic requirements than a
standard study-test-recognition experiment. Taken together, the findings
described so far permit the conclusion that reliance on absolute familiar-
ity might be indexed by a parietal distribution of the early old/new effect
although the conditions under which assessment of absolute familiarity
is stressed over the increment of familiarity still have to be determined.
Coane, Balota, Dolan, and Jacoby (2011) were the first to isolate in-
cremental and absolute familiarity behaviorally in a two-list-exclusion
paradigm. Participants studied high and low frequency words of an au-
ditory and a visual list but only words from the auditory list had to be
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endorsed as ‘old’ whereas those from the visual list and new items had
to be endorsed as ‘new’. Hence, an ‘old’ response to a studied visual
word is an exclusion error. Absolute familiarity should contribute to the
decision for studied as well as unstudied items. In contrast, relative fa-
miliarity can only be diagnostic for studied items because an increment
of familiarity is only possible for already presented items. In order to
exclude the contribution of recollection, a response-deadline was applied.
In line with their expectations, they found higher hit rates for low fre-
quency than high frequency words along with higher exclusion error rates
for low frequency words. Coane and colleagues attributed this to higher
relative familiarity for low than for high frequency words. Moreover, in
at least one of two experiments they also found higher FA rates for high
frequency new words compared to low frequency new words. Thus, also
absolute familiarity is assessed during recognition memory decisions.
3.2 Discrepancy-Attribution-Hypothesis
The concept of absolute familiarity is tied to the idea of conscious ac-
cess to one’s semantic memory. However, an alternative although not
contradictory interpretation of the early parietal old/new effect is also
possible. In several articles, Whittlesea and Williams (e.g., Whittlesea
& Williams, 1998, 2000, 2001b, 2001a) argued that familiarity is per def-
inition a diverse concept and that the evaluation of memory strength is
not the only way of producing familiarity signals. They claimed that
especially this strong feeling of familiarity, when you meet someone for
who you neither remember the name nor any other episodic information
but who you are completely sure to know, is based on an attribution
process. Whittlesea and Williams further developed the idea of a flu-
ency heuristic for recognition memory (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) which is
grounded in the phenomenon that stimulus repetition leads to enhanced
fluency during processing. Thus, the experience of fluent processing can
be attributed to a prior encounter. Jacoby and Dallas (1981) already
noted that it is not the absolute fluency which determines if a familiar-
ity attribution takes place but rather the increase in fluency due to the
study phase encounter (this might relate to the notion of increment in
familiarity). They showed that naming times of low-frequency words in
contrast to high-frequency words are disproportionately enhanced when
presented for the second time. Moreover, in a recognition test, they found
greater hit rates for low-frequency words than for high-frequency words.
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Thus, greater discrepancy of actual fluency and baseline fluency corre-
lates with a greater probability of being recognized. However, Whittlesea
and Williams (1998) argued that the attribution of fluency does not only
depend on stimulus characteristics but also on context. Whereas you
do not expect to meet your butcher on the bus, you strongly expect to
encounter him in the butcher’s shop. Moreover, attribution of fluent pro-
cessing to familiarity only takes place in the former but not the latter
case. In a series of experiments, Whittlesea and Williams showed that
fluent processing is attributed to a source in the past whenever it is unex-
pected. For example, regular non-words (e.g., hension) are presumably
processed more fluently than irregular non-words (e.g., stofwus). The
fluent processing, however, is not expected as this is usually associated
only with meaningful words. In line with this, regular non-words at-
tract more ‘old’ responses than words in recognition tests (Whittlesea &
Williams, 1998). Note that not only perceptual fluency but also concep-
tual fluency augments the number of ‘old’ responses. Evidence comes
from studies which increased fluency by means of a preceding semantic
prime (Rajaram & Geraci, 2000) or a preceding predictive sentence stem
(e.g., Whittlesea & Williams, 2000). Importantly, the increase in ‘old’
responses can basically be traced back to more ‘know’ and not ‘remem-
ber’ responses to those items (Rajaram & Geraci, 2000; Whittlesea &
Williams, 2000).
Arguments against the use of fluency as a recognition heuristic such
as the finding of completely impaired recognition memory despite intact
perceptual or conceptual priming in amnesic patients (Conroy, Hopkins,
& Squire, 2005; Levy, Stark, & Squire, 2004) have to face the notion that
the influence of fluency on recognition memory comes with prerequisites.
Apart from the unexpectedness (e.g., Whittlesea & Williams, 1998), co-
herence was identified as one factor. To this effect, perceptual fluency
is not effective when modality changes from study to test. For exam-
ple, if visual fluency is perceived as enhanced during test, participants
take into account that it is unlikely to arise from presentation during
an auditory study phase (Miller, Lloyd, & Westerman, 2008). Moreover,
salience of fluency (Whittlesea & Williams, 2000) also seems to be im-
portant. Accordingly, Keane, Orlando, and Verfaellie (2006) showed that
an increase in the salience of fluency as a hint for being studied enhanced
the performance of amnesic patients in a recognition memory test.
There are also hints from ERP research that fluency plays a role during
recognition memory tasks. Wolk et al. (2004) showed that test items fol-
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lowing predictive sentence stems were associated with a reduced N400 in
contrast to test items following non-predictive sentence stems. Although
this is complemented by their finding that test items after predictive
sentence stems were more likely endorsed as ‘old’ than those after non-
predictive stems, they failed to show that the N400 is modulated by the
type of response. Thus, the N400 amplitude did not differ for ‘old’ and
‘new’ responses. Therefore it is unclear to what extent fluency reflected
by a reduced N400 really directly triggered ‘old’ responses. Woollams,
Taylor, Karayanidis, and Henson (2008) used masked repetition priming
to increase fluency of test words. In the N400 time window, they sta-
tistically dissociated two different effects. On the one hand, they found
an old/new effect maximal over frontal electrode sites and on the other
hand, they found an effect of priming with a parietal maximum. Due to
an overlap of the two effects, it is impossible to determine if the parietal
component is also sensitive to response type. However, on the behavioral
level, masked priming increased the likelihood of ‘old’ responses. In sum,
ERP evidence in favor of fluency processing which is deterministic for
the recognition decision is rather weak, but there is first evidence for the
relevance of fluency during recognition decisions.
Coming back to the initial question of familiarity for novel units, it is
important to note that the discrepancy-attribution-hypothesis explicitly
states that “the phenomenological state of familiarity is not associated
only with context-free, item-based processing but instead with any pro-
cessing that is experienced as discrepant” (Whittlesea & Williams, 2000,
p. 561). Thus, it is a concept of familiarity which is especially applicable
to associative recognition memory. Specifically, unitization seems to be a
perfect candidate in order to induce fluent processing as Whittlesea and
Williams emphasize that processing fluency means the quality of pro-
cessing. They refer, for instance, to “the degree to which the component
features of a stimulus configure into an integral whole when processed”
(Whittlesea & Williams, 1998, p. 163). Moreover, as the expected flu-
ency for pre-experimentally unrelated word pairs is practically zero, the
discrepancy between expected and actual fluency for novel units is dis-
proportionately high. In addition, conceptual fluency at test is coherent
with the semantic study phase task and it is a salient diagnostic feature
of the studied pairs in contrast to the new pairs. In strong support of
the conceptual fluency hypothesis of familiarity for novel units, reaction
times for correctly recognized same pairs are faster than for correctly rec-
ognized reversed pairs, for which a disruption of the concept is assumed
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(Wiegand, 2009). Moreover, since in the Wiegand (2009) study partic-
ipants rated the plausibility of the definition during the study phase,
test pairs could be sorted into well integrated (i.e. plausible definition at
study) and poorly integrated (i.e. implausible definition at study) pairs.
Post-hoc analyses revealed that well integrated pairs were recognized
faster than poorly integrated pairs when presented in same, but not in
reversed order. As accelerated processing is one of the main behavioral
manifestations of fluency, this is further evidence that conceptual fluency
is enhanced because of successful unitization. Further substantiating this
notion, the early parietal old/new effect for same pairs was present only
for well integrated pairs but not for poorly integrated pairs. In con-
trast, the mid-frontal effect for reversed pairs was observed irrespective
of integration/unitization quality (Wiegand et al., 2010).
In sum, it is important to note that it is impossible and also not nec-
essary to adjudicate between the absolute familiarity account and the
discrepancy-attribution-hypothesis. Whereas the former is related to
stimulus characteristics, the latter is based on processing characteristics.
Moreover, interestingly Coane et al. (2011) establish a link between rela-
tive familiarity and discrepancy attribution as the discrepancy is greater
when baseline familiarity is lower. Thus, the exact interrelations between
absolute familiarity, relative familiarity, discrepancy-attribution and pos-
sible other sources of feelings of familiarity still have to be determined.
It is only clear that it is crucial to distinguish between different kinds of
familiarity and to acknowledge that probably different neural networks
are involved.
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CHAPTER 4
Research Questions
4.1 Recognition Memory for Associations with Differ-
ent Degrees of Unitization
Yonelinas et al. (2010) emphasized that unitization should be regarded
as a continuum rather than a dichotomy (see also Section 2.1). The
different ways to induce unitization introduced in Section 2.3 result in
associations which can be placed on different positions on that contin-
uum. Figure 4.1 depicts a sketch of the continuum for those types of
unitization which are most relevant to the current thesis. Degree of uni-
tization in this classification was inferred from the perceived rigidity. i.e.
how difficult it is to break up the unit.1 Single items such as words are
supposed to constitute the highest degree of unitization. As they have
a pre-experimental familiarity, only the increment in familiarity (rela-
tive familiarity) can be diagnostic for occurrence during a specific study
episode. The mid-frontal old/new effect is postulated to be the corre-
sponding ERP correlate (Stenberg et al., 2009) and the PrC was found
to be deactivated for familiar in contrast to new items (e.g., Henson et
al., 2003; Montaldi et al., 2006). A highly similar picture can be drawn
for pre-existing units. Although being de-constructable, they appear so
frequently as a unit that they have as a whole a pre-experimental fa-
miliarity implicating relative familiarity during a recognition test. In
line with this, a mid-frontal old/new effect (Rhodes & Donaldson, 2007)
and modulation in the PrC (Ford et al., 2010) were reported for these
pairs. Pre-existing associations were shown to elicit a mid-frontal effect,
1Note that as it is an unresolved question to date how to measure the degree of
unitization, this is a subjective classification serving as a working hypothesis.
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Figure 4.1.: Overview of different degrees of unitization. Degree of unitization is in-
creasing from bottom to top. For each degree, examples, the hypothesized
primary retrieval process, the putative ERP correlate (old/new effect) and
the underlying brain region activated during retrieval are presented. Note
that in the cases where familiarity-based retrieval is indicated, additional
recollection is not necessarily excluded. PrC = perirhinal cortex.
too (Kriukova, 2012; Greve et al., 2007). Due to their pre-experimental
joint occurrence they have a pre-experimental familiarity and a relative
familiarity mechanism during recognition is conceivable. The brain re-
gions involved during retrieval of those pairs have not yet been investi-
gated. However, one encoding study is suggestive of an involvement of
the PrC (Greve et al., 2011). For novel units it was postulated that due
to pre-experimental unrelatedness an absolute familiarity signal can be
diagnostic and the corresponding ERP effect would be the early parietal
old/new effect (Bader et al., 2010). While the PrC was shown to be in-
volved during encoding of novel conceptual units (Haskins et al., 2008),
to the best of my knowledge there is no study which has examined the
neural network activated during retrieval yet. The lowest degree of uni-
tization in Figure 4.1 is represented by arbitrary associations as they are
not tied to an exact configuration. For the retrieval of this kind of associ-
ations, recollection is assumed to be essential, a claim which is supported
by findings of the left parietal old/new effect (Donaldson & Rugg, 1998;
Ja¨ger et al., 2006; Bader et al., 2010) and activation of the hippocampus
during retrieval (Giovanello et al., 2004).
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4.2 Dissociating Retrieval Processes for Novel Con-
cepts from those for Pre-existing Units and Items
The overview in Figure 4.1 reveals two major gaps in our knowledge about
the retrieval processes involved in associative recognition memory: the
neural network involved in the retrieval of pre-existing associations and
the the neural network involved in the retrieval of novel units. The cur-
rent thesis primarily focuses on the retrieval processes for the latter and
their dissociation from those for non-unitized associations, pre-existing
units and single items. Novel units are highly interesting in at least two
ways. First, the creation of units during a study event accomplishes the
unique ability of episodic memory to readily form a link between two or
more items, an ability which is usually associated with the hippocampus
(e.g., Norman & O’Reilly, 2003). This is not the case for pre-existing
associations. Second, the ERP effects reported for this kind of pairs are
suggestive of a unique way of processing presumably associated with ab-
solute familiarity. Thus, in the main part of this thesis, novel units are
compared to novel associations which are not unitized in a between-group
design (Experiment 2) and to pre-existing units in a within-group design
(Experiment 3).
Specifically, Experiment 2 aimed to examine the neural network un-
derlying the retrieval of novel conceptual units by means of fMRI. To
this end, the paradigm used by Wiegand (2009) was employed for one
group and contrasted with a sentence encoding group. While for the sen-
tence encoding group a predominant role of the recollection network was
expected based on related ERP (Bader et al., 2010) and fMRI findings
(Giovanello et al., 2004), precise predictions for the definition encoding
group were difficult to derive. Findings from an encoding study (Haskins
et al., 2008) suggest the involvement of the perirhinal cortex. Moreover,
as this region is also important for conceptual processing in general (e.g.,
K. I. Taylor, Moss, Stamatakis, & Tyler, 2006), it is probably also in-
volved during retrieval. However, the previous ERP studies suggest that
the brain regions activated during retrieval for novel conceptual units
are at least partly different from those activated during retrieval of pre-
existing units. The second aim of Experiment 2 was to contrast the neural
networks involved in familiarity for novel units (absolute familiarity) and
familiarity for single items (relative familiarity). Therefore, in addition
to same pairs, reversed versions of the studied pairs were presented at
test for which the conceptual unit is assumed to be disrupted.
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Wiegand (2009) found faster reaction times for same pairs compared
to reversed pairs. This was interpreted as enhanced conceptual fluency
which is specific to the unitization encoding. Alternatively, the fact that
the pairs were repeated as an exact copy for same pairs but with a percep-
tual change for reversed pairs could have led to the speed-up in response
times. Hence, the aim of Experiment 1 was to rule out this possibility
before this manipulation was applied in Experiment 2. Thus, in Experi-
ment 1 the same test conditions as in the study by Wiegand (2009) were
applied. However, during study, participants had to follow a sentence
encoding instruction. The results were compared to those of the defini-
tion group from the Wiegand study. The speed advantage for same in
relation to reversed pairs was expected to be reduced for the sentence
group.
The goal of Experiment 3 was to substantiate the existence of two to-
pographically different early old/new effects by dissociating them within
one experiment. Therefore, in order to manipulate the pre-experimental
familiarity while holding the stimulus characteristics otherwise constant,
pre-existing units (compound pairs) and novel conceptual units (defini-
tion encoding) were directly contrasted. While for the former a mid-
frontal old/new effect was predicted, the latter were expected to elicit an
early parietal old/new effect based on the findings by Rhodes and Don-
aldson (2007) or Bader et al. (2010) and Wiegand (2009), respectively.
4.3 Stretching the Unitization Continuum: Unitization
in the Pictorial Domain
Experiment 4 was a behavioral study with the aim to stretch the con-
tinuum of unitization. Unitization of previously unrelated items during
encoding was applied in the pictorial domain inducing unitization by cre-
ation of a scene. While following studies using interactive imagery, the
design of Experiment 4 provides a better control of the actually stud-
ied representations. Moreover, effects of unitization of unrelated items
on familiarity-based recognition memory have until now only been found
for verbal material. Effects on familiarity were isolated by means of a
repsonse-deadline procedure (e.g., Mecklinger et al., 2010, see Section
1.2.2). Thus, better memory performance under speeded response condi-
tions was predicted for the picture pairs which were arranged as a scene
compared to those which were not arranged as a scene.
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CHAPTER 5
Experiment 1∗
5.1 Introduction
As already described in Section 2.3 and Chapter 3, Wiegand (2009) dis-
sociated two early ERP old/new effects for novel conceptual units and
pre-existing items, respectively. This was accomplished by means of two
different test cues to probe memory for word pairs studied together with
a definition combining the pair to a novel compound. Same pairs were
exact repetitions of the studied pairs which was intended to maintain the
novel unit. In contrast, it was assumed that the unit is disrupted when
word pairs were presented in reversed order as the configuration of a unit
is considered to be rigid (Horowitz & Prytulak, 1969). However, although
familiarity for the whole unit is not assumed to occur, the constituents
should still be familiar at test. As the constituents are pre-existing single
words, it can be assumed that they undergo an increment in familiarity
and elicit a relative familiarity signal.
Support for the disruption of the unit was provided by Haskins et al.
(2008) in a supplemental behavioral study. They compared recognition
accuracy for word pairs encoded under definition encoding compared to
word pairs encoded under sentence encoding conditions. In this latter
condition, the sentence provides an external link for the separate single
words. It is believed that associations built in this way are more flexible
than the rigid units and recollection is needed to remember these kinds
∗The results of Experiment 1 were partially published together with the findings
reported in Wiegand (2009) in Brain Research. Starting from the next chapter,
reference to the results obtained by Wiegand (2009) and those from Experiment
1 is made as Wiegand, Bader, and Mecklinger (2010).
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of associations (see also Bader et al., 2010; Quamme et al., 2007). Given
that recollection is the core process contributing to recall (e.g Baddeley
et al., 2001), findings from recall implicate that recollection is flexible
with respect to word order (Kahana, 2002). Thus, reversing the pair
is not expected to impair performance for recollection-based retrieval as
in the sentence encoding task. In support of this notion, Haskins et
al. (2008) found better performance in the definition group than in the
sentence group only for same pairs, but not reversed pairs. The authors
took this as evidence that the creation and maintenance of a unit is
important to enhance associative recognition memory (presumably by
increased familiarity).
As outlined in Chapter 3, a tempting explanation of the parietal shift
in the distribution of the early old/new effect for novel conceptual units
is the enhanced conceptual fluency or facilitated semantic access for stud-
ied word pairs reflected in an N400-like component (Bader et al., 2010;
Wiegand, 2009). This interpretation is supported by the finding that
same pairs are recognized faster than reversed pairs, which can be inter-
preted as an indicator of enhanced fluency for novel units. It is possible,
however, that a pure perceptual repetition effect caused the shorter re-
sponse times for same pairs. Same pairs were the only test cues which
were repeated without perceptual change from study to test. However, if
unitization causes the speeded responses to same pairs, reaction times to
same and reversed pairs should not differ if the pairs have not been uni-
tized during study. As Haskins et al. (2008) have not reported reaction
times, the aim of Experiment 1 was to test this hypothesis in a supple-
mentary behavioral study to the Wiegand study. This was a neccessary
prerequisite in order to substantiate the validity of the same vs. reversed
manipulation as a dissociation between unit and item specific processes
for subsequent studies.
To this end, a separate group of participants was tested in the sen-
tence encoding paradigm. In the study phase, the same set of word pairs
was used, but were presented together with a sentence frame (e.g., VEG-
ETABLE BIBLE - This was already mentioned in the .). The
test phase was exactly the same as in the Wiegand study: participants
had to discriminate between same, reversed, recombined, and new pairs.
The same and reversed pairs had to be classified as ‘old’ and the other
two pair types as ‘new’. As the data obtained in Experiment 1 were di-
rectly compared to the behavioral data obtained in the Wiegand (2009)
study, I describe the current experiment as the sentence group whereas
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the Wiegand (2009) experiment is referred to as the definition group. I
hypothesized the difference in reaction times between same and reversed
pairs to be larger in the definition group than in sentence group. Anal-
ogously, the results by Haskins et al. (2008) suggest that same pairs are
remembered better than reversed pairs in the definition group whereas
this difference should be smaller in the sentence group.
5.2 Methods
Generally, methods were set up in order to match the definition group in
Wiegand (2009). Methods are described for both groups as data of both
groups entered the analyses.
5.2.1 Participants
Data of 18 participants (10 female) were analyzed in the definition group.
Mean age in the definition group was 22.18 (range: 19–26). Nineteen
participants took part in the sentence group. Data of one participant
had to be excluded because of failure to follow the instructions. Mean
age of the remaining 18 participants (10 female) was 23.39 (range: 20–
30). All participants were native German speakers and right-handers
as assessed by the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971).
They had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were reimbursed 8
Euros/hour or received course credit for participation. The experiment
was approved by the local ethics committee.
5.2.2 Material
The study phase stimuli consisted of 126 unrelated German word pairs
(see Appendix A.1 and A.2 for a full list of stimuli). Unrelatedness was
assured by a pre-experimental rating study in which participants (n = 59)
had to judge the relatedness on a 4-point scale. Only pairs which were
rated as unrelated were considered. Word length was 4–10 letters and
mean lexical frequency was 10–500 per million (Baayen, Piepenbrock, &
Gulikers, 1995). In the definition group, pairs were presented together
with a definition combining the words to a novel concept. Definitions con-
sisted of a noun phrase followed by a relative clause (e.g., VEGETABLE
BIBLE – A book which is consulted by hobby gardeners.) In the sen-
tence group, pairs were presented together with a sentence frame. The
words were not repeated in the sentence frame but were replaced with
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blanks in which participants had to fill in the words (e.g., VEGETABLE
BIBLE – This was already mentioned in the ). Each word pair
was presented twice in the study phase. Study list composition was
pseudo-randomized with the constraint of a 10–30 items lag between two
identical study cues.
The test phase included 168 pairs. 42 same pairs were exact repetitions
of the studied pairs, 42 reversed pairs were studied in the same combina-
tion but in reversed order, 42 recombined pairs consisted of new combi-
nations of studied pairs, and 42 new pairs were not studied. Assignment
of the 126 study pairs to the conditions old, reversed, and recombined
was counterbalanced across participants. The 42 new pairs were equal
for all participants. In a second rating study (n = 43) the unrelatedness
of recombined and new pairs was approved. In the pseudo-randomized
test lists, no more than three items of the same pair type were presented
in a row.
5.2.3 Procedure
The experiment was programmed using E-Prime (Psychology Software
Tools, Inc.). Only the definition group was prepared for electroencephalo-
gram (EEG) recording and was tested in the EEG lab. The sentence
group was tested under comparable conditions in front of a standard PC.
All stimuli were displayed in Arial font white letters on black background.
During the study phase, word pairs were presented in 24 pt upper-case
letters. Definitions or sentences were presented simultaneously slightly
below the pair in 20 pt font. The definition group had to rate how well
the definition combined the words into a novel compound while the sen-
tence group was instructed to rate the plausibility of the sentence with
the two words inserted into the blanks. Subjects had to use a 4-point
scale for the rating ranging from 1 (“very badly”) to 4 (“very well”).
A trial began with a 200 ms fixation cross, followed by a 200 ms blank
screen and the presentation of the word pair and the definition/sentence
for 5000 ms. After another blank screen of 50 ms, the response window,
during which a question mark was presented, appeared for 1500 ms. The
keys ‘x’, ‘c’, ‘n’, and ‘m’ on a standard German keyboard corresponded
to the responses 1–4. Participants used their middle and index fingers of
both hands. After every 42 trials, participants had the possibility for a
self-paced break.
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After a 5 min distractor task in the retention interval, participants were
informed about the upcoming memory test. The test phase was exactly
the same in both groups. Same and reversed pairs had to be classified as
‘old’ whereas recombined and new pairs had to be classified as ‘new’ by
pressing the keys ‘c’ and ‘n’ with the index fingers of both hands. Key
assignment was counterbalanced across subjects. After a 500 ms fixation
cross and a 300 ms blank screen, the stimulus was presented for 750 ms
followed by a 2000 ms blank screen. Responses were allowed from onset
of the test pair until the end of the blank screen. Then, participants had
to make a confidence judgment (‘sure’ and ‘unsure’) within maximally
3000 ms. After 42 trials there was a self-paced break.
5.2.4 Data analysis
Descriptive statistics are provided for all four pair types. However, as
the purpose of this study was to compare performance for same and
reversed pairs, inferential statistics are restricted to these two conditions.
Repeated-measures analyses of variance (ANOVA) were used to analyze
the data. The significance level was set to α = .05.
5.3 Results
As can be seen in Figure 5.1, accuracy was generally on a high level.
However, there were differences between same and reversed test pairs.
This was substantiated by an ANOVA on percentage correct with the
between-subjects factor Encoding Group (definition, sentence) and the
within-subjects factor Pair Type (same, reversed). The analysis revealed
a main effect of Pair Type (F (1, 34) = 11.10, p < .01), but neither a
main effect of Encoding Group (F < 1) nor an interaction (F < 1).
These findings indicate that there is a general forward advantage, which
is comparable for the definition group (same : mean (M) = .86, standard
error (SE) = .02; reversed : M = .82, SE = .02) and the sentence group
(same : M = .85, SE = .02; reversed : M = .82, SE = .02).
An ANOVA on the reaction times with the between-subjects factor
Encoding Group (definition, sentence) and the within-subjects factor
Pair Type (same, reversed) yielded a significant main effect of Pair Type
(F (1, 34) = 24.11, p < .001) and a significant interaction of Pair Type ×
Encoding Group (F (1, 34) = 6.68, p < .05). The main effect of Encoding
Group was not significant (F < 1). Follow-up t-tests revealed that same
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Figure 5.1.: Mean probabilities of correct responses (A.) and mean reaction times (B.)
for same, reversed, recombined, and new pairs in the definition and sen-
tence encoding group of Experiment 1. Error bars indicate 95% confidence
intervals for the interaction term (Jarmasz & Hollands, 2009).
pairs (M = 1358, SE = 53.50) were recognized faster than reversed pairs
(M = 1465, SE = 52.33) in the definition group (t(17) = 5.40, p < .001),
but not in the sentence group (t(17) < 1.74). Thus, speeded reaction
times for same pairs in contrast to reversed pairs could only be observed
in the definition group and not in the sentence group.
5.4 Discussion
In Experiment 1, participants studied word pairs within sentence frames
as separate lexical items. The results were directly compared to the be-
havioral data obtained by Wiegand (2009) in order to test whether the
behavioral advantage for same in contrast to reversed test pairs observed
for pairs encoded in the definition encoding condition can be attributed
to the maintenance of the conceptual unit or to the perceptual repetition
of the study cue. Analysis of the accuracy data revealed generally better
performance for same compared to reversed pairs, which was not mod-
ulated by study group. In contrast, faster responses for same pairs in
contrast to reversed pairs were selectively found in the definition group
and virtually absent in the sentence group.
The main focus of this experiment was the comparison of the reaction
times as the faster responses to same pairs were previously attributed
to enhanced conceptual fluency. The significantly smaller difference in
reaction times for same and reversed pairs in the sentence group supports
this interpretation because conceptual fluency should prevail for novel
concepts and be less relevant for word pairs encoded within sentence
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frames. The explanation that the speed advantage was caused by the
repetition of the study cue at test can be ruled out by the current results.
In contrast to Haskins et al.’s (2008) data, better performance for same
compared to reversed pairs was found in both encoding groups. As this
merits further discussion, it might be valuable to consider other studies
which investigated memory for forward and backward associations, i.e.
same and reversed test cues. Comparing recognition and cued recall for
forward and backward associations, an experimental series conducted by
Yang et al. (2013) consistently showed that a forward advantage with
respect to memory performance exists only for recognition but not recall
and that this pattern is independent of the type of association (related
vs. unrelated word pairs). Giovanello et al. (2009) could also demon-
strate a forward advantage in a recognition task, no matter if the pairs
were originally encoded within one or two sentences. Yang et al. (2013)
propose that the recall vs. recognition dissociation might be explained by
the different processes contributing to the two tasks. Whereas recall pri-
marily depends on recollection, recognition can generally be subserved by
recollection and familiarity. The authors further argue that there might
be familiarity for the associative sequence which can only be beneficial if
the pair is presented as a whole such as in a recognition task and not if
only one of the constituents serves as the test cue. However, this explana-
tion is not reconcilable with the general finding that the contribution of
familiarity to recognition of (non-unitized) word pairs is negligible (e.g.,
Donaldson & Rugg, 1998). Another possible interpretation is that the di-
rection of an association is a feature which is generally encoded (Kahana,
2002) and thus can serve as an additional cue during recognition increas-
ing the performance. In cued recall, direction is not presented as a cue
and thus cannot influence performance in favor of forward associations.
The presentation of an additional test cue could generally have positive
effects on both, recollection and familiarity.
Irrespective of the explanation, the current results add to the exist-
ing findings that associative recognition is better for forward than for
backward associations. One possible reason why the Haskins et al.’s
(2008) sentence encoding data diverges from the current data are the
different types of list composition. Haskins and colleagues presented def-
inition and sentence encoding trials intermixed during the study whereas
the current experiment used a between-subjects design. In a blocked or
between-subjects design, participants can adapt their retrieval strategies
as maximally suitable for the respective task. However, in a mixed list
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participants probably concentrate on the most salient items. It is not
unlikely that in the case of the Haskins et al. study, the novel conceptual
units were most prominent leading to an emphasis on familiarity-based
recognition. This in turn generally decreased the performance in the
sentence condition – also for forward pairs.
An alternative explanation for the divergent results of the Haskins
et al.’s (2008) study and the current experiment could be the different
numbers of study repetitions. While in the Haskins et al. study each
word pair was studied only once, there were two study presentations in
the current study. This might have enhanced memory performance for
the reversed pairs by boosting recollection. The finding of a left parietal
old/new effect for the definition group (Wiegand, 2009) is consistent with
this explanation.
In summary, the current findings support the notion that the speed ad-
vantage of same vs. reversed pairs in a definition encoding paradigm can
be attributed to increased conceptual fluency and cannot be explained
by the identical study cue repetition for same but not for reversed pairs.
Thus, the formation of a novel unit induces unique processing character-
istics which strongly rely on the exact configuration of the unit. Impor-
tantly, Experiment 1 adds further evidence that the manipulation used
here can dissociate between novel conceptual units and pre-existing single
items. This is important for the use of this design in Experiment 2.
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CHAPTER 6
Experiment 2
As described in Chapter 2.3 recent advancements of dual-process models
of recognition memory state that an association between two or more
items can be familiar if the parts are unitized (Diana et al., 2007; Ran-
ganath, 2010; Yonelinas, 2002; Yonelinas et al., 2010, 1999). As argued
before, it can be distinguished between pre-existing units (i.e. stored in
semantic memory) and newly created units. Various methodological ap-
proaches showed that in comparison to unrelated word pairs (e.g., poker-
curl), familiarity-based memory is enhanced for pre-existing units such
as compound word pairs (e.g., motor-cycle, Rhodes & Donaldson, 2007;
Giovanello et al., 2006). Regarding the neural basis, findings from a re-
cent fMRI study suggest a shift in the relative contribution of different
MTL structures as they showed a reduction of hippocampal activation
and an enhancement of perirhinal involvement for pre-existing unitized
in contrast to unrelated word pairs (Ford et al., 2010). This has been
taken as evidence that pre-existing unitized associations are remembered
in a comparable way to single items.
However, is this also the case for previously unrelated items which are
unitzed not until encoding? As described in Section 2.3, it was suggested
that one learning occasion is sufficient for unitization to induce subse-
quent familiarity-based remembering subserved by the PrC (e.g., Henke,
2010). As evident from Figure 4.1, this has not yet been investigated.
Quamme et al. (2007) showed that patients with damage limited to the
hippocampus can perform above chance-level when two unrelated words
are studied in a definition encoding condition compared to a sentence
encoding condition. In contrast, patients with a damage comprising also
the surrounding MTLC did not benefit from definition encoding. This
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suggests an increased contribution of MTLC mediated familiarity-based
memory for unitized associations. Using the same paradigm in an fMRI
study, Haskins et al. (2008) showed that the PrC is more engaged when
previously unrelated word pairs are encoded as novel conceptual units.
However, the brain structures involved in the retrieval of novel conceptual
units cannot readily be inferred from these studies.
As outlined in Chapter 3, the results from two recent ERP studies
investigating the retrieval of such type of novel compounds (Bader et al.,
2010; Wiegand et al., 2010) suggest that novel conceptual units and single
items elicit different familiarity signals: absolute and relative familiarity.
The aim of Experiment 2 was two-fold. The first aim was to compare
the brain regions generally engaged in retrieval of experimentally unitized
associations to those engaged in retrieval of arbitrary associations. The
second aim was to compare brain regions which are involved in relative
familiarity for single items and absolute familiarity for novel units.
By means of fMRI, the neural correlates of associative recognition
memory were investigated when previously unrelated word pairs were
unitized during encoding. Analogous to the previous ERP studies (Bader
et al., 2010; Wiegand et al., 2010), I compared the neural correlates of
associative recognition memory for unrelated German word pairs using
encoding instruction as a between-group variable (see Figure 6.1). Uni-
tization was stimulated in the definition group who learned word pairs
together with a definition combining the two words to a novel concep-
tual unit. Conversely, unitization was minimized in the sentence group
who studied the pairs together with a sentence frame containing the two
words as distinct lexical items. Encoding instruction was manipulated
between subjects to avoid any strategy carry over between the two in-
structions. After one long study block, participants had to do a surprise
recognition test. Encoding was incidental in order to reduce the proba-
bility that participants apply individual encoding strategies which could
obscure the intended effects of the instructions. During recognition, dif-
ferent types of word pairs were presented: same pairs reappeared in the
same order as during study, reversed pairs consisted of studied pairings
but in reversed order, recombined pairs were new combinations of two
words studied within two different pairs, and new pairs consisted of two
unstudied words. Same and reversed pairs had to be classified as ‘old’
whereas recombined and new pairs had to be classified as ‘new’. Com-
parable to the Wiegand et al. (2010) study (see also Experiment 1), re-
versed pairs were included. The rationale behind this was that reversing
64
Figure 6.1.: Schematic illustration of the study phase in the definition group and the
test phase in both groups. In the sentence group, the definitions were re-
placed by the respective sentences. In the study phase, participants judged
the fit of the definition/sentence and the pair during the presentation of
the question mark. In the test phase, participants had to discriminate
between same, reversed, recombined, and new pairs before the end of the
response window. Same and reversed pairs had to be classified as ‘old’
and recombined and new pairs had to be classified as ‘new’.
the word pair disrupts the newly created unit as the exact configuration
is a key feature of units (Haskins et al., 2008; Horowitz & Prytulak, 1969;
Wiegand et al., 2010). Hence, the effects of unitization are assumed to
be present for same pairs only, while pure item recognition mechanisms
should be diagnostic for reversed pairs.
Due to the disruption of the novel units, I expected processing dif-
ficulties for reversed pairs being evident in decreased performance and
longer reaction times compared to same pairs in the definition group.
This was not expected for the sentence group in which no conceptual
units were created. Here, recollection-driven processing should result in
comparable performance for same and reversed pairs because recollec-
tion is assumed to be less reliant on the precise configuration, as findings
from recall implicate (e.g., Kahana, 2002, see also Section 2.2.1 and Ex-
periment 1). Generally, I expected recollection to be the main process
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Figure 6.2.: Schematic illustration of hypothesized primary retrieval processes in the
two encoding groups and definition of process-specific contrasts. Note that
for recollection, two contrasts are equally suitable to reveal process-specific
brain regions, and that the reversed vs. new contrast is associated with
different processes in the two groups. Thickness and number of crosses in-
dicate relative importance of the process in the respective encoding group.
sam = same; rev = reversed; rec = recombined.
to subserve associative recognition in the sentence group. In contrast,
recollection should play a minor role in the definition group as reduced
engagement of regions normally associated with recollection was already
shown for pre-existing unitized pairs (Ford et al., 2010). Moreover, the
finding of a reduced putative ERP correlate of recollection (Bader et al.,
2010) suggests that a reduced involvement of the recollection network
can be expected for novel conceptual units, too. Effects specific to uni-
tization should only be present in the definition group and absent in the
sentence group whereas relative familiarity signals should be observable
in both groups. These general assumptions should become manifest in
the following specific contrasts (see Figure 6.2).
At first, a general recognition memory contrast between correct re-
sponses to same and new pairs was examined because the former reflect
recognized items in general irrespective of the involved process and the
latter reflect a memory free baseline condition. For the sentence group,
I expected activation in a network including the hippocampus and other
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regions normally associated with recollection such as the posterior cingu-
late cortex and the ventral PPC (e.g., Daselaar, Fleck, & Cabeza, 2006;
Henson et al., 2005; Vilberg & Rugg, 2008; Yonelinas et al., 2005). In
the definition group, the engagement of the recollection network was ex-
pected to be reduced. Moreover, this contrast should have the maximal
potential to reveal all the brain structures involved in both hypothesized
familiarity processes. Thus, I generally predicted deactivation in the PrC
as well as activation in other regions previously associated with famil-
iarity such as the lateral PFC (BA 45/46) and the dorsal PPC in the
definition group (e.g., Daselaar, Fleck, & Cabeza, 2006; Henson et al.,
2005; Montaldi et al., 2006; Vilberg & Rugg, 2008; Yonelinas et al., 2005;
Aly et al., 2011).
The next contrast was intended to capture those regions which are
specifically crucial for associative recognition memory comparing correct
responses to same and recombined pairs as item familiarity should not
be diagnostic to distinguish these pair types. In the sentence group,
absolute familiarity should not be elicited. Therefore, this contrast was
assumed to reveal again mostly regions associated with recollection (see
above). In contrast, the engagement of this network was expected to be
smaller in the definition group where, as in the same vs. new contrast,
familiarity-related regions should be more engaged. These should be
limited to regions involved in absolute familiarity (see below).
The contrast between correctly recognized reversed and new pairs
should reveal brain regions involved in item recognition, especially in
the defnition group where influences of recollection are assumed to be
minimal. Moreover, reversed pairs are not assumed to evoke absolute
familiarity because the unit is assumed to be disrupted. For this reason,
they should be a more sensitive indicator of relative familiarity than same
pairs when contrasted to new pairs.1 Given that recollection is assumed
to play a minor role in the definition group, the reversed vs. new contrast
is expected to reveal mostly activity modulation in regions previously as-
sociated with familiarity. In particular, I predicted decreased activation
for reversed compared to new pairs in the perirhinal cortex as this region
is highly implicated in familiarity for single items (e.g., Henson et al.,
2003; Montaldi et al., 2006). As the recollection-based processing in the
1Reversed pairs were chosen for this contrast because the requirement to classify
recombined pairs as ‘new’ allows that not recognized unfamiliar recombined pairs
are correctly rejected. This makes recombined pairs more heterogeneous in terms
of familiarity and therefore less suitable for the item familiarity contrast.
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sentence group should be flexible with respect to the order of the pair
(Giovanello et al., 2009), the pattern of results in the sentence group was
expected to be similar to the same vs. new contrast.
The effect of unitization is postulated for newly created unitized word
pairs, only, i.e. for same pairs in the definition group. As the unit is as-
sumed to be disrupted for reversed pairs and item familiarity should be
equal for the two pair types, brain regions which are specific to recogni-
tion of novel conceptual units were determined by the same vs. reversed
pairs contrast. Moreover, differences in recollection between same and
reversed pairs should be negligible because both pair types had to be
classified as ‘old’. Due to the lack of previous studies, I did not have any
specific expectations with respect to the localization of these regions.
From the data reported by Haskins et al. (2008), a perirhinal familiarity
signal should be expected for same in contrast to new pairs. However, it
is unclear whether this is additional to the familiarity signal for the single
items (in magnitude or spatial extent). In general, I predicted absolute
familiarity regions to be revealed only in the definition group but not in
the sentence group.
6.1 Methods
6.1.1 Participants
Forty native German speakers, all students from Saarland University,
took part in the experiment and were randomly assigned to the two en-
coding groups. Mean age was 22.3 (range: 19–28) and 23.2 (range: 19–
29) in the definition (10 male/10 female) and the sentence (10 male/10
female) encoding group, respectively. All participants had no known neu-
rological problems, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision (contact
lenses or fMRI compatible goggles) and were right-handed as assessed by
the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). One additional
participant took part, but had to be excluded because of excessive mo-
tion during scanning. The experiment was approved by the local ethics
committee of Saarland University. Participants gave informed consent
and were reimbursed with course credit or payment (8 Euros/hour) for
participation.
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6.1.2 Materials
Stimuli were built of 160 pairs of thematically and categorically unre-
lated German 3-10 letter nouns with a mean lexical frequency of 54/mil-
lion (Baayen et al., 1995) (see Appendix A.3 for a full list of stimuli).
Pairings had to fulfill the requirement of being suitable for compound
combination in German in original and reversed order. To this end,
some of the words were used in plural form. Original and reversed pairs
did not differ according to frequency of plural words in first and second
position. Unrelatedness of word pairs (in original and reversed order and
all recombined pairs) was assured by a pre-experimental rating study
(each word pair was rated by 16 participants on average who belonged
to the same student population but did not participate in the actual ex-
periment). For definition encoding, a definition combined each word pair
to denote a novel concept (e.g., VEGETABLE BIBLE - A book which
is consulted by hobby gardeners). Only synonyms or associates of the
words were used in the definitions. Likewise, there were no repetitions of
the words in the sentences for the sentence group. Here, the words were
part of a sentence as separate lexical items but were substituted by blank
spaces (e.g., VEGETABLE BIBLE – This was already mentioned in
the ).
Study lists comprised 128 word pairs together with either the corre-
sponding definitions or sentences. Of these pairs, 32 reappeared in the
same combination and order as in the test phase. Another 32 were in the
original combination but in reversed order. The remaining 64 were used
to build 32 recombined pairs consisting of new combinations of studied
words whereby only one word of each original pair was used. First and
second positions of the single words were maintained from original to
recombined pairs. Additional 32 word pairs served as new pairs. Assign-
ment of word pairs to the 4 pair types (same, reversed, recombined, and
new) was counterbalanced across participants.
6.1.3 Procedure
The experiment was presented using E-Prime Professional 2.0 (Psychol-
ogy Software Tools, Inc.). The experiment consisted of three parts: a
study phase, a motor response task in the retention interval, and a test
phase. All three parts were run in the scanner. Participants responded
via two 2-button response grips using their thumbs and index fingers of
both hands. Participants were not aware of the final memory test.
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Participants’ head movements were minimized using cushions and a
headrest. Stimuli were viewed through a mirror attached to the head
coil on which they were projected via a translucent screen. All stimuli
were presented in white on a black background. Word pairs were pre-
sented next to each other separated by four blanks. In the study phase,
word pairs and definitions/sentences were displayed one above the other,
slightly above and below the center of the screen. Sentence frames in
the sentence group contained two blank spaces in which participants had
to mentally insert the two words in the given order. In the test phase,
word pairs were presented in central vision. Encoding group was manip-
ulated between subjects. The definition group had to give a subjective
rating on a scale from 1 (‘very badly’) to 4 (‘very well’) according to
how well the definition combined the meanings of the two words into a
novel compound. To facilitate the rating, they were told to create a men-
tal image of the new concept. In the sentence group, participants were
supposed to rate the plausibility of the sentence on a 4-point-scale after
having inserted the two words. To prevent unitization, participants were
told to imagine each single object separately. Assignment of fingers and
ratings was counterbalanced across subjects. In both encoding groups,
a trial started with a 500 ms fixation cross followed by 300 ms blank
screen. Then, the stimulus appeared on the screen for 4000 ms after
which participants were given a 1500 ms response window for the rating
judgment indicated by a question mark. The inter-stimulus interval (ISI)
was jittered in steps of 1000 ms following an approximately exponential
distribution (mean: 7000 ms, range: 4000 – 12000 ms). It included the
response window and a blank screen. In the middle of the study phase,
there was a break of 46.2 s. After the study phase, there was a retention
interval of about 10 minutes containing a simple motor response task.
Participants were then informed about the upcoming memory test. In
the test phase, both encoding groups saw exactly the same stimuli and
had the same task. Participants had to classify same and reversed pairs
as ‘old’ and recombined and new pairs as ‘new’. They were instructed
to indicate if they were sure or unsure about their classification resulting
in four possible responses. Mapping of responses and fingers was coun-
terbalanced across subjects. Trials started with a 500 ms fixation cross
followed by a 300 ms blank screen. Word pairs were presented for 1000
ms. The response window expanded additional 1750 ms with a blank
screen. If participants failed to respond until then, they saw a warning
‘Too slow!’ for 500 ms. The ISI included the response window and the
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warning if applicable. The remaining time was filled with a blank screen.
ISI duration was jittered in steps of 1000 ms following an approximated
exponential distribution (mean: 4000 ms, range: 3000 – 9000 ms). In
the middle of the test phase, there was a break of 46.2 s.
6.1.4 Data Acquisition and Processing
A Siemens Skyra 3T system was used for MRI data acquisition. For func-
tional MR scans T2-weighted gradient-echo planar imaging sequences
with blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) contrast were used (Ma-
trix: 94, FOV = 192 mm, TR = 2200 ms, TE = 30 ms, flip angle =
90◦). Thirty axial slices with a thickness of 3 mm, an inter-slice gap of
.75 mm, and an in-plane resolution of 2.04 × 2.04 mm were acquired
parallel to the AC-PC plane covering the whole brain. In order to al-
low for T1 equilibration the first four volumes of each functional run
were discarded. Prior to the experiment high resolution (.9 × .9 × .9
mm) T1-weighted anatomical brain scans (MP-RAGE) were obtained.
In order to foster the co-registration of these anatomical images with the
functional images, 3 mm thick T1-weighted images (TR = 250 ms, TE =
2.5 ms, flip angle = 70◦, in-plane resolution of .6 × .6) in plane with the
functional images were acquired. MRI data was processed using Brain
Voyager QX (Brain Innovation; Goebel, Esposito, & Formisano, 2006).
First, the 366 functional volumes of the test phase were slice acquisi-
tion time corrected to the beginning of each volume scan using cubic
spline interpolation. Second, all images were motion corrected to the
first volume of the run applying a trilinear detection and sinc interpola-
tion rigid-body-transformation. Following spatial smoothing (Gaussian
kernel with a full width at half maximum of 4 mm), low-frequency signal
changes and baseline drifts were removed by a high-pass filter at .004
Hz. Transformation parameters gained by co-registration of functional
and anatomical images were applied to the preprocessed fMR images to
create a representation of the functional time series in 3D space which
was subsequently normalized into stereotactic Talairach space (Talairach
& Tournoux, 1988) and re-sampled to a resolution of 2 × 2 × 2 mm.
6.1.5 Data analysis
Only data of the test phase was analyzed. Behavioral data was analyzed
using SPSS 18. Accuracy as indicated by the percentage of correctly
classified items and reaction times for correct items were entered into a
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Pair Type (same, reversed, recombined, new) × Encoding Group (def-
inition, sentence) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA, Pillai’s
trace) with the within-subjects factor of Pair Type and the between-
subjects factor of Encoding Group. Proportion of high confidence judg-
ments of correct items was analyzed in a Confidence (high, low) × En-
coding Group (definition, sentence) MANOVA. The significance level of
the aforementioned analyses was set to α = .05. P-values in post-hoc
comparisons were corrected for Type-I-error accumulation using Holm’s
sequential Bonferroni correction method (Holm, 1979).
Statistical analysis of the fMRI was conducted using BrainVoyager QX
(Brain Innovation; Goebel et al., 2006). The functional time series were
analyzed with least-squares estimation using a mixed effects general lin-
ear model. The event-related design matrix was created by modeling
the hemodynamic response function for each predictor using a box-car
function with a 1 s event duration convolved with a 2-gamma function
model (onset: 0, time to response peak: 5 s, time to undershoot peak:
15 s) starting at the onset of the critical events. Correctly responded
to items were used to build four levels of Pair Type which entered the
general linear model as predictors (same, reversed, recombined, new).
All incorrectly classified items, key presses as well as 3-D motion pa-
rameters estimated during motion correction were added as predictors of
no interest. Percent signal change was calculated relative to a baseline
based on the average of all non-modeled time points. Second-level anal-
ysis determined active clusters for four contrasts of interest (Figure 6.2).
Generally, clusters of voxels were considered as active when the t-test for
the contrast exceeded a threshold of p < .001 for at least 10 contiguous
voxels (see Lieberman & Cunningham, 2009, for arguments in favor of
using a voxel extent threshold). In the MTL, the threshold was set to
p < .005 for at least 5 contiguous voxels.
In order to get an overview of the regions being generally involved in
recognition of the word pairs, I first examined the contrast same vs. new
pairs. Regions specifically involved in associative memory were identi-
fied by contrasting correctly identified same and recombined pairs. Item
recognition regions were defined as regions which were more active for
reversed than for new pairs. Brain regions specific to unitization effects
were determined by the same vs. reversed pairs contrast. For all three
contrasts, three different analyses were conducted to disentangle effects
specific and common for the two groups. Common group effects were
revealed by a conjunction analysis identifying the overlap between active
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regions in both groups (Friston, Penny, & Glaser, 2005). Group specific
effects for one of the groups were identified by masking active regions in
the other group. Exclusion masks were thresholded at a liberal threshold
of p < .05 in order to reduce the probability of missing a truly active
region. Note that a liberal threshold in the exclusion mask is equivalent
to a conservative procedure to detect group specific effects (see Desseilles
et al., 2009; Uncapher, Otten, & Rugg, 2006, for a similar rationale).
6.2 Results
6.2.1 Behavioral Results
As can be seen in Figure 6.3, performance in the sentence group seemed
to be generally better than in the definition group. MANOVA of ac-
curacy as indicated by percentage of correctly classified items with the
factors Pair Type and Encoding Group revealed a significant main ef-
fect of Pair Type (F (3, 36) = 67.07, p < .001), a significant main effect
of Encoding Group (F (1, 38) = 6.30, p < .05), and a marginally signif-
icant interaction (F (3, 36) = 2.75, p < .06). Dissolving the interaction,
post-hoc comparisons between encoding groups for each pair type sep-
arately yielded only one significant difference, namely higher accuracy
for reversed pairs in the sentence group (M = .80, SE = .12) than
in the definition group (M = .68, SE = .10; t(38) = 3.48, p < .01).
Comparisons of same pairs (definition: M = .80, SE = .11; sentence:
M = .83, SE = .09), recombined pairs (definition: M = .74, SE = .15;
sentence: M = .79, SE = .13), and new pairs (definition: M = .94, SE =
.06; sentence: M = .95, SE = .08) across encoding groups were not sig-
nificant (p-values > .62). These results show that the overall difference
is mainly driven by the higher performance for reversed pairs in the
sentence group. Furthermore, testing my specific hypotheses regarding
accuracy for same pairs and reversed pairs, planned t-tests revealed that
reversed pairs were remembered significantly worse than same pairs in
the definition group (t(19) = 4.22, p < .001), but not in the sentence
group (p > .27) suggesting processing difficulties for disrupted units in
the definition group. The proportion of time-outs was low for the def-
inition group (same: 0, reversed: .002, recombined: .009, new: .006)
and the sentence group (same: .003, reversed: 0, recombined: .002, new:
.003) and did not differ between the groups (p > .19).
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Figure 6.3.: Mean probabilities of correct responses (A.) and mean reaction times (B.)
for same, reversed, recombined, and new pairs in the definition and sen-
tence encoding group in Experiment 2. Error bars indicate 95% confi-
dence intervals for the interaction term (Jarmasz & Hollands, 2009).
A general speed advantage for the definition group (see Figure 6.3)
was demonstrated by a MANOVA of reaction times (Pair Type × En-
coding Group) revealing a significant main effect of Pair Type (F (3, 36) =
60.59, p < .001), a significant main effect of Encoding Group (F (1, 38) =
6.26, p < .05), and a significant interaction (F (3, 36) = 8.84, p < .001).
Post-hoc t-tests showed faster reaction times in the definition group than
in the sentence group, which were significantly different for recombined
pairs (definition: M = 1677, SE = 72; sentence: M = 1910, SE = 52;
t(38) = 2.62, p < .05) and for new pairs (definition: M = 1476, SE = 66;
sentence: M = 1770, SE = 52; t(38) = 3.51, p < .01) and marginally
significantly different for same pairs (definition: M = 1401, SE = 53;
sentence: M = 1567, SE = 49; t(38) = 2.26, p < .06). No differences
were obtained for reversed pairs (definition: M = 1512, SE = 56; sen-
tence: M = 1554, SE = 41; p < .55) suggesting that even though recog-
nition judgments are speeded up after definition encoding, this is not
the case when reversed pairs serve as retrieval cues. With regard to my
hypotheses for the comparison between same and reversed pairs, t-tests
revealed that same pairs were recognized faster than reversed pairs in the
definition group (t(19) = 4.56, p < .001), but not in the sentence group
(p > .48) further underlining the importance of the exact configuration
for unitized pairs.
The proportion of high confidence judgments of all correct responses
shows that participants in both groups were highly confident, but consis-
tently higher in the sentence group than in the definition group for same
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pairs (definition: M = .85, SE = .03; sentence: M = .93, SE = .02),
reversed pairs (definition: M = .80;SE = .05, sentence: M = .94, SE =
.02), recombined pairs (definition: M = .56, SE = .05; sentence: M =
.68, SE = .06), and new pairs (definition: M = .63, SE = .05; sentence:
M = .68, SE = .06). A Pair Type × Encoding Group MANOVA yielded
a significant main effect of Pair Type (F (3, 36) = 22.54, p < .001) and
of Encoding Group (F (1, 38) = 4.31, p < .05) the latter reflecting par-
ticipants’ higher confidence in the sentence group than in the definition
group. The interaction did not reach significance (p > .19). Post-hoc t-
tests revealed that ‘old’ responses were generally given with higher con-
fidence than ‘new’ responses irrespective of encoding group: same vs.
recombined (t(39) = 8.41, p < .001), same vs. new (t(39) = 6.19, p <
.001), reversed vs. recombined (t(39) = 6.71, p < .001), reversed vs. new
(t(39) = 4.98, p < .001). All other comparisons were not significant (p-
values > .27). Thus, recognition of word pairs studied within sentence
frames was accomplished with higher confidence. Moreover, confidence in
recognizing studied pairs was higher than in rejecting non-studied pairs.
6.2.2 Imaging Results
Same vs. New Pairs: General Recognition Memory
In order to see the general pattern of active regions underlying successful
recognition judgments in this associative recognition memory task, active
regions contrasting same vs. new pairs were explored. The results are
listed in Table 6.1. Activated clusters common to both groups were found
on the left medial and lateral surface of the parietal lobe. Specifically
in the sentence group, activation on the medial surface was generally
more extended (Figure 6.5.A) and the activation in the PPC reached
further ventral (Figure 6.4.A). Additionally, there were activated clusters
in the left middle frontal gyrus and in a region at the boarder of the
left hippocampus and entorhinal cortex (Figure 6.6.A). In the definition
group, the activation in the PPC spread further dorsal and medial (Figure
6.4.A). No clusters were identified in the new > same contrast.
Same vs. Recombined Pairs: Recollection
In order to identify regions specific to recollection which should predom-
inantly be activated in the sentence group, same and recombined pairs
were compared. As listed in Table 6.2, whole brain analysis revealed
common activation in regions on the medial surfaces of the PFC and the
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Table 6.1.: Brain regions showing significantly different BOLD signals for same vs.
new pairs. Side of activation (Hemi; L = left, R = right, B = bilateral),
Brodmann areas (BA), size of activation (in anatomical voxels), Talairach
coordinates of peak voxels (for group-specific clusters) or center of gravity
(for inclusion analysis), and t-value of peak voxel are indicated. Note that
there is no peak voxel in a conjunction analysis.
region of activity hemi BA size x y z t-value
both groups
same > new
Posterior Cingulate L 31 520 -5 -46 27
Inferior Parietal Lobule L 40 88 -41 -56 37
Angular Gyrus L 39 136 -50 -60 32
Angular Gyrus L 39 416 -42 -68 32
same < new
no clusters
sentence group
same > new
Middle Frontal Gyrus L 6 141 -39 1 45 4.97
Posterior Cingulate L 31 226 -13 -48 26 5.23
Posterior Cingulate L 29 703 -4 -48 14 6.34
Inferior Parietal Lobule L 40 169 -51 -58 39 5.57
Middle Temporal Gyrus L 39 1605 -48 -57 23 7.61
Superior Occipital Gyrus L 19 171 -36 -75 27 5.08
Superior Occipital Gyrus L 19 117 -39 -79 27 5.29
Hippocampus / L 28 89 -18 -22 -13 3.80
Entorhinal Cortex
same < new
no clusters
definition group
same > new
Precuneus L 19 139 -32 -71 35 5.85
Inferior Parietal Lobule L 40 168 -40 -52 43 5.31
same < new
no clusters
parietal lobe (Figure 6.5.B). As in the same vs. new contrast, there was
recruitment of the hippocampus (Figure 6.6.B), the posterior cingulate
and the ventral PPC (Figure 6.4.B) in the sentence group. In addition,
there were activated clusters in bilateral superior frontal gyrus. Specific
to the definition group was an anterior extension of the common activa-
tion in the anterior cingulate (Figure 6.5.B). Clusters showing a higher
activation for recombined than same pairs were not revealed.
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Table 6.2.: Brain regions showing significantly different BOLD signals for same vs.
recombined pairs. See Table 6.1 for details.
region of activity hemi BA size x y z t-value
both groups
same > recombined
Medial Frontal Gyrus L 10 144 -7 50 15
Anterior Cingulate L 24 88 -2 38 3
Posterior Cingulate L 23 80 -2 -49 25
same < recombined
no clusters
sentence group
same > recombined
Superior Frontal Gyrus R 8 85 9 51 38 4.83
Superior Frontal Gyrus L 8 122 -15 34 51 5.28
Superior Frontal Gyrus R 6 115 15 20 59 6.08
Superior Frontal Gyrus L 6 124 -10 25 58 5.69
Anterior Cingulate L 32 262 -5 34 19 6.79
Anterior Cingulate B 24 163 0 35 6 6.42
Cingulate Gyrus B 31 122 1 -23 39 4.96
Cingulate Gyrus B 23 139 0 -25 30 5.29
Cingulate Gyrus B 31 317 -4 -28 35 5.27
Posterior Cingulate R 31 256 10 -47 26 5.87
Posterior Cingulate B 30 1133 -5 -52 14 6.52
Inferior Parietal Lobule R 40 381 46 -51 36 5.39
Inferior Parietal Lobule L 40 128 -49 -58 39 5.38
Superior Temporal Gyrus L 39 1178 -57 -60 18 7.15
Hippocampus L 144 -24 -9 -20 4.37
same < recombined
no clusters
definition group
same > recombined
Anterior Cingulate L 32 234 -3 44 7 5.98
same < recombined
no clusters
Reversed vs. New Pairs: Relative Familiarity and/or Recollection
The results of the reversed vs. new pairs contrast are listed in Table
6.3. There was common activation for reversed > new pairs in the left
PPC (Figure 6.4.C). This spread more ventral in the sentence group.
Additionally, there was activation specific for the sentence group in the
left middle frontal gyrus, the left medial surfaces of the PFC and the
parietal lobe (Figure 6.5.C) as well as the left hippocampus (Figure 6.6.B
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Table 6.3.: Brain regions showing significantly different BOLD signals for reversed
vs. new pairs. See Table 6.1 for details.
region of activity hemi BA size x y z t-value
both groups
reversed > new
Angular Gyrus L 39 182 -42 -64 35
reversed < new
no clusters
sentence group
reversed > new
Middle Frontal Gyrus L 6 285 -22 14 60 6.14
Medial Frontal Gyrus L 9 173 -5 38 32 6.36
Medial Frontal Gyrus L 9 198 -9 30 31 5.81
Medial Frontal Gyrus L 9 83 -3 52 18 5.26
Anterior Cingulate L 32 99 -8 34 24 5.18
Thalamus L 161 -4 -15 10 6.35
Posterior Cingulate R 23 146 10 -48 24 5.62
Posterior Cingulate L 31 1895 -11 -56 20 7.41
Middle Temporal Gyrus L 19 3927 -37 -77 21 7.57
Hippocampus L 169 -22 -19 -12 4.85
Amygdala L 70 15 -7 -9 4.88
reversed < new
no clusters
definition group
reversed > new
Inferior Frontal Gyrus L 45 203 -48 23 19 5.75
Inferior Parietal Lobule L 39 684 -36 -64 41 6.70
Caudate Nucleus L 83 -9 3 9 4.91
reversed < new
no clusters
and C). Regions exclusively activated in the definition group were found
in the left IFG (BA 45) and in a more dorsal and more medial extension
of the common activation in the posterior parietal lobe (Figure 6.4.C).
Same vs. Reversed Pairs: Absolute Familiarity
In search for regions specific to unitization, same and reversed pairs were
contrasted. There was no cluster being more activated by same than
reversed pairs neither was there one being more activated by reversed
than same pairs.
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Figure 6.4.: Common and group-specific activation in clusters on the lateral surface
of the left hemisphere activated by three different contrasts. The clusters
are overlaid on a T1-weighted image of one participant and coordinates
indicate slice position. Note that left hemisphere is depicted on the right
side.
Absolute vs. Relative Familiarity
Although predicted, the same vs. reversed contrast did not reveal any
clusters specific to absolute familiarity. However, different patterns of
results in the same > new (general recognition) and the same > recom-
bined contrast in comparison to the reversed > new (relative familiarity)
Figure 6.5.: Common and group-specific activation in clusters on the medial surface
of the left hemisphere activated by three different contrasts. The clusters
are overlaid on a T1-weighted image of one participant and coordinates
indicate slice position.
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Figure 6.6.: Common and group specific activation in clusters in the hippocampus
activated by three different contrasts in the left hemisphere (upper panel).
The clusters are overlaid on a T1-weighted image of one participant and
coordinates indicate slice position. Note that left hemisphere is depicted
on the right side. For descriptive purpose, bar graphs show mean beta
values in the indicated clusters for all four pair types (lower panel) in
both encoding groups. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
contrast in the definition group suggest that there are differences in the
processing of same and reversed pairs which might not have been revealed
by the same vs. reversed contrast. Therefore, I conducted two additional
analyses for the definition group which might be more sensitive to detect
regions specific to absolute and relative familiarity.
In order to isolate absolute familiarity regions, the same> new contrast
was masked by the reversed > new contrast (exclusive mask thresholded
at p > .05). Thus, this analysis reveals regions which are activated by
Table 6.4.: Brain regions which were selectively activated for same > new and re-
versed > new in the definition group. In this analysis, each contrast was
exclusively masked by the other contrast. See Table 6.1 for details.
region of activity hemi BA size x y z t-value
same > new masked by reversed > new
Medial Frontal Gyrus L 10 80 -12 51 7 6.61
Posterior Cingulate L 31 112 -10 -50 22 5.34
Precuneus L 7 96 -4 -59 31 5.97
Middle Temporal Gyrus L 39 176 -41 -70 28 5.24
reversed > new masked by same > new
Inferior Frontal Gyrus L 45 96 -44 19 12 4.87
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Figure 6.7.: Selected clusters in the left hemisphere which were selectively activated
for same > new and reversed > new, respectively, in the definition group
(upper panel). In this analysis, each contrast was exclusively masked by
the other contrast. The clusters are overlaid on a T1-weighted image
of one participant and coordinates indicate slice position. For descriptive
purpose, bar graphs show mean beta values in the indicated clusters for all
four pair types (lower panel) in both encoding groups. Error bars indicate
standard errors of the mean.
same pairs in contrast to new pairs, but not for reversed pairs in contrast
to new pairs. Activated clusters were found on the medial surface of
the PFC and the parietal lobe as well as in the left PPC (Table 6.4 and
Figure 6.7.A and B).
In order to identify regions specific to relative familiarity, the reversed
> new contrast was masked by the same > new contrast. This analysis
revealed regions which show greater activation for the reversed compared
to new pairs but not for same compared to new pairs. Only one cluster
in the left IFG was found (BA 45) to be activated in this analysis (see
Table 6.4 and Figure 6.4.A).
6.3 Discussion
The current study compared neural activity during associative retrieval
for unrelated word pairs which were either encoded in a unitized or in a
non-unitized manner. The aim of the experiment was to find out which
brain regions are generally involved in retrieval of unrelated word pairs
when they have been unitized in only one study trial compared to non-
unitized word pairs. Moreover, the design of Experiment 2 allowed to
directly compare brain regions associated with absolute familiarity for
novel units to those associated with relative familiarity for single items
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within one experiment. Unitization was manipulated between subjects.
In the definition group, participants encoded word pairs together with
a definition combining the two words to a novel conceptual unit. In
the sentence group, participants were provided with a sentence frame in
which they had to fill in the two words of the pair separately minimiz-
ing the degree of unitization. At test, participants had to discriminate
same, reversed, and recombined versions of the studied pairs as well as
completely new pairs.
6.3.1 Behavioral Data
Assessment of behavioral data revealed that participants in the two
groups generally performed on the same level, but differed according
to how well they could deal with reversed pairs. Consistent with my
assumption, the definition group recognized reversed pairs significantly
worse than the sentence group. This is in line with a less flexible retrieval
process which is engaged after definition encoding where participants pri-
marily rely on a familiarity signal for novel conceptual units. This unit
familiarity signal is sensitive to the exact configuration of the pair and
is disrupted by reversed test cues. Thus, the missing unit familiarity
signal presumably makes the participants falsely rejecting the reversed
pairs. Also consistent with greater reliance on familiarity in the definition
group was the speed advantage for the definition group which was found
for all except for reversed pairs. Within-group comparisons between same
and reversed pairs complement this pattern. Decreased performance and
slower reaction times for recognition of reversed pairs compared to same
pairs was shown only in the definition group, but not in the sentence
group. In the case of reversed pairs, participants in the definition group
probably perceive interference when item familiarity indicates that the
two items are old but missing unit familiarity indicates that the pair is
new. This interference might also make participants reversing the pre-
sented test cue mentally in order to compare it to the studied pairs in
mind which would also lead to prolonged response times. In line with the
hypothesis of a reduced reliance on recollection for unitized word pairs
is the lower confidence with which participants gave their responses be-
cause recollection based responses are thought to be associated with on
average higher confidence (see Yonelinas, 2002).
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6.3.2 Imaging Data
Analyses of the sentence group revealed a general pattern showing greater
activation for studied pairs (same or reversed) in contrast to non-studied
pairs (recombined or new) in areas located in the posterior cingulate, the
ventral PPC, and the hippocampus. Activation in these brain regions
was more extended in the sentence group than in the definition group or
even exclusive as in the case of the hippocampus. These regions were pre-
viously identified as being associated with recollective processing (e.g.,
Henson et al., 2005, 1999; Yonelinas et al., 2005). Thus, these results
are in line with the prediction that associative recognition of word pairs
recruits a network typically associated with recollection when word pairs
were studied as separate lexical items within sentence frames. Joining
the few examples of fMRI studies examining the retrieval phase of as-
sociative recognition memory for arbitrary associations (e.g., Giovanello
et al., 2004, 2009; Ford et al., 2010), the current experiment provides
further evidence that in healthy young participants recognition of arbi-
trary word pairs strongly engages the recollection network including the
hippocampus.
Complementing the behavioral results, this pattern of brain activation
is in line with a flexible recollection process. Although encoded in a spe-
cific order (word order in the sentence), a highly overlapping network
of brain regions is engaged when same and reversed pairs have to be
retrieved. This is consistent with findings from recall implicating that
recollection is less reliant on the precise configuration of the association
(e.g., Kahana, 2002). I am aware of only one other fMRI study showing
flexibility of the hippocampus with respect to order of the association
(Giovanello et al., 2009). Interestingly, Giovanello et al. (2009) showed
comparable activation for same and reversed pairs only in the anterior
but not in the posterior hippocampus. As can be seen in Figure 6.6.A
and 6.6.C, the clusters identified in the same vs. new and the reversed vs.
new contrast are almost at the same location in the anterior hippocam-
pus. Thus, the current study substantiates the notion that the anterior
hippocampus can retrieve associations in a highly flexible way. The same
vs. recombined contrast revealed a non-overlapping cluster even further
anterior which seems to be selectively deactivated for recombined pairs
(see Figure 6.6.B) exhibiting a similar activation level for same, reversed,
and new pairs. At first glance, this pattern seems difficult to explain. If
one assumes that activation in this cluster is associated with successful
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associative memory, one would expect the new pairs to show a level of
activation which is similar to recombined pairs. However, the anterior
hippocampus has also been associated with novelty detection for sin-
gle items (e.g., Daselaar, Fleck, & Cabeza, 2006). Thus, it is possible
that activation related to the novelty of the new pairs countervailed the
effects of associative memory. Although the exact functional interpreta-
tion of this finding remains elusive, Experiment 2 extends the findings
by Giovanello et al. (2009) showing flexibility also for other regions in
the recollection network such as the posterior cingulate and the ventral
PPC.
In the definition group, greater activation for same than new pairs in
the posterior cingulate and the PPC was found mainly in areas over-
lapping with the sentence group. This suggests at least some residual
recollection in the definition group. However, the extent of the activa-
tion was considerably smaller than in the sentence group and there was
no hint of an involvement of the hippocampus. Notably, recollection-
related activation in the definition group was primarily found when same
pairs were presented as test cues (there was only one common cluster
showing greater activation for reversed than new pairs in the angular
gyrus). Thus, recollection in the definition group was dependent on the
exact reinstatement of the study cue. This speaks in favor of successful
integration during encoding and a less flexible process than in the sen-
tence group which corresponds well with the impaired performance for
reversed pairs in the definition group. In sum, these results imply a mini-
mal impact of recollection when word pairs have been unitized in contrast
to non-unitized word pairs. Although evidence for reduced recollection
for unitized associations has been reported before in ERP (Bader et al.,
2010; Ja¨ger et al., 2006) as well as fMRI studies (Ford et al., 2010), this
finding has until now received only little attention. Reduced recollection
for unitized representations could reflect that more effortful recollective
retrieval processes are less recruited if familiarity provides a sufficiently
diagnostic signal. Note that some ERP studies did not find evidence for
reduced recollection for unitized associations when study conditions pro-
moted the contribution of recollection. For example in the Wiegand et
al. (2010) study, all word pairs were studied twice, a condition which is
known to increase recollection (Jacoby et al., 1998; Opitz, 2010a) while
in the Rhodes and Donaldson studies (2007, 2008b) multiple short study-
test-cycles were used. The exact boundary conditions of when unitization
influences recollection still have to be determined.
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In addition to the common activation in the PPC, activation extended
into more ventral areas in the sentence group (for same > new, same >
recombined, and reversed > new). In contrast, activation spread more
dorsal and medial into the vicinity of the intra-parietal sulcus in the def-
inition group (for same > new and reversed > new). This corresponds
to a dissociation which has previously been reported associating ventral
PPC regions with recollection and more dorsal areas with familiarity
(Yonelinas et al., 2005; Henson et al., 2005; Vilberg & Rugg, 2008). Al-
though the dorsal area has often been associated with familiarity-based
responses, there are doubts about the memory-specificity of its function
(Vilberg & Rugg, 2008). However, irrespective of the exact functional
interpretation, the differential activation patterns across the sub-regions
of the PPC suggest stronger reliance on recollection in the sentence group
and more familiarity-based responding in the definition group. This
familiarity-related processing seems to be general and neither specific
to relative nor to absolute familiarity.
One region in the left IFG (BA 45) was more activated for reversed than
new pairs selectively in the definition group. Additionally, this region was
identified as specific to relative familiarity (rev > new masked by same >
new). This region has previously been associated with familiarity-based
retrieval. It has been shown to vary linearly with familiarity strength
(Yonelinas et al., 2005) and damage to this regions leads to a selective
deficit in familiarity (Aly et al., 2011). Aly and colleagues suggested a
possible role of this region in setting decision criteria and/or assessing
familiarity strength in order to make old/new judgments. This is further
evidence that there was a tendency to base decisions on familiarity signals
in the definition group. Moreover, it was shown that a cluster within this
region was selectively activated by the reversed vs. new contrast and not
by the same vs. new contrast suggesting a specific role of this region in
relative familiarity. It is possible that the left IFG, as one of the possible
generators of the mid-frontal old/new effect (see Bridger et al., 2012, for
a discussion), is involved in the assessment of the increment in familiarity
relative to a pre-experimental baseline (Stenberg et al., 2009). An alter-
native explanation for this activation pattern, however, could be that it
reflects stronger engagement during the specification of the retrieval cue
(Dobbins, Foley, Schacter, & Wagner, 2002). Cue specification might be
more demanding for reversed pairs when participants choose the strat-
egy to mentally reverse the test cue whenever they do not immediately
recognize it as ‘old’ or ‘new’. Although I cannot completely rule out
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this explanation, I think it is unlikely that participants consistently em-
ployed this strategy as in this case performance for reversed pairs should
be much better.
The contrast between same and reversed pairs did not reveal any dif-
ferences in activation between the two types of pairs. It is conceivable
that the differences in brain activation for the two types of familiarity are
too subtle to be detected by this contrast. The situation is even changed
for the worse by a less optimal signal-to-noise ratio for the reversed pairs
due to the poor performance for this pair type in the definition group.
Moreover, if participants mentally reversed the test cue in the case of
reversed pairs (even if only sometimes), the differences between same
and reversed pairs become even more marginal. However, an additional
analysis revealed brain regions which were selectively activated in the
same vs. new contrast, but not in the reversed vs. new contrast. One
of these clusters is located in the left PPC slightly inferior to the clus-
ters which were shown to be selectively activated in the definition group
compared to the sentence group (Figure 6.4.A). Thus, it probably reflects
the enhanced recollection for same in contrast to reversed pairs already
observed in the other contrasts. Two other clusters were identified on
the medial surface of the parietal lobe. However, both of them were not
revealed in the group comparison and are commonly either associated
with recollection or both, recollection and familiarity. Thus, they do not
seem to be specific to the same pairs in the definition group.
However, another region specific to the same vs. new contrast was
found in BA 10 in the medial PFC. Consistently, this region was also
activated in the same > recombined contrast in the definition group.2
According to van Kesteren, Ruiter, Ferna´ndez, and Henson (2012), the
mPFC is activated when incoming information is congruent to prior
knowledge. If this is the case, mPFC couples with posterior associa-
tion areas and inhibits hippocampal memory function. Thus, congruent
events are encoded and retrieved by the neocortex whereas incongruent
events (such as arbitrary associations) are encoded and retrieved by the
hippocampus. Possibly, by providing a reasonable definition, unitization
renders arbitrary word pairs more congruent to existing schemas leading
to activation in mPFC. The lack of hippocampal activation for unitized
pairs is consistent with this explanation.
2BA 10 was not revealed as specific for the definition group in the same vs. new
contrast in the group comparison. However, a cluster in this region was obtained
when reducing the voxel extent threshold to 5 contiguous voxels.
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Familiarity signals in the PrC were not detectable in neither of the
computed contrasts.3 One possible reason of this null finding is that
fMRI signals in the MTL can suffer from susceptibility-induced signal
loss (e.g., Asano, Mihara, Kirino, & Sugishita, 2004) leading to a poor
signal-to-noise ratio. Thus, it was impossible to find out whether there
is activity modulation in the PrC associated with absolute familiarity
which is additional to the item-related familiarity signal.
Experiment 2 showed that recognition of arbitrary associations en-
coded within sentence frames, which was supposed to minimize unitiza-
tion, recruits a network of brain regions that has previously been asso-
ciated with recollection. This underlines the importance of recollection
in memory for arbitrary associations. Moreover, large parts of this net-
work were shown to be highly flexible with respect to the order of the
retrieval cue. Concordantly, memory performance for reversed pairs was
comparable to same pairs in the sentence group. In contrast, using uni-
tization as an encoding strategy as in the definition group leads to a
limited involvement of this network. Consistent with this, I found faster
reaction times and less confident responses in the definition group. This
suggests that effortful recollection is recruited only if it yields additional
diagnostic value for an associative memory task. Possibly, this is already
determined during encoding which is why recollection could not be re-
cruited for reversed pairs during the test although it would have been
advantageous. There was a general shift to an engagement of brain re-
gions previously associated with familiarity in the definition group such
as BA 45 in the IFG or the dorsal part of the PPC. Contrary to my
expectations, this shift was also observed for reversed pairs suggesting
a generally greater emphasis on familiarity-based processing, not only
for the intact conceptual units. Although, a clear dissociation of brain
regions involved in item and unit familiarity was not revealed, an addi-
tional set of analyses suggests that activation in BA 45 was specific to
reversed pairs, possibly associated with relative familiarity. In contrast,
activation in BA 10 in the medial PFC was selective for same pairs and
is possibly related to absolute familiarity.
3This null result is also obtained without the masking procedure.
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CHAPTER 7
Experiment 3
7.1 Introduction
The findings summarized in Chapter 3 suggest that there are at least two
different neural signals contributing to the feeling of familiarity: relative
and absolute or conceptually-driven familiarity. Together with studies
using pre-existing single items (e.g. Stenberg et al., 2009), the study by
Wiegand et al. (2010) suggests that the early mid-frontal old/new effect
is a marker of relative familiarity that operates on pre-existing represen-
tations in semantic memory. In contrast, the early parietal old/new effect
in the same time window seems to be associated with absolute familiar-
ity which takes effect in case of novel representations or when facilitated
conceptual processing can be diagnostic for prior occurrence. According
to the discrepancy-attribution-hypothesis (e.g., Whittlesea & Williams,
2001b, 2001a), this is the case whenever fluent processing occurs unex-
pectedly.
Applied to the influence of unitization on familiarity-based associative
recognition memory (see Figure 4.1), relative familiarity seems to play
a role when the to-be-remembered associates are already linked to one
single representation. In support of this view, Rhodes and Donaldson
(2007) found an enhanced mid-frontal old/new effect for associated word
pairs such as traffic–jam in contrast to non-unitized word pairs. The
pairs employed by Rhodes and Donaldson (2007) are perceived as uni-
tized because together they denote one pre-experimentally known single
concept. Unrelated pairs are pre-experimentally associated with two dis-
tinct concepts but can be unitized during study. Associative recognition
of this kind of pairs was shown to be associated with an early parietal
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old/new effect (Bader et al., 2010; Wiegand et al., 2010). Moreover,
consistent with the discrepancy-attribution-hypothesis, in these exper-
iments the creation of novel units enhanced processing fluency for the
pairs (a claim which was substantiated by Experiment 1 and 2). As flu-
ent conceptual processing is unexpected for novel units because of their
pre-experimental unrelatedness, it is conceivable to link the early parietal
old/new effect to absolute familiarity.
The study by Rhodes and Donaldson (2007) on the one hand and the
studies investigating recognition memory for novel units (Bader et al.,
2010; Wiegand et al., 2010) on the other hand found the two different
ERP effects across different experimental settings. Moreover, the study
by Wiegand et al. (2010) dissociated the two ERP old/new effects by con-
trasting item and associative memory. Thus, the main aim of the current
study was to dissociate the mid-frontal and parietal early old/new effect
within one study by comparing two kinds of stimuli which are struc-
turally comparable but differ in type of unitization. For this purpose,
pre-experimentally unitized associations (compound pairs) were directly
compared with experimentally unitized word pairs (novel units). Impor-
tantly, pre-experimentally existing compound pairs and experimentally
learned novel units are both supposed to be conceptually integrated and
therefore can be processed fluently during a recognition test. However,
only for novel units this fluent processing is unexpected and therefore
should elicit absolute familiarity. By using these two types of pairs, the
potential confound of a study cue repetition only for one but not the
other condition was avoided (see Experiment 1 for discussion). In the
current experiment, old pairs of both conditions were exact repetitions
of the study cue.
The notion that the early parietal old/new effect reflects differences
in conceptual fluency for studied and unstudied items is motivated by
its resemblance to the N400 effect. Among other processes, the N400 is
considered to reflect the ease of semantic processing and has mostly been
reported in language comprehension paradigms (Kutas & Federmeier,
2000, 2011). In those studies, processing ease is not directly task relevant
but can be observed as a byproduct. Thus, the N400 can be considered as
a marker of implicit memory access. Hence, if the early parietal old/new
effect is an instantiation of the generic N400 effect under explicit memory
conditions, it should also be observable outside the context of an explicit
recognition memory experiment. This hypothesis underlies the second
aim of the current experiment.
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Figure 7.1.: Schematic illustration of one study-test block. Word pairs from both con-
ditions were presented intermixed during study and test. In the study
phase, participants judged the fit of the definition/description and the
pair during the presentation of the question mark. In the test phase,
participants had to discriminate between old, recombined, and new pairs
before the end of the trial.
Due to the large amount of stimuli to be studied, the experiment was
split into two study-test blocks. A schematic illustration of one study-
test block can be seen in Figure 7.1. During study, word pairs of both
conditions were presented intermixed. After a short delay, a definition
combining the two words of a pair to a novel concept (unitization con-
dition) or a description fitting the general meaning of the pre-existing
compound pair (compound condition) was presented along with the pair.
Participants were instructed to remember the pair for a subsequent mem-
ory test and to judge how well the definition or description fits to the
pair treating each condition as its own reference category. Each word
pair was studied twice. During test, participants were presented with
old, recombined, and new pairs which they were instructed to classify
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as such. Familiarity is generally considered to be an automatically oc-
curring signal (Yonelinas, 2002). Consequently, this should also hold
for the postulated different kinds of familiarity signals. Thus, the two
signals and the associated ERP effects should be dissociable when the
two conditions are presented intermixed in the same test lists. Indeed,
in the studies reported by Whittlesea and Williams (e.g., Whittlesea &
Williams, 2000), expectedly fluent and unexpectedly fluent items were
presented intermixed. Predominantly, the unexpectedly fluent test items
were associated with a fluency-driven increase in false alarms. Therefore,
conditions were likewise presented intermixed in the present experiment.
At the end of the whole experimental procedure, a vocabulary test ex-
amining how well the participants remembered the meaning of the novel
concepts was administered. The performance in this test provides an
external measure of the goodness of conceptual integration during study.
Concerning the main aim of this experiment – to test the hypothetical
link of the early parietal old/new effect and absolute familiarity and to
dissociate it from the mid-frontal old/new effect – the comparison of
the two types of word pairs manipulates the expectedness of conceptual
fluency. Thus, I expected the early parietal old/new effect only for the
unitization condition but a more frontally distributed effect in the same
time window in the compound condition. In the later time window, a left
parietal old/new effect was expected in both conditions as a recollection-
related effect was previously reported for both conditions (Wiegand et al.,
2010; Rhodes & Donaldson, 2007) when study conditions were beneficial
for recollection such as studying each pair twice (Opitz, 2010a). On
the behavioral level, I expected decreased memory performance for the
recombined pairs in the compound compared to the unitization condition
because these pairs were highly similar to the studied pairs.
The second aim of this experiment was to examine whether the early
parietal old/new effect can be found outside of an explicit memory con-
text, that is a reduced N400 for novel conceptual units in contrast to
unrelated pairs. By this, a link between the N400 and the early pari-
etal old/new effect was supposed to be established. In the current study,
implicit memory conditions were created during the study phase by pre-
senting each pair twice. At the second presentation, the novel conceptual
units were already integrated and were known to the participants. How-
ever, participants were not explicitly asked if they remember the pair but
had to do the same task again. Based on the reasoning described above,
a reduced N400 was expected for the already integrated pairs during the
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second presentation in contrast to the first presentation where the pair
was still completely unrelated. This effect should be greater in the uni-
tization condition than in the compound condition as compound pairs
should already be processed fluently during the first presentation. Ac-
cordingly, compound pairs should elicit a reduced N400 compared to un-
related pairs already during the first presentation as was already shown
by Rhodes and Donaldson (2008a).
7.2 Methods
7.2.1 Participants
Data was collected from 20 students (10 female) from Saarland University
with a mean age of 24.5 (range : 20 − 31), who were all native German
speakers and right-handed as assessed by the Edinburgh Handedness In-
ventory (Oldfield, 1971). Due to technical problems the EEG data of
one participant was not correctly recorded in the study phase. Thus,
the study phase sample was reduced to n = 19. The participants had
no known neurological problems, normal or corrected-to-normal vision,
and gave informed consent prior to taking part. They were reimbursed
with course credit or 8 Euros/hour. The experiment was approved by
the local ethics committee of Saarland University.
7.2.2 Stimuli
A set of 640 German nouns was used to build 80 word quadruplets in
each condition which could be combined to two original word pairs and
a recombined version of the pairs (see Appendix A.4 and A.5 for a full
list of stimuli). Stimulus parameters are listed in Table 7.1. Mean lexical
frequency (Baayen et al., 1995) did not significantly differ between the
two conditions (original pairs: t(318) = .96, p = .34; recombined pairs:
t(158) = .1.59, p = .11) neither did mean word pair length (original pairs:
t(318) = .80, p = .42; recombined pairs: t(158) = .55, p = .58).
Word pairs in the compound condition were pre-existing German com-
pound combinations of words. Thus, the two constituents were expected
to be related and unitizable. In contrast, word pairs in the unitization
condition were pre-experimentally unrelated and non-unitizable, how-
ever, were chosen to be suitable for a grammatically correct compound
combination in German without requiring any further adjustments to
the singular nouns. The effectiveness of this manipulation was tested in
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a pre-experimental rating study. All original word pairs and all recom-
bined word pairs were rated according to relatedness and unitizability
on a 4-point-scale. Each pair was rated by 10 to 13 participants (valid
ratings) who did not take part in the actual experiment. Relatedness
was explained in a general sense capturing categorical relatedness (fea-
ture overlap) and association (common occurrence). The scale ranged
from ‘not related’ and ‘hardly related’ over ‘rather related’ to ‘strongly
related’. Unitizability denoted how suitable the pair is for forming a
concept together. The scale ranged from ‘not at all’ and ‘hardly’ over
‘well’ to ‘very well’. Mean ratings are listed in Table 7.1. As expected,
compound word pairs were significantly more related (original pairs:
t(318) = 28.78, p < .001; recombined pairs: t(158) = 20.78, p < .001)
and more unitizable (original pairs: t(318) = 85.12, p < .001; recom-
bined pairs: t(158) = 85.85, p < .001) than the pairs in the unitization
condition.
Participants studied 120 original pairs in each condition. Compound
word pairs were presented together with a definition describing the com-
Table 7.1.: Examples of word pairs used in Experiment 3 (English translations).
Means (SD) are provided for lexical frequency, pair length, as well as the
relatedness and unitization question in the pre-experimental rating.
compound unitization
original pairs
example pair 1 TEE TASSE GEMU¨SE BIBEL
(tea cup) (vegetable bible)
example pair 2 DESSERT LO¨FFEL KUSS KLAGE
(dessert spoon) (kiss complaint)
frequency 53.03 (58.45) 60.77 (83.29)
pair length 11.04 (2.41) (range: 6 – 18) 10.85 (1.73) (range: 8 – 16)
relatedness 1.27 (.24) 2.78 (.62)
unitizability 1.26 (.22) 3.78 (.30)
recombined pairs
example Pair TEE LO¨FFEL GEMU¨SE KLAGE
(tea spoon) (vegetable complaint)
frequency 72.23 (90.74) 52.60 (63.19)
pair length 10.55 (2.52) (range: 6 – 19) 10.74 (1.70) (range: 8 – 14)
relatedness 2.62 (.54) 1.28 (.18)
unitizability 3.70 (.21) 1.34 (.13)
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pound adequately (e.g., TEA CUP – A pot which can be used to drink
hot liquids). Word pairs in the unitization condition were presented to-
gether with a definition combining the words to a novel concept (e.g.,
VEGETABLE BIBLE – A book which is consulted by hobby gardeners).
Only synonyms or associates were used in the definitions in order to avoid
repetitions of the words. At test, 40 pairs of the study list were repeated
as old pairs and for the remaining 80 pairs the 40 recombined versions
were included. Forty pairs which had not been studied served as new
pairs in the test list. Assignment of pairs to old, recombined, and new
pair types was counterbalanced across subjects.
7.2.3 Procedure
Before the start of the experiment, participants were fitted with an elas-
tic cap containing the EEG electrodes. The experiment was presented
using E-Prime Professional 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.) on a
17 inch monitor. Experimental stimuli were presented in white letters in
Arial font on black background. The experiment consisted of two study-
test blocks. Assignment of items to blocks was counterbalanced across
subjects. In study and test phases, word pairs of both pair types were
presented intermixed. In each study block, a list containing 60 word pairs
in each condition was presented twice (two cycles), each time in pseudo-
randomized order with the constraint that no more than four items of
each type were presented in a row. Participants had the general instruc-
tion to encode the word pairs for an upcoming recognition test. Moreover,
for each word pair they had to decide how well the definition fitted to
the concept which was denoted by the pair on a 4-point-scale ranging
from ‘1 = fits very well’ and ‘2 = fits well’ over ‘3 = fits satisfactorily’ to
‘4 = fits fairly’. Participants were pointed to the difference between the
two pair types and were instructed to use the scale separately for each
pair type in order to avoid that the novel units generally received bad
ratings and compounds generally received good ratings. A study trial
began with a 500 ms fixation cross followed by a 300 ms blank screen.
Then, the pair alone was presented in 24 pt font size for 1200 ms in the
center of the screen. Subsequently, the definition appeared in 17 pt font
size below the pair for 3800 ms. After a 50 ms blank screen, a question
mark in the middle of the screen prompted the subjects to indicate their
rating by pressing the respective key. Maximal time to respond was 1500
ms. A key press, however, terminated the trial immediately and after
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another 50 ms blank screen, the next trial started. Participants used
their index and middle fingers of both hands. The keys ‘x’, ‘c’, ‘n’, and
‘m’ corresponded to the ratings from 1–4 for every participant. After
every 40 trials, there was a self-paced break.
Each of the two test blocks comprised 20 old pairs, 20 recombined
pairs, and 20 new pairs. They were presented in pseudo-random order
with the constraint that no more than four pairs of each condition and
no more than three pairs of each pair type were presented in a row. Par-
ticipants were instructed to indicate as fast and as accurately as possible
if the presented pair was old, recombined, or new. A test trial started
with a 800 ms fixation cross followed by a 300 ms blank screen. The pair
was presented in 22 pt font size in the center of the screen lasting for
750 ms. In the following 2000 ms blank screen, participants still had the
opportunity to respond. The inter-trial-interval was kept constant. Par-
ticipants used their index and middle fingers of both hands to respond.
The assignment of the keys ‘x’ and ‘m’ to the responses ‘old’ and ‘new’
and the use of ‘c’ or ‘m’ for the response ‘recombined’ was counterbal-
anced across subjects. After every 40 trials, there was a self-paced break.
At the beginning of each study cycle and each test block, eight additional
warm-up trials were included which did not enter the analyses.
After taking off the EEG cap at the end of the main experiment,
participants were given a paper and pencil vocabulary test for the novel
concepts. All 40 old pairs from the unitization condition were presented
intermixed with 20 new pairs. For each pair, participants had to recall
the definition as literally as possible or indicate that it was a new pair.
7.2.4 EEG Recording and Data Processing
EEG was continously recorded during study and test blocks with 58
Ag/AgCl electrodes which were mounted in an elastic cap according to
the extended 10-20 system (Sharbrough et al., 1990). Recording was
mastered with the BrainVision Recorder software (Brain Products, Inc.).
Voltage differences were measured referenced to the left mastoid and re-
referenced off-line to the average of the left and right mastoid. Elec-
troocular activity was recorded with additional four electrodes, two of
which were placed outside the outer canthi of both eyes and the other
two above and below the right eye. The EEG was sampled with a rate
of 500 Hz and was amplified with a bandpass from DC to 70 Hz and a
50 Hz notch filter. Electrode impedances were kept below 8 kΩ.
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Off-line data processing was done using EEProbe software (ANT
Neuro). After applying a digital bandpass filter (.02–30 Hz), 1100 ms
epochs for each study and test pair were built time-locked to the onset of
the stimulus and including a 100 ms pre-stimulus baseline. Prior to aver-
aging, epochs with eye movement artefacts were corrected using a linear
regression algorithm (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1983) and epochs with
other artefacts were rejected. Only trials attracting correct responses
were averaged. This procedure resulted in a mean number (range) of
averaged trials of 28.2 (20 – 38) old pairs and 26.15 (20 – 35) new pairs
in the compound condition and 25.15 (13 – 34) old pairs and 23 (16 –
33) new pairs in the unitization condition. Mean voltages relative to pre-
stimulus baseline in different time windows were extracted for statistical
analyses. For illustration purposes a 12 Hz lowpass filter was applied to
the waveforms.
7.2.5 Data Analyses
Behavioral data from the study phase consisted of the participants rating
judgment. A MANOVA using Pillai’s trace test statistic was conducted
to compare mean ratings in the compound and unitization condition
during the first and second presentation. Behavioral data from the test
phase comprised accuracy (percentage of correct responses) and reaction
times for each condition and pair type. Inferential statistics included
MANOVAs with the factors of Condition (compound, unitization) and
Pair Type (old, recombined, new).
ERP inferential statistics were conducted on mean amplitudes in time
windows according to the predicted effects and visual inspection of the
waveforms. ERPs in the study phase were analyzed between 380 and
580 ms after stimulus onset for the N400 time window. An additional
time window from 600 to 800 ms was analyzed to examine the later ef-
fects covering effects more related to the second word of the pair. The
overall MANOVA in each time window included the within-subjects fac-
tors of Condition (compound, unitization), Presentation (first, second),
Anterior-Posterior (frontal, central, parietal), and Laterality (left, mid-
line, right). Only effects involving the factors Condition and Presentation
are reported as those are the the effects in the focus of interest. Non-
significant effects are generally not reported for reasons of clarity. ERPs
in the test phase were analyzed in a 360 to 540 ms time window to cover
the early old/new effects. The second window covering the left pari-
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etal old/new effect started at 590 ms and ended at 750 ms, which was
isochronic with the offset of the word pair. The overall MANOVA in each
time window included the within-subjects factors of Condition (com-
pound, unitization), Pair Type (old, new), Anterior-Posterior (frontal,
central, parietal), and Laterality (left, midline, right). Recombined pairs
were not analyzed as they were not in the focus of interest and they
are hard to interpret as they might contain conflicting signals (the con-
stituents are old, but the pair is new) which are difficult to tear apart in
such a spatially integrating measure as ERPs.
The significance level was set to α = .05. In post-hoc pair-wise com-
parisons, p-values are marked as non-significant (ns.) when they failed to
reach significance after adjustment using the Bonferroni-Holm procedure
(Holm, 1979).
7.3 Results
7.3.1 Behavioral Results
Study Phase
During the first presentation, participants’ mean rating was M = 1.61
(SE = .06) in the compound condition and M = 2.82 (SE = .10) in
the unitization condition. During the second presentation, the mean
rating was M = 1.66 (SE = .07) in the compound condition and M =
2.90 (SE = .10) in the unitization condition. MANOVA over all pairs
with the within-subject factors Condition (compound, unitization) and
Presentation (first, second) yielded a significant main effect of Condition
(F (1, 18) = 80.95, p < .001), a significant main effect of Presentation
(F (1, 18) = 6.802, p < .001), but no significant interaction (F < 1).
Ratings during first and second presentation were highly consistent as
revealed by an item-based (n = 180) Pearson’s correlation coefficient of
r = .92 (p < .001) in the compound condition and r = .86 (p < .001)
in the unitization condition. Using Fisher’s r-to-z-transformation it was
revealed that the correlation coefficient in the compound condition was
significantly larger than in the unitization condition (Z = 2.86, p < .01).
Thus, the fit of the pair and the description was generally perceived
as better in the compound condition. Moreover, participants generally
applied a stricter criterion during the second presentation. There was a
strong consistency in the ratings from first to second presentation which
was even stronger in the compound condition.
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Test Phase
As can be seen in Figure 7.2.A, old and new pairs were better recognized
in the compound than in the unitization condition but recombined pairs
were better recognized in the unitization condition. A MANOVA on ac-
curacy revealed a main effect of Pair Type (F (2, 18) = 30.42, p < .001)
and an interaction of Pair Type by Condition (F (2, 18) = 46.98, p < .001)
but no main effect of Condition (F < 1). Deconstruction of the inter-
action by pair-wise comparisons showed that in the compound condi-
tion old pairs (M = .91, SE = .02) were better recognized than recom-
bined pairs (M = .50, SE = .03, t(19) = 10.55, p < .001) and new
pairs (M = .86, SE = .02) were better recognized than recombined pairs
(t(19) = 8.88, p < .001). Moreover, the difference between old and new
pairs failed to reach significance (t(19) = 2.60, p = .018, ns.). In contrast,
in the unitization condition old pairs (M = .82, SE = .03), recombined
pairs (M = .74, SE = .03), and new pairs (M = .74, SE = .03) were
recognized on a comparable level. All t-tests were not significant (old vs.
recombined: t(19) = 2.16, p = .04, ns.; old vs. new: t(19) = 1.98, p = .06,
ns.; recombined vs. new: t(19) < 1). Comparisons between compound
and unitization condition revealed that compounds were better recog-
nized when the pair type was old (t(19) = 3.66, p < .01) and when it was
new (t(19) = 6.00, p < .001). However, performance was better in the
unitization condition than the compound condition for recombined pairs
(t(19) = 8.18, p < .001).
Figure 7.2.: Mean probabilities of correct responses (A.) and mean reaction times (B.)
for old, recombined, and new pairs in the compound and unitization con-
dition in Experiment 3. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals for
the interaction term (Jarmasz & Hollands, 2009).
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Table 7.2.: Mean proportion of incorrect responses for all three pair types in the two
conditions. rec = recombined.
old pairs rec pairs new pairs
‘rec’ ‘new’ ‘old’ ‘new’ ‘old’ ‘rec’
compound .06 (.01) .03 (.01) .22 (.02) .27 (.02) .01 (.01) .12 (.02)
unitization .15 (.02) .04 (.01) .08 (.01) .16 (.02) .02 (.01) .23 (.03)
Table 7.2 shows mean proportions of incorrect responses. As can be
seen, old pairs rarely attracted incorrect responses, but if any it were
‘recombined’ responses. Recombined pairs were more likely classified as
‘new’ than ‘old’ mirroring the pattern for new pairs which were more
likely classified as ‘recombined’ than ‘old’. Incorrect responses were ana-
lyzed in three separate Condition by Response MANOVAs. For old pairs,
the MANOVA revealed significant main effects of Condition (F (1, 19) =
32.43, p < .001) and Response (F (1, 19) = 15.02, p < .001) as well as
a significant interaction (F (1, 19) = 13.65, p < .01). Follow-up t-tests
revealed that incorrect ‘recombined’ responses were more frequent in the
unitization condition than in the compound condition (t(19) = 4.04, p <
.01), but there was no difference between conditions for ‘new’ responses
(t(19) = 1.10, p = .29). For recombined pairs, the MANOVA revealed
only significant main effects of Condition (F (1, 19) = 87.16, p < .001)
and Response (F (1, 19) = 7.63, p < .05) indicating more incorrect re-
sponses in the compound condition and more incorrect ‘new’ responses
than ‘old’ responses. For new pairs, significant main effects of Response
(F (1, 19) = 36.05, p < .001) and Condition (F (1, 19) = 33.55, p < .001)
and a significant interaction (F (1, 19) = 14.75, p < .01) were yielded.
Follow-up t-tests could show that the interaction indicated that there was
no significant difference between conditions for ‘old’ responses (t(19) =
1.10, p = .29), but for ‘recombined’ responses (t(19) = 5.10, p < .001).
Reaction times show the mirror pattern of the accuracy data (see Fig-
ure 7.2.B). For old and new pairs, reaction times were faster for com-
pounds than for novel units but for recombined pairs they were faster for
novel units than for compounds. A MANOVA on reaction times revealed
significant main effects of Condition (F (2, 18) = 14.56, p < .01) and Pair
Type (F (2, 18) = 52.43, p < .001) as well as a significant interaction
(F (2, 18) = 10.53, p < .01). Post-hoc comparisons for the compound con-
dition showed that old pairs (M = 1145, SE = 32) were recognized faster
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than recombined pairs (M = 1526, SE = 49, t(19) = 12.16, p < .001)
and than new pairs (M = 1298, SE = 52, t(19) = 5.10, p < .001). More-
over, new pairs were recognized faster than recombined pairs (t(19) =
5.47, p < .001). Similarly, in the unitization condition reaction times for
old pairs (M = 1235, SE = 32) were faster than for recombined pairs
(M = 1479, SE = 50, t(19) = 6.74, p < .001) and than for new pairs
(M = 1363, SE = 51, t(19) = 4.05, p < .01). Reaction times for new
pairs were faster than for recombined pairs (t(19) = 3.19, p < .01). Com-
parisons between conditions showed significantly faster reaction times
for the compound than the unitization condition for old pairs (t(19) =
5.46, p < .001) and new pairs (t(19) = 3.95, p < .01) whereas the reversed
pattern was shown for recombined pairs (t(19) = 2.56, p < .05). Analyses
of the behavioral data revealed that performance for old and new pairs
was better and faster in the compound than in the unitization condi-
tion. This performance decrease in the unitization condition can mainly
be attributed to an increased misclassification of old and new pairs as
‘recombined’. However, the pattern was flipped for recombined pairs for
which there was a decrease in accuracy in the compound condition which
resulted in slightly but not significantly worse associative memory than
in the unitization condition. This selective decrease could not be traced
back to a specific type of incorrect response.
7.3.2 ERP Results
Study Phase
Figure 7.3 shows grand average ERPs elicited by the pairs in both con-
ditions during first and second presentation. ERPs to compound pairs
during the second presentation start to diverge in the positive direction
from the other ERPs in the N400 time window at around 400 ms after
stimulus onset at left and midline electrode sites. From about 600 to 800
ms, ERPs to compounds are generally more positive than those to the
pairs in the unitization condition. Moreover, ERPs during the second
presentation are generally more positive than first presentation ERPs.
These late effects are most pronounced at centro-parietal scalp sites.
Early Time Window: 380 – 580 ms The overall MANOVA on mean
amplitudes with the within-subjects factors Condition (Compound, Uni-
tization), Presentation (first, second), Anterior-Posterior (frontal, cen-
tral, parietal), and Laterality (left, midline, right) for the early time
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Figure 7.3.: Grand average ERPs elicited by pairs in the compound and unitization
condition presented during the first and second presentation in the study
phase. Data are shown for the nine electrode sites entering the analyses
at frontal (F3, Fz, F4), central (C3, Cz, C4), and parietal (P3, Pz, P4)
locations as indicated on the scalp layout. Time windows selected for
analyses are shaded in light (early) and darker grey (late).
window revealed a significant main effect of Presentation (F (1, 18) =
4.53, p < .05), significant interactions of Condition × Laterality (F (2, 17)
= 6.96, p < .01) and Condition × Presentation × Laterality (F (2, 17) =
6.86, p < .01), as well as a marginally significant interaction of Presenta-
tion × Laterality (F (2, 17) = 3.01, p < .08). Deconstructing the three-
way interaction, separate MANOVAs were conducted for all three levels
of Laterality. On the left hemisphere, this analysis yielded a marginally
significant main effect of Presentation (F (1, 18) = 3.69, p < .08) and a
significant interaction of Condition × Presentation (F (1, 18) = 6.58, p <
.05). At midline electrodes, it revealed a significant main effect of Presen-
tation (F (1, 18) = 5.14, p < .05) and a marginally significant main effect
of Condition (F (1, 18) = 3.29, p < .09) as well as a marginally significant
interaction of Condition × Presentation (F (1, 18) = 3.09, p < .1). On
the right hemisphere, the MANOVA revealed only a marginally signifi-
cant main effect of Presentation (F (1, 18) = 4.12, p < .06). To follow-
up the significant interaction of Condition × Presentation on the left
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Figure 7.4.: Topographic maps showing the topographical distribution of the critical
differences in the study phase in the early and late time window. A. Dif-
ference waves were obtained by subtracting ERPs associated with the first
presentation from those associated with the second presentation for the
compound (left) and unitization (right) condition. B. Difference waves
were obtained by subtracting ERPs associated with the unitization condi-
tion from those with the compound condition for the first (left) and second
(right) presentation.
hemisphere, separate MANOVAs for first and second presentation were
conducted. For the first presentation there were no significant effects
whereas for the second presentation a significant main effect of Condi-
tion was found (F (1, 18) = 7.40, p < .05).
The main result of the analyses of the early time window is a Condi-
tion effect which is moderated by Presentation. Thus, a reduced N400
amplitude for the compound in contrast to the unrelated pairs in the uni-
tization condition was only found during the second presentation. More-
over, a reduction from first to second presentation was only found in the
compound condition but not in the unitization condition. This pattern
of results was most pronounced at left electrode sites whereas at right
electrode sites the effects are smaller. Topographic distributions over the
scalp of the reported effects can be seen in Figure 7.4.
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Late Time Window: 600 – 800 ms In the late time window, a
MANOVA on mean amplitudes with the within-subjects factors Con-
dition (Compound, Unitization), Presentation (first, second), Anterior-
Posterior (frontal, central, parietal), and Laterality (left, midline, right)
yielded a significant main effect of Presentation (F (1, 18) = 5.95, p <
.05), a marginally significant effect of Condition (F (1, 18) = 3.39, p <
.09), significant interactions of Condition × Laterality (F (2, 17) = 5.03,
p < .05), Condition × Presentation × Laterality (F (2, 17) = 4.10, p <
.05), and Condition × Anterior-Posterior × Laterality (F (4, 15) = 4.03,
p < .05), as well as a marginally significant interaction of Presenta-
tion × Laterality (F (1, 18) = 7.401, p < .05). Subsequently, sepa-
rate MANOVAs for all levels of Laterality were conducted to dissolve
the three-way interactions. At left-hemispheric electrodes, a main ef-
fect of Presentation (F (1, 18) = 7.58, p < .05) and a marginally sig-
nificant main effect of Condition (F (1, 18) = 3.27, p < .09) were re-
vealed. On the midline, the MANOVA showed significant main effects
of Condition (F (1, 18) = 4.45, p < .05) and Presentation (F (1, 18) =
5.84, p < .05) as well as a significant interaction of Condition × Anterior-
Posterior (F (2, 17) = 4.97, p < .05). On the right hemisphere, this
analysis yielded only a marginally significant main effect of Presenta-
tion (F (1, 18) = 3.31, p < .09). In order to deconstruct the Condition ×
Anterior-Posterior interaction at midline electrodes, three further anal-
yses were conducted at each level of Anterior-Posterior. No significant
effects were found at electrode Fz. At electrode Cz, main effects of Con-
dition (F (1, 18) = 5.41, p < .05) and Presentation (F (1, 18) = 5.86, p <
.05) were revealed. The MANOVA at Pz yielded main effects of Condi-
tion (F (1, 18) = 5.36, p < .05) and Presentation (F (1, 18) = 7.22, p <
.05), too.
The main finding in the late time window were two independent effects
of Condition and Presentation which were most pronounced at centro-
parietal midline electrodes. In a last set of analyses for this time window,
I wanted to test the reliability of the Condition effect for each presenta-
tion separately and likewise the reliability of the Presentation effect for
each condition at the two electrodes where the effects were most pro-
nounced. Pair-wise t-tests revealed that the two conditions did not sig-
nificantly differ during the first presentation (Cz: t(18) = 1.34, p = .20;
Pz: t(18) = 1.42, p = .17), but only during the second presentation
(Cz: t(18) = 2.77, p < .05; Pz: t(18) = 2.49, p < .05). Moreover, an
amplitude reduction from first to second presentation was found for the
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compound condition at both electrode sites (Cz: t(18) = 2.54, p < .05;
Pz: t(18) = 2.26, p < .05) whereas in the unitization condition only at
electrode Pz (Cz: t(18) = 1.64, p = .12; Pz: t(18) = 2.75, p < .05).
Hence, although there was no interaction of Condition and Presentation,
a robust effect of Condition can only be found during the second pre-
sentation. However, the effect of Presentation can be observed for both
conditions although it is topographically more restricted in the unitiza-
tion condition.
Test Phase
As depicted in Figure 7.5, ERPs from the compound and unitization
conditions start diverging at around 300 ms after stimulus onset pre-
dominantly at frontal electrode sites with compound pairs eliciting more
positive-going waveforms. This difference extends over the whole scalp
from about 380 ms on until about the end of the recording epoch. Old
and new test pairs in the compound condition minimally differ already
from 300 ms at frontal sites. However, considerable old/new effects in
both conditions can only be observed from 600 ms after stimulus onset
on.
Early Time Window: 360 – 540 ms A MANOVA with the factors
Condition (compound, unitization), Pair Type (old, new), Anterior-
Posterior (frontal, central, parietal), and Laterality (left, midline, right)
in the early time window revealed a significant main effect of Condition
(F (1, 19) = 5.69, p < .05) and a significant interaction of Condition ×
Laterality (F (2, 18) = 6.61, p < .01). In order to dissolve the interaction,
separate analyses were conducted for all levels of laterality. At left and
midline electrode sites, a significant main effect of Condition was yielded
(left: F (1, 19) = 8.31, p < .05; midline: F (1, 19) = 7.54, p < .05).
There were no significant effects over the right hemisphere.
Addressing my specific hypotheses regarding the presence and topo-
graphical distribution of the early effects in the two conditions, I con-
ducted separate MANOVAs for each condition at frontal and parietal
electrode sites with the factors of Pair Type (old, new) and Lateral-
ity (left, midline, right). In the compound condition, the MANOVA at
frontal sites revealed a marginally significant interaction of Pair Type ×
Laterality (F (2, 18) = 3.29, p < .07). No effects were found at parietal
sites. The follow-up t-tests at the frontal electrodes, however, could not
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Figure 7.5.: A. Grand average ERPs elicited by old and new pairs in the compound
and unitization condition in the test phase. Data are shown for the nine
electrode sites entering the analyses at frontal (F3, Fz, F4), central (C3,
Cz, C4), and parietal (P3, Pz, P4) locations as indicated on the scalp
layout. Time windows selected for analyses are shaded in light (early)
and darker grey (late). B. Topographic maps showing the topographical
distribution of the critical differences in the test phase in the early and late
time window for the compound (left) and unitization (right) condition.
Difference waves were obtained by substracting ERPs associated with new
pairs from those with old pairs.
detect any significant old/new effects (F3: t(19) = 1.24, p = .23; Fz:
t(19) = 1.39, p = .18, F4: t < 1). In the compound condition, there were
no significant effects at both scalp locations (F-values < 1).
Analyses of the ERPs in the early time window showed that early
old/new effects could not be detected in either condition. Only the effect
of generally more positive ERPs for the compound condition in contrast
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to the unitization condition over the left hemisphere was replicated from
the study phase.
Late Time Window: 590 – 750 ms In the late time window, a
MANOVA with the factors Condition (compound, unitization), Pair Type
(old, new), Anterior-Posterior (frontal, central, parietal), and Lateral-
ity (left, midline, right) revealed significant main effects of Condition
(F (1, 19) = 14.35, p < .01) and Pair Type (F (1, 19) = 5.65, p < .05)
as well as a significant interaction of Pair Type × Anterior-Posterior ×
Laterality (F (4, 16) = 7.74, p < .01). Moreover, it showed marginally sig-
nificant interactions of Condition × Laterality (F (2, 18) = 3.42, p < .06)
and Condition × Anterior-Posterior × Laterality (F (4, 16) = 2.78, p <
.07). Deconstructing the three-way interactions involving the factor Lat-
erality, separate analyses were conducted on each level of this factor.
On the left hemisphere, a MANOVA revealed a reliable main effect of
Condition (F (1, 19) = 22.03, p < .001) and a reliable main effect of
Pair Type (F (1, 19) = 6.77, p < .05) as well as a significant interac-
tion of Pair Type × Anterior-Posterior (F (2, 18) = 4.61, p < .05) and
a marginally significant interaction of Condition × Anterior-Posterior
(F (2, 18) = 2.67, p < .1). Over the midline, the analysis revealed sig-
nificant main effects of Condition (F (1, 19) = 11.69, p < .01) and Pair
Type (F (1, 19) = 4.47, p < .05). Similarly on the right hemisphere, sig-
nificant main effects of Condition (F (1, 19) = 5.77, p < .05) and Pair
Type (F (1, 19) = 4.70, p < .05) were revealed. Following-up the two-way
interactions involving the factor Anterior-Posterior at left recording sites,
separate MANOVAs revealed a significant effect of Condition at all three
electrodes (F3: F (1, 19) = 5.84, p < .05, C3: F (1, 19) = 20.14, p < .001;
P3: F (1, 19) = 13.70, p < .01). Significant main effects of Pair Type
were revealed only at C3 (F (1, 19) = 4.91, p < .05) and P3 (F (1, 19) =
10.84, p < .01), but not F3 (F (1, 19) = 2.08, p = .17).
In order to check if the old/new effects can be found independently
in each condition, post-hoc t-tests checked the reliability of the old/new
effects for each condition separately at electrodes C3 and P3 where the
effects were maximal. At electrode C3, there was only a marginally
significant effect in the compound condition (t(19) = 2.11, p < .05, p < .1
after correction) , but not in the unitization condition (t(19) = 1.41, p =
.17). At P3, the t-test revealed a significant difference in the compound
condition (t(19) = 3.05, p < .01) and a marginally reliable effect in the
unitization condition (t(19) = 2.06, p = .053). In sum, a left parietal
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old/new effect was present in both conditions albeit with a smaller spatial
extent in the unitization condition.
7.3.3 Analysis According to Study Phase Rating
Wiegand et al. (2010) showed that for same old pairs at test the good-
ness of conceptual integration influenced recognition speed and the early
parietal old/new effect. More specifically, well integrated pairs (plausible
study phase rating of ‘1’ or ‘2’) were recognized faster than poorly inte-
grated pairs (implausible study phase rating of ‘3’ or ‘4’) and the early
old/new effect could only be observed for the former but not the latter.
No such influence was found on the early mid-frontal old/new effect for
the reversed pairs. Following this rationale, the subsequent set of analy-
ses aimed to investigate whether the study phase rating correlated with
test performance and whether the early old/new effect can be observed
for plausible old pairs.
For this purpose, the trials were split into plausible (rating ‘1’ or ‘2’)
and implausible (‘3’ or ‘4’) pairs taking the ratings given during the sec-
ond presentation as a basis. The procedure of splitting the pairs resulted
generally in very few or zero trials in some of the conditions for some
of the participants. Due to this and equipment failure the remaining
sample for the behavioral data of the test phase was n = 16. Reaction
times were expected to be faster for plausible than for poorly integrated
pairs. For the ERP analyses the lower bound for the number of averaged
trials was set to 8. In order to keep as many subjects as possible in the
analyses, only the plausible pairs were used. The remaining sample size
was nonetheless reduced further to n = 11. The mean number of aver-
aged trials was 23.73 (14 – 38) in the compound condition and 11.91 (8 –
19) in the unitization condition. The analyses focused on the early time
window as the hypotheses targeted the early parietal old/new effect. I
expected an early parietal old/new effect to be present when using only
the plausible pairs in the unitization condition, but no such influence
on the early (frontal) effect in the compound condition. The small trial
number and small sample sizes imply that caution is warranted for any
conclusions that might potentially be drawn from these ERP analyses.
Behavioral Data
Mean proportion correct and reaction times are listed in Table 7.3 show-
ing a small performance advantage and a speed-up for plausible in con-
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Table 7.3.: Mean proportion of correct responses and mean reaction times according
to study phase rating for plausible (study phase rating of ‘1’ and ‘2’) and
implausible pairs (study phase rating of ‘3’ and ‘4’) in the compound and
unitization condition. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Note the
smaller sample size of n = 16.
proportion correct reaction times (ms)
plausible implausible plausible implausible
compound .88 (.02) .82 (.04) 1144 (38) 1184 (48)
unitization .84 (.05) .80 (.04) 1221 (43) 1254 (37)
trast to implausible pairs in both conditions. A MANOVA with the
factors Condition (compound, unitization) and Plausibility (plausible,
implausible) on the accuracy data revealed neither a main effect of Con-
dition (F (1, 15) = 1.62, p = .22) nor a main effect of Plausibility and no
interaction (F-values < 1). However, a MANOVA on the reaction times
revealed a significant effect of Condition (F (1, 15) = 12.26, p < .01) and
a significant effect of Plausibility (F (1, 15) = 6.10, p < .05), but no sig-
nificant interaction (F < 1). Thus, a reliable advantage resulting from a
good integration during study was only observable in response speed.
ERPs
Figure 7.6 depicts grand average waveforms for ERPs to all old pairs
and only plausible pairs as well as new pairs. It can be seen that in the
compound condition, the plausible pairs virtually do not differ from all
old pairs. In the unitization condition, however, it seems that at parietal
electrodes the pairs elicit a more positive-going waveform than all old
pairs. Report of the statistical analyses is restricted to the unitization
condition as the hypotheses were targeted to this condition. Neither
the overall MANOVA with the factors Pair Type (old, new), Anterior-
Posterior (frontal, central, parietal), and Laterality (left, midline, right)
revealed any significant effects involving the factor Pair Type (F-values
< 1.2) nor did targeted t-tests at electrodes Cz and Pz reveal a significant
difference between old and new pairs (Cz: t < 1; Pz: t(10) = 1.42, p =
.19). Thus, an early parietal old/new effect could not be observed for
only plausible old pairs either.
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Figure 7.6.: Grand average ERPs elicited by old, new, and plausible old pairs in the
compound and unitization condition in the test phase. Data are shown
for three midline electrode sites (Fz, Cz, Pz) as indicated on the scalp
layout. The time window selected for analyses is shaded in light grey.
Note the smaller sample size of n = 11.
7.3.4 Vocabulary Test
The vocabulary test was administered to the participants as it provides
an external measure of the goodness of conceptual integration during the
study phase. Since the early parietal old/new effect at test is thought to
reflect the ease of conceptual processing which in turn should be fostered
by a strong conceptual integration, I expected the effect to be present for
old pairs for which the meaning could be recalled. Before I turn to the
ERP analyses, the performance in the vocabulary test will be reported.
Vocabulary Test Performance
Subjects’ responses in the vocabulary test were classified in four cate-
gories. If the response was missing or was completely wrong, the response
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was coded as ‘0’. If the principal meaning was correct, but parts were
reproduced incorrectly or were missing, the response was coded as ‘1’. If
the principal meaning was reported completely, the response was coded
as ‘2’. Finally, if the definition was recalled literally, the response was
coded as ‘3’.
On average, participants scored 8.4 times ‘0’, 8.6 times ‘1’, 22.0 times
‘2’, and 1.05 times ‘3’. Thus, although the literal definition could only
rarely be reproduced, participants could remember the general meaning
of the 40 studied pairs.
Relationship of Behavioral Performance and Vocabulary Test Out-
come
The outcome of the vocabulary test was further analyzed on the item
level in order to relate memory for the meaning to performance in the
recognition test. Table 7.4 lists the classification of all items (40 studied
items × 20 subjects) according to whether they were correctly or incor-
rectly remembered in the recognition test. As can be seen, there was a
relationship between the score yielded in the vocabulary test and recog-
nition memory performance. The better the score in the vocabulary test,
the more likely was a correct response in the recognition test. Statistical
analysis of this contingency yielded a significant Kendall’s tau-b value
of = .22 (p < .001). Moreover, a correlation analysis restricted to the
correct items (n = 623) from the recognition test revealed a negative re-
lationship of vocabulary score and reaction times in the recognition test
(Kendall’s tau-b= −.09, p < .01). The reported set of analyses implies
that meaning acquisition of the novel concepts goes along with better
and faster performance in the recognition memory test.
Table 7.4.: Classification in the vocabulary test according to accuracy during the recog-
nition test. Vocabulary test classification: 0 = missing or incorrect; 1 =
principal meaning correct, but parts missing or incorrect; 2 = complete
report of principal meaning; 3 = literal reproduction of the definition.
vocabulary test score
0 1 2 3 total
correct 95 138 370 20 623
incorrect 72 34 70 1 177
total 167 172 440 21 800∗
∗corresponds to 40 studied items × 20 subjects
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Figure 7.7.: Grand average ERPs elicited by old, new, and those old pairs for which
the general meaning could be recalled in the unitization condition in the
test phase. Data are shown for three midline electrode sites (Fz, Cz, Pz)
as indicated on the scalp layout. The time window selected for analyses
is shaded in light grey.
ERPs to Old Pairs for Which Meaning Could be Recalled
As described above, the outcome of the vocabulary test was expected to
explain variance also in the ERP analyses. Thus, the ERP analyses in
this section focuses on those pairs for which the general meaning of the
novel concept could be correctly recalled (i.e., vocabulary score 1 – 3).
Grand average ERPs for all old pairs and for those old pairs for which
the meaning was recalled as well as new pairs are shown in Figure 7.7.
It is clear from the figure that also for the restricted set of items an
early old/new effect cannot be observed. A MANOVA with the factors
Pair Type (old-meaning recalled, new), Anterior-Posterior (frontal, cen-
tral, parietal), and Laterality (left, midline, right) confirmed that there
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were no significant effects involving the factor Pair Type (F-values < 1).
Moreover, targeted t-tests could not reveal significant differences at elec-
trode Cz or Pz (t-values < 1). Hence, meaning acquisition did not have
a nameable influence on the early parietal old/new effect.
7.4 Discussion
Experiment 3 compared ERP old/new effects during study and retrieval
of word pairs from two different conditions. Word pairs in the compound
condition were pre-existing compound word pairs associated with a single
concept. In contrast, word pairs in the unitization condition were pre-
experimentally unrelated, but were presented together with a definition
which was intended to combine the two words to a novel concept. Both
types of pairs are assumed to form a unitized representation. However,
in the compound condition, participants could rely on pre-existing links
in their semantic memory. In contrast, unitization in the unitization
condition took place only during the experiment. Thus, a new link had
to be formed. The aim of Experiment 3 was to directly contrast the two
types of pairs which differ only in the expectedness of fluent conceptual
processing and the novelty of the representation. It was expected that
pairs in the compound and unitization condition automatically elicit the
early mid-frontal and the early parietal old/new effect, respectively. A
second aim of the study was to investigate the early parietal old/new
effect under implicit memory conditions during the study phase of the
experiment.
7.4.1 Behavioral Data
Although the participants were instructed to apply different scales for the
study phase rating for the two conditions, they generally rated the fit of
the description and the word pair better in the compound condition than
in the unitization condition. This is plausible as the description generally
matched the known meaning of the compound. Moreover, participants
seem to have applied a stricter criterion during the second than during
the first presentation. However, more importantly, the ratings during the
first and second presentation showed a high correspondence indicating a
high reliability of the subjects’ ratings. The finding that the correlation
was a bit higher in the compound than the unitization condition is likely
due to the possibility to evaluate the description against an established
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meaning, a possibility which is missing in the unitization condition where
the rating is more subjective. This makes it even more remarkable that
the correlation in the unitization condition is still very high suggesting
that the participants have quite a strong feeling what a specific combina-
tion of words should mean. Thus, the analysis of the rating data suggests
that the unitization instruction employed in this experiment seems to be
suitable and the ratings can further be used as a reliable indicator of how
well the description fitted the pair.
Analysis of performance in the recognition test revealed that old and
new pairs were better recognized in the compound than in the unitization
condition. In contrast, the reversed pattern was found for recombined
pairs. A closer look at the incorrect responses revealed that old and new
pairs in the unitization condition were less likely misclassified as ‘new’
or ‘old’ than in the compound condition. Thus, although the proportion
of hits and correct rejections was lower than in the compound condition,
old/new discrimination was on a high level. This probably comes about
the circumstance that old and new pairs are highly discriminable due
to the presence and absence of meaning. This supposition is fostered
by the inclusion of the vocabulary test outcome into the analysis which
showed that the likelihood of correct recognition of an old pair rises with
increasing completeness of the definition recalled. The lack of this source
of discrimination in the compound condition is visible in the finding that
recombined pairs were recognized on a relatively low level. For these
pairs, feature overlap between recombined and studied pairs is very high
(e.g., dessert spoon vs. tea spoon) which makes them hard to distinguish.
Moreover, the descriptions which were used for highly similar concepts
are likewise highly similar. Thus, recollection of the description offers
only poor evidence for a correct decision.
Mirroring the accuracy data, old and new pairs were recognized faster
in the compound condition whereas recombined pairs were recognized
faster in the unitization condition. Thus, word pairs which are con-
nected with a pre-existing representation in semantic memory seem to
be accessible much faster than just established concepts. Only when the
highly similar foils have to be rejected, responses become slower. In both
conditions, reaction times for old pairs were faster than for new pairs. For
newly unitized pairs it has previously been suggested that this reflects
increased conceptual fluency during test (Bader et al., 2010; Wiegand
et al., 2010, see also Experiment 1). The current finding is not at odds
with this notion. Conceptual fluency should also be increased by a sin-
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gle presentation of a pre-existing compound pair. Consistent with this
interpretation are also the findings that pairs with good ratings during
study were recognized faster than those with poor ratings. Moreover,
the more details were remembered for a specific pair in the vocabulary
test, the faster were the reaction times. Thus, a better integration into
semantic memory leads to better accessibility. However, an alternative
explanation could be that better memory for the meaning goes along
with stronger and also faster recollection.
7.4.2 Study Phase ERPs
Investigation of the ERPs in the N400 time window during the study
phase revealed no difference between compound and unitization condi-
tion during the first presentation. Only during the second presentation,
a difference between the conditions was found with compound pairs elic-
iting more positive going waveforms. Moreover, compound pairs elicited
more positive going waveforms during the second than during the first
presentation. This pattern and the centro-parietal scalp distribution sug-
gests that the differences reflect an N400 effect. Word pairs in the uniti-
zation condition were not reduced from first to second presentation. The
pattern in the early time window, however, cannot be evaluated without
taking into account subsequent processing reflected in ERPs in the late
time window. Here, a robust difference between the conditions can also
only be found during the second presentation. However, in contrast to
the first time window, an amplitude reduction from first to second pre-
sentation was not only found in the compound condition but also in the
unitization condition. Although the later time window does not corre-
spond with the N400 time window, it is conceivable that the effects in this
time window could reflect processes normally associated with the N400.
The topographical distributions of the later effects are highly similar to
what was observed in the early time window. Thus, a successful unitiza-
tion process is probably reflected in the reduced amplitudes during the
late time window.
These results differ in two aspects from the expectations. First, already
during the first presentation compound word pairs were expected to elicit
more positive going ERPs than the (at this time point) completely unre-
lated word pairs in the unitization condition. The current finding is also
not consistent with the report of Rhodes and Donaldson (2008a) who
found that association word pairs (compound pairs and non-compound
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pairs) were associated with a reduced N400 compared to semantically
related and unrelated word pairs. An explanation for this divergence
might come from the kinds of stimuli employed. Rhodes and Donaldson
used opaque compound stimuli as association word pairs. The meaning
of opaque compounds cannot be derived from the meaning of their con-
stituents (e.g., butterfly). Thus, they have a lexical entry along which
their meaning is stored (Sandra, 1990). In the current study, however,
only transparent compounds were used in order to be suitable for recom-
bination. Transparent compounds, however, for which the meaning can
be derived from their constituents, were shown to be semantically com-
posed, i.e. integrated, on-line during processing. More explicitly, they are
associated with a larger N400 than opaque compounds (Koester, Gunter,
& Wagner, 2007). Hence, this integration process might be reflected in a
comparably large N400 for transparent compounds as for unrelated pairs.
This explanation, however, has to acknowledge that Rhodes and Donald-
son (2008a) found the reduced N400 also for word pairs being related in
an associative and semantic manner which do not form a compound pair
(e.g., lemon – orange). Besides the possibility that strength of the asso-
ciation matters and that the word pairs used by Rhodes and Donaldson
(2008a) might be more strongly associated than the ones used in the cur-
rent study, it is also possible that the ratio of related and unrelated pairs
influenced the results. Lau, Holcomb, and Kuperberg (2013) showed that
the reduction of the N400 to a word following a related prime is much
larger when the proportion of related pairings is high in contrast to when
it is low. As in the study by Rhodes and Donaldson the proportion of
related pairs was higher than in the current experiment, this might have
enhanced their effect. In sum, although the question why the effect was
not observed in the current study cannot be completely resolved, the
current results add evidence to the notion that the ease of conceptual
integration is influenced by contextual factors such as list composition
(e.g., Lau et al., 2013).
The second divergence from the hypotheses relates to the assumption
that the N400 in the unitization condition would be reduced during the
second presentation due to the conceptual integration during the first pre-
sentation mirroring the early old/new effect found during explicit recog-
nition conditions (Bader et al., 2010; Wiegand et al., 2010). However, as
already mentioned above, the integration/unitization process from first
to second presentation is probably reflected in the amplitude reduction
in the late time window. A delayed time course of processing is gen-
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erally not surprising for word pairs in contrast to single words. Thus,
in the current study the pairs were probably processed in a sequential
manner (see also Koester et al., 2007, for a late N400 effect during the
processing of compounds). Note that the earlier effect (in the N400 time
window) in the studies by Bader et al. (2010) and Wiegand et al. (2010)
was found under task conditions in which processing speed was pushed
by the requirement to respond as quickly as possible. This might explain
the apparent discrepancy between the findings.
The study phase ERPs as a whole suggest that the ease of conceptual
processing is sensitive to contextual influences. However, if integration
was successful once, conceptual processing is facilitated in a shortly fol-
lowing subsequent presentation of the same stimulus. Moreover, concep-
tual integration has taken place for both conditions. However, it seems
delayed in the unitization condition.
7.4.3 Test Phase ERPs
The Early Old/New Effects
Analyses of the early time window showed that neither compound nor
unitization word pairs were associated with an early old/new effect. The
only effect to be observed were generally more positive going ERPs for
the compound condition than the unitization condition at left/mid-line
electrode sites. This constitutes a replication of the effect found in the
study phase.
The lack of early old/new effects is striking as both kinds of word
pairs have previously been found to elicit reliable early old/new effects
(Rhodes & Donaldson, 2007; Bader et al., 2010). Moreover, these find-
ings have been explained with the unitized nature of the stimuli (Rhodes
& Donaldson, 2007) or the unitizing way of encoding (Bader et al., 2010)
leading to an enhancement of familiarity-based remembering. However,
little has been changed from these studies to the current experiment in
the nature of the stimuli. The only variation was the use of transparent
instead of opaque compounds (see above) in the compound condition.
Although this could mean that the compound word pairs were not per-
ceived as unitized because transparent compounds have to be integrated
during online processing (Koester et al., 2007), this is unlikely the reason
for this discrepancy of the results as the study phase data clearly shows
that integration was successful from first to second presentation. There
is no obvious reason why the studied pairs should be disintegrated again
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during the test phase. Moreover, similar to the stimuli in the Rhodes and
Donaldson (2007) study, the compound word pairs were rated as highly
unitizable in the pre-experimental rating. Thus, contextual or strategic
influences such as list composition have more likely caused the absence
of the effect, comparably to the study phase.
A similar picture emerges for the unitization condition. It could be the
case that the unitization encoding had not been effective possibly because
of the presence of the pre-experimentally unitized word pairs from the
compound condition. However, the positivity associated with the newly
unitized word pairs during the second presentation in the study phase
strongly suggests that some kind of integration process has taken place
leading to facilitated conceptual processing. Moreover, if a less optimal
unitization process would have been the reason for the lack of the effect,
at least the word pairs which were better unitized, as indicated by the
study phase ratings, should have shown the effect. This, however, was not
the case. Hence, together with the results for the compound condition,
this speaks again for a contextual or strategic component influencing the
early old/new effects. Possible contextual or strategic influences will be
elaborated on in the following.
The largest change from the preceding studies to the current one is the
inter-mixed presentation of the two types of word pairs. As is evident
from the significant difference in amplitude size between the conditions,
participants presumably have assessed this difference in some way during
the recognition test. This effect might have been elicited because par-
ticipants perceived the compound pairs relatively more familiar than the
novel units. Nevertheless, given that familiarity is widely considered as
an automatic process (see Yonelinas, 2002, for a review), it is still surpris-
ing that the studied stimuli were not more familiar than the unstudied
stimuli. However, a few ERP studies suggest that task demands can have
an effect not only on recollection but also on familiarity. For example,
Ecker and Zimmer (2009) compared old/new effects for exact repetitions
of studied object pictures (same) and pictures of different exemplars of
studied objects (different) under two different retrieval conditions. In
both conditions, same pairs had to be classified as ‘old’ and new pairs
as ‘new’. In the exclusion condition, participants had to classify differ-
ent pictures as ‘new’ and no mid-frontal old/new effect was found for
different pictures but only for same pictures. In contrast, in the inclu-
sion task, in which participants had to classify different pictures as ‘old’,
there was a smaller but reliable old/new effect also for different pictures.
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Thus, perceptually changed pictures were only assessed as familiar when
this was in accordance with the task. Similar results were obtained in a
study with faces in which some of the studied faces changed the facial
expression from study to test. Faces with a changed expression elicited
only an old/new effect when they had to be classified as ‘old’ (Guillaume
& Tiberghien, 2013). These results together with findings that the mid-
frontal old/new effect is not observed under implicit memory conditions
(Ku¨per et al., 2012) support the notion that it reflects the assessment
of familiarity which takes task demands into consideration rather than a
pure context-independent measure of stimulus familiarity. In the current
experiment, the assessment of familiarity was probably not influenced by
the task instructions, but rather the salience of specific stimulus char-
acteristics. In most recognition memory test phases, the stimulus set is
homogeneous and the most prominent characteristic of the items is the
study status as it was also the case in the Rhodes and Donaldson (2007)
study where at least most of the pairs were related. Similarly, the most
prominent feature of the test stimuli in the Bader et al. (2010) study
was the conceptual fluency of the pair which coincided with the study
status of the pair leading to the emergence of the early parietal old/new
effect. In the current experiment, however, although the pairs in the
unitization condition have presumably been unitized during study, the
most salient feature of the pairs was probably their pre-experimental fa-
miliarity which, however, is not diagnostic. At the same time, the change
in familiarity from study to test would discriminate reliably between old
and new items, i.e. would be diagnostic. However, this feature was not
salient enough, i.e. was not recognized as such, and therefore lost its
diagnosticity.
The Left Parietal Old/New Effect
A reliable left parietal old/new effect in the late time window could be ob-
served in both conditions with the effect being slightly more pronounced
in the compound condition. Although a recollection-related effect in the
unitization condition is contrary to the Bader et al. (2010) study, it was
expected based on the results by Wiegand et al. (2010) and the consid-
eration that two presentations during the study phase boost recollection
at test (Opitz, 2010a). This argument holds independently of condition
which is why a left parietal old/new effect was also expected for the
compound pairs (see also Rhodes & Donaldson, 2007). Furthermore, as
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familiarity was apparently not diagnostic for a correct recognition deci-
sion, recollection was even more important to solve the task. Thus, these
findings add to the evidence that recollection is important for associa-
tive memory (e.g. Donaldson & Rugg, 1998; Ja¨ger et al., 2006, see also
chapter 2.2.1).
7.4.4 Conclusion
The behavioral findings suggest that the higher the degree of unitization,
the faster are the response times during test which is in line with the
interpretation that the response times are an indicator of conceptual
fluency. The study phase ERPs showed that conceptual integration takes
place for both types of pairs although processing is delayed for novel
concepts. Regarding the results in the bigger context of previous studies,
they add evidence to the notion that the ease of conceptual processing
is influenced by external factors which are not directly relevant to the
processing of meaning such as list composition and time pressure during
task completion. Similarly, the early old/new effects associated with
familiarity do not seem to be purely determined by the characteristics
and learning history of the stimulus but also contextual influences such
as the salience of diagnostic features.
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CHAPTER 8
Experiment 4
8.1 Introduction
The influence of unitization on associative recognition memory has so
far been investigated using predominantly verbal stimuli (e.g., Quamme
et al., 2007; Rhodes & Donaldson, 2007; Bader et al., 2010). In these
studies, word pairs are combined in such a way that they denote a sin-
gle concept as in Experiment 2 and 3. Especially, studies investigat-
ing unitization as encoding strategy using pre-experimentally unrelated
stimuli covered solely the verbal domain. The finding of the early pari-
etal old/new effect (Bader et al., 2010; Wiegand et al., 2010) which was
associated with a form of familiarity that emphasizes conceptual pro-
cessing suggests an important role for the creation of a new meaning
during unitization. The few exceptions outside the verbal domain com-
prise studies using face stimuli (e.g., Yonelinas et al., 1999; Ja¨ger et al.,
2006) and object-color-binding (e.g., Diana et al., 2008). Face stimuli
are idiosyncratic as humans are highly specialized in perceiving faces as
a unit and object-color-binding involves binding of an object and an in-
trinsic feature. Thus, participants do not have to create a novel unit out
of previously self-contained entities.
Compelling evidence for the influence of unitization on recognition
memory in a non-verbal domain comes from studies investigating mem-
ory for scene-like stimuli. The instruction of imagining two related words
in an interactive manner during encoding (e.g., table and fork interact-
ing) was shown to boost later familiarity-based recognition (Rhodes &
Donaldson, 2008b) in contrast to a separate item imagery instruction.
However, imagery instructions can only poorly be controlled. Related ev-
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idence comes from Kriukova (2012) who used thematically related word
pairs (e.g., taxi – luggage). These word pairs exhibit a situational unique-
ness meaning that a taxi and luggage can easily be imagined in a coherent
scene because they often occur in the same context. Therefore, they are
supposed to be perceived in a more unitized manner. Kriukova (2012)
found that recognition memory for thematically related pairs is associ-
ated with a mid-frontal old/new effect and a reduced left parietal old/new
effect. Although Kriukova (2012) used word pairs, the unitization mech-
anism does not originate from building a concept but presumably from
creation of a scene. Crucially, both aforementioned studies used word
pairs which were pre-experimentally related. Thus, it is so far unknown
whether unitization of arbitrary item combinations is also possible for
two discrete pictorial items and can enhance familiarity-based recogni-
tion memory comparably to verbal stimuli.
Therefore, the current study’s aim was to extend previous research
on unitization of previously unrelated items by employing pairs of object
pictures creating novel scenes. A scene was expected to be processed in a
more unitized manner than two separate and independent objects. This
manipulation was intended to be consistent with the studies reported
in this thesis in the verbal domain. Thus, the objects did not have a
prior associative or semantic relationship and unitization was supposed
to take effect during encoding. The scene manipulation does not only
transfer the unitization paradigm to the pictorial domain but also ex-
Figure 8.1.: Example stimuli in the unitization and separation group. Displayed are
two original pairs each (upper panel) which were grouped to form recom-
binations (lower panel).
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tends the notion of a unit from contiguous items to a unitized multi-item
array. A scene was created by arranging the objects in a spatial layout
which is coherent to prior location-based associative knowledge (Gronau,
Neta, & Bar, 2008). This means that a specific object can demand other
objects in a specific spatial relation to itself. For instance, other ob-
jects are normally put on top of a table whereas they are put inside a
box. Evidence for the relevance of such spatial relationships during ob-
ject recognition comes from priming studies which showed priming effects
when the target appeared in a spatially coherent position to the prime
(e.g., a dressing-table mirror on top of a dressing-table) compared to an
incoherent position (e.g., mirror below the dressing-table; Gronau et al.,
2008). Similar priming effects can be observed when spatial coherence is
established by an implied action connecting two objects such as a screw-
driver pointing towards a screw (C. Green & Hummel, 2006). Thus, these
studies suggest that spatial coherence makes participants perceive a pair
of objects more readily as an integrated scene, i.e. as a unit.1 Thus, the
scene-like pairs in the unitization condition were arranged in a spatially
coherent way or as if they were interacting. This condition was opposed
to a separation encoding condition which was implemented by revers-
ing the positions of the two objects resulting in a spatially incoherent
arrangement (see Figure 8.1).
Encoding condition was realized as a between-subjects factor to pre-
vent a spill-over between the two conditions. Participants might develop
a general tendency to perceive the two objects as a scene irrespective
of the actual arrangement. During study, object pairs were presented
only very briefly (400 ms) to place stronger weight on the advantage of a
unitized processing. A relatively short presentation time should be suf-
ficient to extract the gist of a scene-like arrangement whereas separated
unrelated objects lack this kind of information. As this manipulation
rendered the memory task rather difficult, the experiment was split into
several short study-test blocks and an intentional encoding instruction
was employed. To further facilitate processing of the pairs during the
1It has to be noted that the priming effects were only found when the two objects
were also thematically related. For unrelated pairs (e.g., a screwdriver pointing
towards a cigarette) the effect is sometimes even reversed (C. Green & Hummel,
2006). However, in this kind of priming paradigms where semantically related pairs
are included participants are likely to form expectations regarding the semantic
features of a target. This might lead to inhibitory effects when these expectations
are violated. Thus, semantic effects could have counteracted the spatial effects
(see Gronau et al., 2008, for a similar discussion).
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short presentation time participants saw each single object once in an
item familiarization phase at the beginning of the experiment at which
point of time participants were not aware of the upcoming memory task.
At test, participants had to discriminate between same and recombined
pairs. In order to isolate effects of unitization on familiarity, a response-
deadline procedure was used. Each participant was tested under two
different testing conditions, a speeded and a nonspeeded response proce-
dure. The nonspeeded condition generally allows familiarity and recol-
lection to occur. However, the speeded condition is assumed to minimize
the contribution of recollection as recollection is a rather slow-acting pro-
cess. Therefore, performance in the speeded condition can be regarded
as an estimate of familiarity-based recognition performance (see Section
1.2.2). Previous studies showed that recollection-based responses are very
unlikely before 800 ms after stimulus onset (e.g., Hintzman & Curran,
1994; Mecklinger et al., 2010).2 The response deadline in the current
experiment was set to 900 ms accounting for the increased perceptual
complexity in a two-object display.
The response deadline manipulation was expected to influence perfor-
mance in such a way that the speeded condition should reduce accuracy.
Moreover, it was expected to interact with the encoding group manip-
ulation. Although the short presentation time during the study phase
was expected to generally favor the unitization group, the performance
advantage of this group was hypothesized to even further increase un-
der speeded response conditions. This was expected because only in the
unitization condition familiarity is assumed to contribute to recognition
whereas in the separation condition recollection is required to remem-
ber the association between the pairs. A stronger reliance on familiarity
should also lead to faster responses in the unitization than in the sepa-
ration group under nonspeeded conditions.
8.2 Methods
8.2.1 Participants
Forty-eight participants recruited from the student population at Saar-
land University took part in the experiment and were randomly assigned
2Although recollection has probably occurred at that point of time considering the
timing of the left parietal old/new effect (500–800 ms), responses based on this
information are unlikely to be made because post-retrieval, decision, and motor
planning processes take additional time.
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to the unitization group (14 female, 10 male) and separation groups (15
female, 9 male). In the separation group, data from one additional par-
ticipant was excluded from analysis due to a PR score < 0 in the non-
speeded condition. Mean age of the remaining participants was 22.21
(range: 18–30) in the unitization group and 20.58 (range: 18–29) in the
separation group. Participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision
and gave informed consent. They received 8 Euros/hour for participa-
tion. The experiment was approved by the local ethics committee of
Saarland University.
8.2.2 Stimuli
The stimulus set consisted of 160 black-and-white line-drawings of ob-
jects, animals, and persons taken from the picture set by Snodgrass and
Vanderwart (1980) and the database of the International Picture Nam-
ing Project (Szekely et al., 2004). The pictures were selected in order to
form pairs of objects which normally do not occur in the same context
but which can be arranged in a spatially coherent configuration. The
pairs were assembled in groups of two to five pairs to build recombina-
tions (see Figure 8.1). For example, in a group of three pairs the pairs
AB, CD, and EF, were recombined to AF, CB, and ED. Each original
pair could be presented in the old or recombined condition at test. Cor-
respondingly, the same version (for old pairs) or the recombination (for
recombined pairs) were presented during the study phase. Assignment
of pairs to the recombined and old condition as well as to the speeded
and nonspeeded condition was counterbalanced across subjects resulting
in four different lists (see Appendix A.6 for a full list of stimuli).
8.2.3 Procedure
The experiment started with the item familiarization phase. In this part
of the study, participants were presented with all single objects one at
a time. They were instructed to make an indoor/outdoor decision for
each object. A trial started with a 750 ms fixation cross followed by
a blank screen of 250 ms. Then the pair appeared on the screen until
the participant responded. Responses were given by pressing the keys ’f’
and ’j’ using the index fingers of both hands. Assignment of indoor and
outdoor responses to keys was counterbalanced across participants. In
case an object could not be recognized participants had the possibility
to press the space-bar in order to see the name of the object for 1000 ms.
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Analysis of the responses in the item familiarization phase revealed that
the mean number of objects which could not be recognized at first glance
in the unitization group (M = 3.71; range: 0− 13) and in the separation
group (M = 2.96; range: 0 − 13) did not differ (t < 1).
In the main experiment, encoding condition was manipulated between
subjects. In both groups, the speeded condition always followed the
nonspeeded condition as piloting suggested that participants had diffi-
culties switching to a slower response mode after having got used to the
speeded response timing. The whole procedure was split into two study-
test blocks for both conditions. Each block consisted of ten study and
ten test trials. The study phase instruction was to remember the pairs
for a later memory test and to be highly attentive as presentation time
would be very short. Each trial started with a blank screen of 1200 ms
followed by a 500 ms fixation cross and a further 200 ms blank screen.
Then the pair was presented for 400 ms. At test, participants had to
discriminate between old and recombined pairs. Each trial began with a
sequence of a 500 ms blank screen, a 500 ms fixation cross, and 200 ms
blank screen. The pair was presented for 1000 ms. In the speeded con-
dition, subjects were instructed to respond before the offset of the pair
and a warning tone was played if the response was slower than 900 ms
(participants were not aware of the deadline being slightly earlier than
picture offset). If they would hear the tone, participants were instructed
to try to respond faster. In the nonspeeded condition, if required, par-
ticipants had additional 3500 ms time to respond during the display of a
blank screen. Responses were made by pressing the keys ’f’ and ’j’ with
the index fingers of both hands. Assignment of responses to keys was
counterbalanced across subjects.
8.2.4 Data Analysis
Memory performance was assessed by hit and FA rates as well as the per-
centage of time-outs (no response was given). Additionally, the combined
performance measure PR and the estimate of response bias BR were cal-
culated based on corrected hits and FA rates as suggested by Snodgrass
and Corwin (1988). Moreover, reaction times for correct responses were
analyzed. Trials were excluded from all analyses if the reaction time was
< 300 ms which resulted in the exclusion of one trial each for the uniti-
zation and separation group in the nonspeeded condition and three trials
for the separation group in the speeded condition. Inferential statistics
126
were performed using a MANOVA with the factors of Speed (nonspeeded,
speeded) and Group (unitization, separation) as well as the factor of Pair
Type (old, recombined) if applicable. The significance level was set to
α = .05.
8.3 Results
As can be seen in Table 8.1, performance was generally better in the
nonspeeded than the speeded condition and better in the unitization
group than in the separation group. A MANOVA with the factors Speed
(nonspeeded, speeded) and Group (unitization, separation) on the PR-
scores revealed a significant main effect of Speed (F (1, 46) = 16.41, p <
.001) and a significant main effect of Group (F (1, 46) = 5.73, p < .05),
but no interaction (F < 1). However, performance was above chance
in both speed conditions for the unitization group (nonspeeded: t(23) =
14.95, p < .001; speeded: t(23) = 8.62, p < .001) as well as the separation
group (nonspeeded: t(23) = 8.04, p < .001; speeded: t(23) = 6.91, p <
.001). An analysis of the hit rate with the factors Speed and Group
revealed a main effect of Speed (F (1, 46) = 34.60, p < .001), but neither
a main effect of Group (p = .14) nor a significant interaction (F < 1).
Analysis of the FA rate yielded only a marginally significant main effect
of Group (F (1, 46) = 3.43, p < .08), but no other significant effects (F-
values < 1). Thus, the drop in performance for the speeded condition
was mainly driven by a decrease of the hit rate. For the group difference
the story is less clear. It seems to be driven by differences in both, hits
and false alarms.
Analysis of the percentage of time-outs with the factors Speed, Pair
Type, and Group revealed a main effect of Speed (F (1, 46) = 111.97, p <
Table 8.1.: Mean response rates, mean proportion of time-outs, and mean Pr- and
Br-scores in the nonspeeded and speeded conditions for the unitization and
the separation group. Standard errors are given in parentheses. TO =
time-out; rec = recombined.
hit miss CR FA old TO rec TO Pr Br
nonspeeded
unitization .88 (.02) .10 (.02) .65 (.03) .31 (.03) .02 (.01) .04 (.01) .54 (.04) .68 (.03)
separation .84 (.02) .14 (.02) .59 (.04) .39 (.04) .02 (.01) .02 (.01) .43 (.05) .70 (.03)
speeded
unitization .74 (.03) .19 (.03) .49 (.03) .34 (.03) .07 (.01) .17 (.02) .38 (.04) .58 (.03)
separation .69 (.03) .17 (.02) .38 (.03) .41 (.04) .14 (.02) .21 (.03) .27 (.04) .57 (.03)
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.001), a main effect of Pair Type (F (1, 46) = 22.23, p < .001), and a
marginally significant effect of Group (F (1, 46) = 3.41, p < .08). More-
over, significant interactions of Speed × Group (F (1, 46) = 7.25, p < .05)
and Speed × Pair Type (F (1, 46) = 16.22, p < .001) were obtained.
No other interactions were significant (F-values < 1.58). Following-up
the significant interactions, separate MANOVAs with the factors Pair
Type and Group were performed for each speed condition separately. In
the nonspeeded condition, no significant effects were obtained (F-values
< 2.25). However, in the speeded condition, a significant main effect
of Pair Type (F (1, 46) = 21.93, p < .001) and a significant main effect
of Group (F (1, 46) = 5.33, p < .05) were revealed, but no interaction
(F < 1). In sum, analysis of the actually given responses suggests gen-
erally better performance in the unitization group irrespective of speed
condition. However, examination of the time-outs revealed that the sep-
aration group more often failed to respond at all when forced to respond
very fast.
A MANOVA on the Br-score yielded a significant main effect of speed
(F (1, 46) = 20.57, p < .001), but no main effect of group and no interac-
tion (F-values < 1) showing a more liberal bias in the nonspeeded than
speeded condition.
Table 8.2 shows that in line with the speed manipulation, reaction
times in the nonspeeded condition were longer than in the speeded con-
dition. Moreover, old pairs were recognized faster than recombined pairs.
Correspondingly, a MANOVA with the factors Speed, Pair Type, and
Group revealed a main effect of Speed (F (1, 46) = 204.29, p < .001), a
main effect of Pair Type (F (1, 46) = 74.98, p < .001), but no main effect
of Group (F < 1). Additionally, a significant interaction of Speed × Pair
Type was revealed (F (1, 46) = 50.08, p < .001). No other interactions
Table 8.2.: Mean reaction times for correct responses in the nonspeeded and speeded
conditions for the unitization and the separation group. Standard errors
are given in parentheses.
nonspeeded speeded
hit CR hit CR
unitization 1023 (50) 1343 (52) 690 (10) 731 (9)
separation 977 (46) 1316 (63) 679 (11) 747 (12)
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were significant (F-values < 1). Separate analyses for the two speed
conditions showed that old pairs were recognized faster than recombined
pairs in the nonspeeded (F (1, 46) = 64.92, p < .001) and the speeded
condition (F (1, 46) = 45.61, p < .001). Neither main effects of Group
nor the interactions were significant in both analyses (F-values < 2.63).
8.4 Discussion
The purpose of Experiment 4 was to extend the spectrum of domains in
which using unitization as an encoding strategy can enhance familiarity-
based recognition memory. In particular, effects of unitization were ex-
amined for scene-like pictorial stimuli. Participants had to study pairs
of objects which normally do not co-occur. By manipulating the spa-
tial configuration of the two objects, the pair should either be perceived
as a scene or as a set of separate objects. Scenes were established by
putting objects in a position which is typical for this specific object or
by implying an action between the two objects. The separation condi-
tion was realized by interchanging the position of the objects thereby
disintegrating the scene. In order to increase the efficacy of this manip-
ulation, object pairs were presented only very briefly during the study
phase leaving just enough time to extract the gist of the scene – an in-
formation which was not available in the separation condition. During
the recognition test, a response deadline procedure was applied. In the
speeded condition, familiarity is expected to be the primary source of
mnemonic information whereas in the nonspeeded condition familiarity
and recollection can contribute to recognition memory.
In line with our expectations, performance dropped in the speeded
compared to the nonspeeded condition. Interestingly, this difference be-
came only manifest in hit rates but not in false alarm rates. This is sur-
prising as impeding recollection should particularly inflate false alarms
(Yonelinas, 2002). However, examination of response bias reveals that
participants presumably counteracted this by applying a less liberal re-
sponse criterion in the speeded condition. Crucially, correct rejection
rates dropped, too. Thus, in a state of uncertainty, participants did not
respond ‘old’ as in the nonspeeded condition, however, neither responded
they ‘new’. Instead, they chose to not respond at all resulting in higher
rates of time-outs in the speeded condition. Thus, hit and false alarm
rate differences are influenced by this specific behavior in the state of
uncertainty and are therefore difficult to interpret in isolation.
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In line with my predictions was the generally better performance
(higher PR-scores) in the unitization compared to the separation group.
The short presentation time during study was intended to favor the uni-
tization group over the separation group. A scene-like configuration pro-
vides the possibility to extract the gist of the scene in very short time. In
contrast, such kind of information can less likely be found in an arrange-
ment of separate objects. An alternative explanation for better perfor-
mance in the unitization group could be that the scene-like arrangement
has triggered the establishment of additional associations (e.g., stories
are more easily made up for scenes) and by this has enhanced recol-
lection. However, the performance advantage for the unitization group
was not diminished under speeded response requirements which suggests
that it cannot fully be explained by recollection of additional associations.
Thus, although the finding is less clear than expected (a greater group
difference in the speeded condition), within the dual-process framework
it can hardly be explained without enhanced familiarity for the unitiza-
tion compared to the separation group. The expected interaction was
presumably not observed because there was not enough recollection in
the separation group to compensate for the lower level of familiarity dur-
ing nonspeeded responding (see Diana et al., 2008, for similar results).
It is possible that recollection was generally at a very low level because
of the short study phase presentation.
The finding of lower false alarm rates in the unitization group lend fur-
ther support for this notion because differences in false alarms are gen-
erally associated with differences in familiarity as already argued above
(Yonelinas, 2002). The most compelling evidence, however, comes from
the analysis of the time-outs. When forced to respond fast, participants
in the separation group chose not to respond at all more often than those
in the unitization group. This implicates that mnemonic information in
a quality sufficient to make a decision was available earlier in the unitiza-
tion group than in the separation group in line with enhanced familiarity.
Contrary to our expectations, a difference in reaction times was not
found. However, if it holds true that recollection generally played a minor
role during this task and the results mainly reflect differences in famil-
iarity, it is not surprising that there was no difference. A speeding-up of
responses would presumably go along with higher reliance on familiarity
and at the same time less reliance on recollection. However, if the in-
fluence of recollection is generally minimal in both groups, reaction time
differences cannot necessarily be assumed.
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A general drawback of the response-deadline procedure is that the
actual contribution of familiarity and recollection under speeded and
nonspeeded response conditions cannot be completely controlled. Some
responses in the speeded condition are possibly based on recollection
(Yonelinas, 2002). Thus, a criticism of the familiarity interpretation of
the current results could be that recollection was faster in the unitization
group leading to more recollection which in turn boosted performance.
However, I consider this explanation as unlikely for two reasons. First,
given the complexity of the visual display and previous ERP research
(Mecklinger et al., 2010), the 900 ms deadline should have been success-
ful to reduce recollection-based responses to a minimum in both groups.
Second, the reaction times in the nonspeeded condition are not suggestive
of speeded recollection due to unitization. If anything, they suggest the
opposite. However, it could still be that speeded recollection in the uniti-
zation group was induced by the speeded response requirements. Thus, a
replication of the findings with another method would clearly strengthen
the results.
Assuming the response-deadline procedure was effective in impeding
recollection, the pattern of results suggests that familiarity for a pair of
objects is boosted when they are presented in a coherent spatial configu-
ration, i.e. in a unitized manner, in contrast to an incoherent configura-
tion. This implies that familiarity enhancement due to unitization of two
previously discrete entities by means of an encoding instruction is not re-
stricted to the creation of a novel concept. This is in line with previous
findings on thematically related word pairs (Kriukova, 2012) and inter-
active imagery (Rhodes & Donaldson, 2008b). However, as these studies
used pre-experimentally related pairings, the current study extends these
findings by showing complementary effects using pre-experimentally un-
related items.
Moreover, the current results imply that the concept of unitization is
not limited to the formation of a novel contiguous entity such as a novel
compound word pair. A scene or the action depicted in a scene (e.g., drill
targets the vase) can seemingly also induce familiarity. This is in line with
the notion that unitization is not a dichotomy but rather a continuum
(Yonelinas et al., 2010) with the current implementation probably being
located somewhat away from the end point. If the current results can be
substantiated in the future they are further evidence against a one-to-
one-mapping of familiarity and item memory (e.g., Aggleton & Brown,
2006).
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CHAPTER 9
General Discussion
This thesis addressed open questions with respect to retrieval processes
involved in recognition memory for different types of units. This issue
is highly relevant within dual-process models of recognition memory as
many models assume that familiarity-based recognition is only possible
for single items or unitized associations (e.g., Yonelinas, 2002; Aggleton
& Brown, 2006; Henke, 2010), but not for arbitrary associations. Uni-
tization, i.e. the integration into a coherent whole, can be regarded as
a continuum (Yonelinas et al., 2010) on which different degrees of uniti-
zation can be assumed. Although previous studies investigating the ef-
fects of unitization on associative recognition memory have implemented
different degrees of unitization in their experimental designs (e.g., Gio-
vanello et al., 2006; Rhodes & Donaldson, 2007; Quamme et al., 2007),
implications of this aspect have largely been neglected in the literature.
However, this seems necessary as especially processes during retrieval
turned out to vary according to the degree of unitization (Wiegand et
al., 2010).
The main focus of this thesis was placed on novel units, i.e. associa-
tions which were unitized during the study phase encounter by means
of a specific encoding strategy. In contrast to remembering pre-existing
unitized associations (e.g., compound word pairs) or single items (e.g.,
single words), the creation of a novel unit establishes a new link within a
specific episode. Learning links between previously not associated item
combinations during only one encounter is of particular interest as it
is a core function of episodic memory. In the current work, retrieval
processes were examined in order to dissociate them from those being in-
volved in recognition of non-unitized associations, pre-existing items and
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pre-experimentally unitized associations. Moreover, the goal of the final
study was to extend the range of the unitization continuum by examining
unitization of scene-like pictorial stimuli.
9.1 Summary of Findings
9.1.1 Experiment 1
The study by Wiegand (2009) investigated the effects of a definition en-
coding instruction on associative recognition memory. Definition encod-
ing (e.g., VEGETABLE BIBLE = A book which is consulted by hobby
gardeners.) is intended to foster unitization of previously unrelated word
pairs. Recognition was tested for four different kinds of word pairs: same,
reversed, recombined, and new pairs. Same and reversed pairs had to be
classified as ‘old’ whereas recombined and new pairs had to be classi-
fied as ‘new’. The results revealed faster reaction times for same than
reversed pairs. This was interpreted as an indicator for facilitated con-
ceptual processing for the novel units in contrast to the disrupted units.
However, this finding can also be explained by a mere perceptual effect:
facilitated processing could have been induced by the exact repetition of
the study cue in the same condition in contrast to reversed pairs, which
were not identical repetitions of the study phase pair. Thus, the prin-
cipal goal of Experiment 1 was to rule out this explanation in order to
substantiate the suitability of the design for Experiment 2. Participants
studied the same set of word pairs as separate lexical items which had
to be inserted into sentence frames (e.g., VEGETABLE BIBLE – This
was already mentioned in the ). This encoding instruction was
intended to minimize unitization of the pairs. The results of Experiment
1 were directly compared to the behavioral data of the Wiegand (2009)
study revealing that in contrast to the definition group, reversed pairs
were recognized as fast as same pairs when studied in the sentence en-
coding condition. However, accuracy was slightly lower for reversed than
same pairs irrespective of encoding instruction.
9.1.2 Experiment 2
Previous studies suggested that associative recognition memory can be
mediated by brain structures outside the hippocampus, presumably in
the PrC, when word pairs are studied in the definition encoding con-
dition (Quamme et al., 2007; Haskins et al., 2008). This corresponds
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to findings for familiarity-based retrieval of pre-existing unitized associ-
ations (Giovanello et al., 2006; Ford et al., 2010) and single items (e.g.,
Henson et al., 2003; Montaldi et al., 2006). However, these studies did not
directly examine which brain structures are involved during the retrieval
of unitized word pairs in healthy participants. Moreover, the results of
two ERP studies suggest that familiarity is associated with different neu-
ral correlates when novel units are recognized in contrast to pre-existing
items. Thus, there were two main goals of Experiment 2. One of the
objectives was to investigate the neural network underlying the retrieval
of novel concepts compared to arbitrary associations. The second aim
was to dissociate the brain regions involved in familiarity for novel units
and single items. Thus, definition and sentence encoding was compared
in a between-group design. At test, participants were presented with
same, reversed, recombined, and new pairs (as in Experiment 1). Fa-
miliarity for novel units and single items was dissociated by comparing
same and reversed pairs because for reversed pairs the unit was assumed
to be disrupted. Analysis of the reaction times replicated the findings
from Experiment 1 showing faster responses for same than reversed pairs
in the definition group but not in the sentence group. However, in con-
trast to Experiment 1, there was also a selective decrease in accuracy
for reversed pairs in the definition group. Analysis of the imaging data
revealed a strong recruitment of a network normally associated with rec-
ollection in the sentence group. Among others, I found activation in the
posterior cingulate, the ventral PPC, and the hippocampus. This net-
work was engaged to a comparable extent for same and reversed pairs.
In contrast, in the definition group, recruitment of recollection-related
areas was considerably reduced. Instead, same as well as reversed pairs
engaged the dorsal PPC. Specifically associated with recognition of same
pairs in the definition group was a region in BA 10 in the mPFC. Con-
versely, solely activated by reversed pairs was one cluster in BA 45 in the
left IFG.
9.1.3 Experiment 3
Experiment 3 was designed to directly compare novel conceptual units
(unitization condition) to pre-existing units (compound condition) as
these two types of pairs are assumed to differ in the degree of unitization
and were previously associated with two different early old/new effects
(Rhodes & Donaldson, 2007; Bader et al., 2010). Therefore, only novel
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conceptual units were expected to elicit an early parietal old/new effect
whereas pre-existing units were assumed to elicit an early mid-frontal ef-
fect. During study, each word pair was studied twice allowing to compare
ERPs to the pairs during the first presentation to those during the sec-
ond presentation. By this, I aimed to establish a link between the early
parietal old/new effect and the N400 during implicit memory conditions.
During study, participants had to rate the fit of the description or defini-
tion which was provided along with the pairs. These ratings were highly
consistent across presentations. Moreover, they were slightly higher for
pre-existing units than for novel units. At test, participants had to dis-
criminate old, recombined, and new pairs. Performance was better in the
compound than in the unitization condition. Moreover, the higher the
degree of unitization, the faster were the responses. This was not only
evident in faster reaction times in the compound condition, but also in
a speed-up for plausible compared to implausible pair-definition combi-
nations as indicated by the study phase ratings. The N400 during study
was reduced in the compound compared to the unitization condition only
during the second presentation. Within the unitization condition, a re-
duction of the ERPs during the second presentation compared to the
first presentation was only observed in a later time window (600–800
ms) whereas this was the case in the compound condition already during
the early time window (380–580 ms). Contrary to my predictions, an
early old/new difference at test was revealed in neither of the conditions,
but the compound condition was associated with generally more positive
going waveforms than the unitization condition. Reliable left parietal
old/new effects were observed in both conditions.
9.1.4 Experiment 4
The aim of the final experiment was to extend the use of unitization as
encoding strategy to the pictorial domain. Units were created by the
arrangement of two unrelated objects in a scene-like configuration (uni-
tization group). By this, the novel unit was not a novel item as in the
previous experiments but a multi-item array extending the continuum
of unitization. In a between-group design, this condition was contrasted
with a condition in which the two objects changed positions, which was
intended to disintegrate the scene (separation group). By applying a
response-deadline procedure, effects on familiarity could be identified in
the speeded condition. The unitization group was better than the sepa-
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ration group in the speeded and nonspeeded condition. Moreover, partic-
ipants in the separation group more often failed to respond at all in the
speeded condition. There were no group differences in reaction times.
9.2 Implications
In the following, I discuss implications from the results of the exper-
iments reported in this thesis. Before addressing different aspects in
detail, I shortly elaborate on a more general issue which is relevant for
the subsequent considerations. Until now, few studies have investigated
familiarity-based memory for novel units. With respect to the brain re-
gions involved, these studies suggest an important role of the PrC in
memory for unitized associations in a comparable way to single items.
However, they either allow only for inferences about the encoding phase
(Haskins et al., 2008; Staresina & Davachi, 2008) or do not allow for a dif-
ferentiation between encoding and retrieval processes at all (Quamme et
al., 2007) as lesion studies cannot isolate the effects to one or the other. In
line with the transfer-appropriate-processing account which states that
performance in a memory task depends on the appropriateness of the
encoding task (Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977), it is assumed that
neural activity at encoding and retrieval are at least overlapping (Rugg,
Johnson, Park, & Uncapher, 2008). This is in particular the case for ma-
terial specific activation and for the structures in the MTL. The latter is
most evident in the MTL memory models described in Section 1.3 which
do not differentiate between encoding and retrieval (e.g., Aggleton &
Brown, 2006; Diana et al., 2007; Ranganath, 2010; Norman & O’Reilly,
2003). It is conceivable that the memory components housed in the MTL
are directly related to the representation of the to-be-remembered stim-
ulus and are therefore common to encoding and retrieval. However, it is
also clear that there must be processes which are specific to encoding or
retrieval, respectively, such as attention to the to-be-encoded event or the
control processes necessary for intentional retrieval (Rugg et al., 2008).
Therefore, it is crucial to investigate both, encoding and retrieval. More-
over, when interpreting the results, it is important to distinguish between
different processing stages.
I start with a discussion about the engagement of recollection during
associative recognition memory focusing on the role of the hippocampus.
Thereafter, I shed light on the different aspects of familiarity which are
relevant during recognition of unitized associations.
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9.2.1 Recollection
The results from Experiment 2 clearly show a strong involvement of a
network usually associated with recollection, especially the hippocampus,
when arbitrary associations have to be retrieved. This is consistent with
previous ERP (e.g., Donaldson & Rugg, 1998; Bader et al., 2010) and
fMRI studies (e.g., Giovanello et al., 2004; Ford et al., 2010). Moreover,
behavioral (Experiment 1 and 2) as well as imaging results revealed a
flexible recollection process in the sentence condition. Brain responses
and overt behavior were highly similar for same and reversed test cues.
This is consistent with a previous fMRI study (Giovanello et al., 2009)
which showed flexibility of hippocampal retrieval when word pairs were
encoded within sentences. Moreover, this outcome would be predicted by
the computational model proposed by Norman and O’Reilly (2003). Ac-
cording to this account, the single parts of one episodic memory trace or
association, which are represented in the input layer of entorhinal cortex
(EC), are linked to each other with recurrent connections in region CA3
of the hippocampus proper. A re-representation of the CA3 representa-
tion can be found in region CA1. Crucially, this CA1 representation has
back-connections to each representation of the single parts in the output
layer of EC. As the CA3 representation consists of recurrent connections,
each partial cue can reactivate the whole pattern in CA3 and via activa-
tion in CA1 all constituents can be reactivated in the output layer of EC.
This implicates that reversing the test cue does not have any detrimental
effects on the ability of the hippocampus to retrieve the original study
cue as reflected in the parallel finding of hippocampal activation for same
and reversed pairs in the sentence group in Experiment 2.
Consistent with previous comparisons of item and associative recog-
nition memory (Giovanello et al., 2004), I found reduced engagement
of the hippocampus in the definition group of Experiment 2 compared
to the sentence group. The findings by Quamme et al. (2007) already
showed that the hippocampus is not necessary to remember novel units.
The results from Experiment 2, however, implicate that the recollection
network including the hippocampus plays only a limited role in recogniz-
ing novel units also in cases where it is generally available as in healthy
young participants. This is in contrast to the findings from Experiment
3 where recognition of novel conceptual units was associated with a left
parietal old/new effect and other studies investigating the retrieval of
unitized associations which did not find a reduced involvement of recol-
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lection (Wiegand et al., 2010; Rhodes & Donaldson, 2007, 2008b). This
raises the question when and how recollection is impeded. One possibil-
ity is that the involvement of the hippocampus during retrieval is already
determined during encoding. Given that a unitized association is primar-
ily processed in the PrC and not in the hippocampus during encoding
(Haskins et al., 2008), no hippocampal representation of the association
is established. In this case, the hippocampus is just not able to retrieve
the association. In the studies mentioned above which showed recollec-
tion for unitized associations, the study conditions slightly differed from
those in Experiment 2. For instance, each pair was studied twice in the
study by Wiegand et al. (2010). Whereas during a single study trial, con-
ceptual integration mediated by the PrC might be emphasized, a second
presentation of the study pair might enhance recollection in the follow-
ing way: having already integrated the unitized pair during the first
presentation, processing can proceed one step further during the second
presentation and the hippocampus can establish links between the novel
unit and the definition and/or other study details. According to this in-
terpretation, the observed recollection effects reflect recollection for study
details and not recollection of the association itself. Another explanation
can be found in the framework postulated by van Kesteren et al. (2012)
which claims that whenever incoming information is perceived as con-
gruent to pre-existing knowledge, hippocampal involvement is inhibited
by the mPFC. Thus, the selective mPFC activation for same pairs in the
definition group would be consistent with this explanation. This view
would allow for the opportunity that unitized associations could have
been initially encoded also in the hippocampus. However, hippocampal
involvement was inhibited only during retrieval because the conceptual
integration during study rendered the pairs congruent to pre-existing
knowledge. The study by Haskins et al. (2008) cannot adjudicate be-
tween these two accounts as it reported hippocampal activation neither
in the sentence nor in the definition condition. Hence, it remains open
to future research to determine the boundary conditions of when recol-
lection is engaged in cases where it is not necessarily needed in order to
make a correct recognition decision.
9.2.2 Familiarity
The following section starts with considerations about the functional sig-
nificance of different brain regions associated with familiarity, focusing
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first on the MTL and turning then to structures outside the MTL which
might subserve functions specific to retrieval. Subsequently, I discuss
different aspects in relation to familiarity such as conceptual fluency and
contextual influences.
Engagement of the MTL
With respect to the PrC, the results from the current thesis are somewhat
ambiguous as I did not find any evidence of a significant PrC response to
any of the pair types in Experiment 2. Nonetheless, the current results
do not imply that the PrC is not involved during recognition of novel
units. As neither single items nor the novel units were associated with a
deactivation in the PrC, susceptibility induced signal loss and low power
are likely reasons for this null finding. The role of PrC in memory for
units is nevertheless an interesting issue. Especially, as the better perfor-
mance in the unitization group compared to the separation group under
speeded response conditions in Experiment 4 constitute first evidence for
familiarity-based memory for multi-item arrays. In keeping with the pre-
vailing theories of MTL memory functions, these results indirectly speak
for a representation of these multi-item arrays in the PrC (but note that
familiarity for the scenes could have also been induced by an attribution
process not mediated by the PrC, see below). In the models described
in Section 2.3, the claim that the PrC is involved in memory for unitized
associations is motivated by the reasoning that unitized associations are
processed as single items (Diana et al., 2007; Ranganath, 2010; Yoneli-
nas, 2002; Yonelinas et al., 2010). This is in line with another account for
the functions of the MTL. The representational-hierarchical view (RHV,
e.g., Cowell, Bussey, & Saksida, 2010) provides a more general conceptu-
alization of MTL functioning. It rejects the idea of specialized processes
within the MTL and puts forward the notion that the subregions within
the MTL are differentially suitable for different kinds of representations,
regardless of the task. Along the ventral-visual stream (VVS) from the
most caudal regions in the primary visual cortex to the most anterior re-
gion in the anterior temporal lobe, complexity of representations steadily
increases. Thus, according to the RHV, the PrC is best suited to rep-
resent complex conjunctions of many features whereas more upstream
regions in the VVS represent more simple conjunctions or single fea-
tures. Crucially, the PrC is able to discriminate very similar objects
containing identical features as it recognizes the specific configuration.
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Higher up in the hierarchy, the hippocampus is best suited to represent
contextual, spatial or relational information. Evidence for the PrC’s role
in object representation comes from studies with monkeys (Bussey, Sak-
sida, & Murray, 2002) and rats (e.g., McTighe, Cowell, Winters, Bussey,
& Saksida, 2010), but also from studies with human MTL patients. For
instance, Barense et al. (2005) compared patients with selective hip-
pocampal lesions and patients with more extensive MTL lesions in a
task where they had to learn which of two objects was the target to
choose. Both patient groups performed at the control group’s level when
feature ambiguity between the objects was minimal. With high feature
ambiguity the target could only be identified based on the feature con-
junction. In this condition, hippocampal patients still performed within
the normal range but the MTL patients showed a significant drop in
performance. This implicates that the MTLC, most likely the PrC, sup-
ports identification and recognition of complex objects. K. I. Taylor et
al. (2006) provide complementing fMRI evidence that the PrC is crucial
for the integrated representation of objects and associated conceptual
information. Participants had to make congruency judgments in either
a crossmodal condition (e.g., a picture of a cat and the sound “meow”)
or a unimodal condition (e.g., two parts of a picture of a cat). The PrC
was more involved in the crossmodal than in the unimodal condition and
was more activated for incongruent in contrast to congruent crossmodal
pairs. Congruent combinations seem to match a sharp representation
of the concept whereas incongruent combinations activate a larger and
more ambiguous set of features. In line with the RHV, these results sug-
gest that the PrC serves an amodal integration hub which can represent
complex feature configurations on the object and the conceptual level.
Thus, it is a likely candidate to produce a memory signal which is spe-
cific to these kinds of configurations. Given that the scene-like stimuli
used in Experiment 4 could be recognized under speeded response re-
quirements because they were represented in the PrC, this finding would
have to be incorporated into the accounts of PrC function described
above. However, the multi-item arrays are neither single objects nor are
they circumscribed concepts. Animal studies which are taken as support
for the RHV partly used multi-item displays, too (e.g., Saksida, Bussey,
Buckmaster, & Murray, 2007). Thus, object in this sense might rather
refer to any stable configuration of multiple features which is processed
independent of context. It is also possible that participants extracted
concepts about specific actions out of the scenes such as drill points to
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vase. If further research can substantiate the results from Experiment
4 and can show that the PrC is involved in familiarity for scenes, both
explanations would challenge a mapping of perirhinal familiarity to item
recognition (e.g., Aggleton & Brown, 2006).
Downstream from the MTL
As already stated above, processes which are specific to retrieval might
be mediated by structures outside the MTL. This section focuses on
“processes downstream from those responsible for computing familiar-
ity” (Tsivilis, Otten, & Rugg, 2001, p. 502) such as comparing famil-
iarity strength against a given criterion. As already mentioned in the
Discussion of Experiment 2, the lateral PFC including the IFG has al-
ready been proposed to serve such an evaluating downstream function in
familiarity-based recognition responses (Aly et al., 2011). In Experiment
2, this region was selectively activated for reversed pairs. Therefore, it
possibly has a role in relative familiarity which might be comparing the
actual familiarity and the pre-experimental baseline familiarity.1 A sim-
ilar claim was made for the mid-frontal old/new effect (Stenberg et al.,
2009). In addition to this parallel claim, the parallel observation of a
mid-frontal old/new effect in the study by Wiegand et al. (2010) and
activation of the left IFG in Experiment 2 for reversed pairs would be
consistent with the left IFG being one of the neural generators of the
mid-frontal old/new effect (see Bridger et al., 2012, for a discussion).
This hypothesis is substantiated by the finding that activation in this
region revealed by an fMRI old vs. new contrast was shown to corre-
late with the simultaneously recorded ERP mid-frontal old/new effect
(Meyer, Hoppsta¨dter, Ba¨uchl, Diener, & Flor, 2012, October).
Evaluation processes in familiarity might differ according to the type
of familiarity. For example, the criterion might be determined in an abso-
lute sense as in the notion of absolute familiarity (“Have I ever seen that
item before?”, MacKenzie & Donaldson, 2007). In addition, according
to the discrepancy-attribution hypothesis (e.g., Whittlesea & Williams,
2001b, 2001a), familiarity evaluation might operate not on a familiarity
strength signal but compare actual processing fluency with the expected
processing fluency. For the same pairs in Experiment 2, there was no
activation in the left IFG. Instead, same pairs specifically activated a
1Note, however, the alternative interpretation that the IFG activation is associated
with cue specification, as argued in the Discussion of Experiment 2.
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cluster in the mPFC. The mPFC was postulated to signal congruency
with pre-existing knowledge (van Kesteren et al., 2012). For same pairs,
this could arise from the conceptual integration of the novel units during
study. Congruency might be interpreted as absolute familiarity under
specific circumstances. The reduced hippocampal activation in the def-
inition group would also be consistent with the view of van Kesteren et
al. (2012, see discussion above).
In summary, although the current work cannot directly relate the ERP
findings to the activation found in the fMRI study, comparison of parallel
effects has turned out to be highly stimulating in considerations of how
different brain regions contribute to different topographical distributions
in the ERP effects. Taken together, these findings put further weight
on the notion that familiarity-based responses can be determined and
influenced in highly different ways in different situations. Whereas the
current work emphasizes differences in downstream processes, future re-
search might reveal commonalities and differences in the more upstream
signals. For example, a common familiarity signal arising in PrC could
be evaluated against a pre-experimental baseline or in an absolute sense.
On the other hand, a fluency signal arising outside the MTL such as
perceptual facilitation could be evaluated against the expected fluency
as postulated by the discrepancy-attribution-hypothesis (e.g., Whittlesea
& Williams, 2001b, 2001a).
Familiarity and Conceptual Fluency for Novel Units
Bader et al. (2010) and Wiegand et al. (2010) interpreted the reaction
time decrease which they found for unitized compared to non-unitized
pairs as an indication of increased conceptual fluency for the novel con-
ceptual units. This claim was substantiated by the findings from Exper-
iment 1 and 2 which showed faster reaction times for same than reversed
pairs in the definition group but not in the sentence group. Moreover,
in Experiment 3 reaction times were faster in the compound than in the
unitization condition and for plausible pair-definition combinations than
for implausible combinations. This is in line with increased conceptual
fluency for a higher degree of unitization. In addition, the ERP data
from the different studies match this interpretation by revealing reduced
amplitudes of the negative deflection in the time window and topograph-
ical distribution of the N400 for pairs with a higher degree of unitization
than those with a lower degree. However, the neuroimaging data are less
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clear with respect to this issue. Given that the enhanced mPFC acti-
vation for same pairs reflects congruency to pre-existing knowledge (van
Kesteren et al., 2012), this might reflect the better integration of the
novel units into semantic memory. In contrast, other brain areas usually
implicated in conceptual fluency such as the left IFG, the left middle
temporal gyrus (BA 21) or the anterior temporal lobes (Lau et al., 2008)
did not show activity modulation specific to the novel conceptual units.
The lack of activation in the PrC in Experiment 2 renders conclusions
concerning a conceptual fluency component even more difficult as this re-
gion was previously associated with conceptual implicit memory (Wang
et al., 2010). Nevertheless, although the relationship between familiarity
for novel units and conceptual fluency cannot fully be explained by the
current work, the involvement of mPFC and its possible role in semantic
processing are at least tentative support for the influence of conceptual
processes on recognition memory for novel conceptual units.
Contextual Influences on Familiarity
The results from the present work are in line with contextual influences
on familiarity. Experiment 3, which used stimuli comparable to previous
ERP studies (Rhodes & Donaldson, 2007; Bader et al., 2010; Wiegand,
2009), could not replicate the early familiarity-related old/new effects
found in these studies. Otherwise being comparable, two different types
of unitized associations (pre-experimental and novel) were presented in-
termixed in Experiment 3. As I already suggested, due to the mixed lists
the most salient feature of the pairs was their pre-experimental familiar-
ity. This feature was apparently processed in one or the other way by
the participants as there were reliable differences in the ERPs between
the two types: ERPs in the compound condition were more positive-
going than those in the unitization condition in the N400 time window.
This, however, might have rendered familiarity less salient and therefore
it was not assessed. Moreover, the mixed lists induced a high variance
in familiarity strength which did not covary with memory status (new
pre-experimentally unitized pairs were probably more familiar than old
novel units). Thus, neither the assessment of absolute nor relative fa-
miliarity was diagnostic for all pairs. This might have made participants
disregard familiarity assessment completely and focus on recollection.
It is conceivable that only a part of the sub-components contributing
to familiarity-based memory decisions can be influenced by contextual or
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strategic factors. These are probably not the components which are di-
rectly involved in computing familiarity strength as presumably the PrC.
Being engaged during all kinds of tasks not related to recognition mem-
ory (Wang et al., 2010; Barense et al., 2005; K. I. Taylor et al., 2006), the
PrC is less likely affected by external task-specific factors. It is rather the
downstream sub-components of familiarity specific to retrieval which can
be influenced. As mentioned above, the mid-frontal old/new effect was
already proposed to reflect such a downstream sub-component (Tsivilis
et al., 2001). In line with this proposal, task demands such as implicit
vs. explicit memory tasks (Ku¨per et al., 2012) and exlusion vs. inclusion
tasks (Ecker & Zimmer, 2009) were shown to provoke the absence or pres-
ence of the early mid-frontal old/new effect (see Discussion of Experiment
3). Moreover, Tsivilis et al. (2001) found no mid-frontal old/new effect
for studied items on a non-studied background. The studied items most
likely were associated with an increased degree of familiarity strength
compared to new items. However, although these test items had to be
classified as ‘old’, familiarity for these items was apparently not assessed
in this task whereas it was when studied items were presented on stud-
ied backgrounds. In a follow-up study, Ecker, Zimmer, Groh-Bordin, and
Mecklinger (2007) replicated the findings by Tsivilis et al. (2001) but also
showed that old items on a non-studied background elicited a mid-frontal
old/new effect when a cue directed attention to the item and away from
the background. These findings strongly support the notion that the
early mid-frontal old/new effect reflects a sub-component of familiarity
which can be influenced by strategic factors such as directing attention
towards a stimulus (see also Mecklinger, in press, for a discussion on
the functional significance of the early mid-frontal old/new effect). In a
similar way, the early parietal old/new effect might reflect downstream
components involved in absolute familiarity which can also be influenced
by contextual factors. Due to the reasons described in the preceding
paragraph, these sub-components might not have been initiated leading
to the absence of the early ERP old/new effects.
The findings from Experiment 2 also include data points which might
be informative regarding this issue. The reversed vs. new contrast re-
vealed that activation in the definition group spreads further into regions
previously associated with familiarity (dorsal PPC and IFG) than in the
sentence group. A priori there is no reason as to why familiarity strength
for the single items should be higher in the definition group than in the
sentence group. However, the unavailability of recollection in the defi-
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nition group might have put emphasis on the assessment of familiarity
during recognition. In contrast, the non-diagnosticity of familiarity in
the sentence group turned its assessment useless. Therefore, given that
activation in the dorsal PPC and the left IFG was indeed associated
with familiarity in Experiment 2, involvement of familiarity for the sin-
gle items was moderated by study task. This is also consistent with the
idea of contextual influences on familiarity.
9.2.3 Costs of Unitization
As stated by Mayes et al. (2007), if unitization is taken as an explana-
tion for an effect on associative recognition memory, it is important to
establish independent objective criteria of whether an association has ac-
tually been unitized or not. One suggestion is that unitization should not
only have mnemonic benefits for the unit but also “costs of unitization”
(Pilgrim, Murray, & Donaldson, 2012, p. 1672) for the constituents. As
reversed pairs initially had been encoded within a unit, but the beneficial
effect of the unit was disrupted by reversing the pairs, costs of unitizaition
should be observable for these pairs. Thus, the following section looks
more closely on the memory performance for the reversed pairs.
With respect to accuracy of the recognition judgments for same and
reversed pairs, the results of Experiment 1 and 2 do not correspond.
Whereas Experiment 2 revealed a selective decrement in accuracy for
reversed pairs in the definition group, there was no group difference in
accuracy for reversed pairs in Experiment 1. Again slightly different are
the findings by Haskins et al. (2008). They also showed better perfor-
mance for same than reversed pairs in the definition condition. However,
accuracy for same and reversed pairs in the sentence condition was gen-
erally low which is in contrast to Experiment 2 where performance in
the sentence group was relatively high. Two possible reasons for the dis-
crepant findings were proposed in the discussion of Experiment 1. The
first explanation suggested that the mixed lists (definition and sentence
trials) in the Haskins et al. study induced an advantage for same pairs
in the definition condition because they were the most salient test items
due to their unitized meaning. While this explanation might still hold
for the drop in performance for same pairs in the sentence compared
to the definition condition in the Haskins et al. study, it cannot ex-
plain why accuracy for reversed pairs was selectively low in Experiment
2, but not Experiment 1 (both between-subjects designs). According to
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the second possible explanation mentioned in the discussion of Exper-
iment 1, it is conceivable that presenting each word pair twice during
the study phase might have boosted recollection and by this memory
performance for reversed pairs. Two further findings support this ex-
planation. First, the definition group of Experiment 1 (Wiegand et al.,
2010) showed a left parietal old/new effect which was also observable for
reversed pairs, albeit reduced in comparison to same pairs. Second, the
lack of evidence for hippocampal involvement and the reduced engage-
ment of other recollection-related regions, especially for reversed pairs, in
the definition group of Experiment 2 suggests that recollection played a
minor role when pairs were presented only once during study. Thus, only
if recollection is generally engaged, it can compensate for low familiarity
for reversed pairs.
The behavioral dissociation between the two different encoding con-
ditions revealed by the reversed pairs at test is a strong indication that
unitization was effective. This means that the current results show behav-
iorally evident costs of unitization. Pilgrim et al. (2012) found evidence
for costs of unitization in the reduction of the early mid-frontal old/new
effect elicited by single items which had been studied as parts of unitized
pairs in contrast to items which had been studied as parts of non-unitized
pairs. However, behavioral differences were not revealed in their study.
As they discuss, this can probably be explained by equal levels of recol-
lection as indexed by comparably large left parietal old/new effects. The
pattern of results across the Haskins et al. (2008) study, the Wiegand et
al. (2010) study, and Experiment 2 are consistent with the notion that
behavioral costs as indicated by a drop in accuracy can only be observed
when recollection cannot compensate for diminished familiarity.
9.2.4 Semantic vs. Episodic Memory
In Section 1.4, I argue that it is always important to be clear about
whether a specific recognition memory task addresses the episodic or the
semantic memory system. Further on, I point out that many of the stud-
ies investigating unitization use pre-existing associations. By this, the
tasks employed in these studies are on the one hand episodic as they test
if the association has occurred during a specific episode. On the other
hand, the associative element of the task is actually not episodic as the
association had already been established before. In contrast, the cur-
rent work focused on novel units where the elements are bound during
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a specific episode in the study phase of the experiment. However, the
definition encoding paradigm involves semantic integration during study.
Also for the pictorial stimuli in Experiment 4, it cannot be ruled out that
participants extracted a meaning from the scenes. Thus, the study of uni-
tization in the way as it was accomplished here could also be seen as an
instantiation of semantic learning. However, many theories assume that
fast learning of novel facts is also mastered by the hippocampus and ac-
cess to semantic memory becomes independent of the hippocampus only
after repeated exposures (e.g., McClelland & Rogers, 2003; Moscovitch
et al., 2006). Only when the encoded information has been decoupled
from a specific episode, its retrieval can be accomplished by the neocortex
alone (e.g., Baddeley et al., 2001; Henke, 2010). Thus, even if the defini-
tion encoding paradigm is considered as semantic learning, it is striking
that it seems to be independent of the hippocampus already after one
learning trial. The semantic learning view on unitization is in line with
the mPFC activation signaling congruency to existing semantic knowl-
edge (van Kesteren et al., 2012) and the role of conceptual processing in
familiarity for novel units (see above).
9.3 Limitations and Outlook
While the findings described above provide convincing evidence for a dis-
sociation between processes engaged in the retrieval of novel units and
arbitrary associations, there were some unexpected null results. Thus,
the post-hoc interpretation of the findings from Experiment 3 has to
await further support by an independent experiment which compares
the ERP old/new effects for the compound and unitization condition in
mixed and pure lists. In Experiment 2, a non-optimal signal-to-noise-
ratio might have been the reason for which I did not observe any perirhi-
nal activity modulation. In future research an increase in trial num-
ber and optimization of imaging the MTL by orienting slice acquisition
along the long axis of the hippocampus is advised (e.g., Giovanello et al.,
2009). Furthermore, collecting additional behavioral estimates of famil-
iarity and recollection would have been useful. Especially in Experiment
2, the mapping of brain activation to familiarity-based processing hinges
on previous studies which showed a stronger reliance on familiarity af-
ter definition encoding with behavioral measures (Quamme et al., 2007;
Parks & Yonelinas, 2009). However, as explained in Section 1.2.2, be-
havioral estimates rely to a great degree on pre-assumptions which were
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difficult to meet with the complex design of Experiment 2. A reduction
in complexity might allow for a greater number of stimuli per condition.
This would, for example, permit to model the BOLD signal according
to confident judgments and would at the same time improve the signal-
to-noise ratio for the fMRI signal in the MTL. At last, although Experi-
ment 4 constitutes promising first evidence that unitization can enhance
familiarity-based memory for novel object-object associations, these re-
sults need to be substantiated by other methodological approaches such
as study instructions which ensure recollection for the separate condition.
Moreover, in order to attribute the results ultimately to unitization, one
would need to show that the scene-like encoding entails also costs of
unitization.
Future research could also strengthen reference of the current work
to application in special populations. For instance, unitizing or integra-
tive encoding strategies leading to less hippocampus-dependent encoding
and retrieval might help to overcome the associative memory deficit ob-
served in older adults. Associative recognition memory is affected by
aging to a greater extent than item recognition (e.g., Naveh-Benjamin,
2000). Moreover, many studies speak in favor of impaired recollection
but preserved familiarity in older adults (e.g., Bastin & van der Linden,
2003; Daselaar, Fleck, Dobbins, Madden, & Cabeza, 2006; Cohn, Em-
rich, & Moscovitch, 2008). Interestingly, Raz et al. (2005) found greater
volume loss in the hippocampus compared to the rhinal cortex. Thus,
it is conceivable that deficits in binding and recollection mediated by
the hippocampus are one of the key factors in explaining the associative
recognition impairments in elderly (Cohn et al., 2008). Assuming that
familiarity is intact in older adults and volume changes in rhinal cortex
are less severe, one would expect better memory for unitized associations
than non-unitized associations in older adults. However, Ja¨ger, Meck-
linger, and Kliegel (2010) found a greater age related disadvantage for
unitized face pairs than for non-unitized face pairs (face stimuli as used
in Ja¨ger et al., 2006, see Section 2.3). As these unexpected findings might
be explained by the special stimulus characteristics, future research has
to investigate whether other forms of unitization might be effective in
reducing the age related associative memory deficit.
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9.4 Concluding Remarks
The results of the current thesis dissociated retrieval processes for ar-
bitrary and newly unitized associations. Remembering arbitrary asso-
ciations engages a flexible recollection process which is recruited to a
lesser extent for the novel units. Moreover, different brain regions were
engaged for novel units and single items. The exact functional roles of
these regions, however, have still to be determined.
Moreover, whether familiarity plays a role during associative memory
is probably not only dependent on the stimulus characteristics but also
on contextual factors which is line with regarding at least the assessment
of familiarity as not completely automatic. At last, the current work
provides preliminary evidence that familiarity-based recognition is not
restricted to contiguous units.
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APPENDIX A
Stimuli Used in Experiment 1 – 4
A.1 Word Pairs and Sentences Used in Experiment 1 (p. 171)
All word pairs and sentences used in the study phase are listed. Note that
each single word reappeared in one recombined pair in the study phase.
Recombined pairs are specified together with the old pair containing the
same first word.
A.2 Word Pairs Used as New Pairs in Experiment 1 (p. 178)
All word pairs which served as new pairs in the test phase are listed.
A.3 Word Pairs, Definitions, and Sentences Used in Experiment 2
(p. 179)
All word pairs together with definitions and sentences used in the study
phases for the two groups are listed. Word pairs were organized in word
quadruplets (quad) so that two recombined pairs could be formed from
two pairs. Recombined pairs are not listed. Both possible recombinations
were used keeping the word position from the original pairs constant.
Note that only one recombined pair of a quadruplet was presented to
each participant but both recombined pairs were used equally often across
participants.
A.4 Word Pairs and Descriptions Used in the Compound Condition
in Experiment 3 (p. 187)
All word pairs of the compound condition together with the description
used in the study phase are listed. Word pairs were organized in word
169
quadruplets (quad) so that a recombined pair could be formed from two
word pairs which was also a meaningful pre-existing compound word pair.
Word position from the original pairs was kept constant.
A.5 Word Pairs and Definitions Used in the Unitization Condition in
Experiment 3 (p. 195)
All word pairs of the unitization condition together with the definition
used in the study phase are listed. Word pairs were organized in word
quadruplets (quad) so that one recombined pair was formed from two
word pairs. Word position from the original pairs was kept constant.
A.6 Object Pairs Used in Experiment 4 (p. 203)
Names of all object pairs are listed. Object pairs were organized in
sets so that they could be recombined within the sets. Each single object
appeared in the same location in the original and the recombined picture.
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ch
ti
g
te
d
a
s
.
S
T
A
U
B
S
C
H
U
L
E
S
T
E
R
N
S
E
S
S
E
L
D
en
ko
n
n
te
m
a
n
vo
m
a
u
s
se
h
en
.
S
T
E
R
N
T
A
X
I
S
T
O
F
F
G
A
R
A
G
E
D
er
w
u
rd
e
in
d
er
g
ef
u
n
d
en
.
S
T
O
F
F
E
N
G
E
L
S
T
R
A
N
D
T
R
E
P
P
E
D
er
ko
n
n
te
u¨
b
er
d
ie
er
re
ic
h
t
w
er
d
en
.
S
T
R
A
N
D
W
A
N
G
E
S
T
R
U
M
P
F
T
E
A
M
D
er
w
u
rd
e
vo
m
g
a
n
ze
n
g
es
u
ch
t.
S
T
R
U
M
P
F
M
E
D
A
IL
L
E
T
A
N
Z
A
N
S
T
A
L
T
w
u
rd
e
in
d
er
im
m
er
a
n
g
eb
o
te
n
.
T
A
N
Z
T
O
P
F
T
E
L
E
F
O
N
K
L
IN
IK
D
as
la¨
u
te
te
in
d
er
.
T
E
L
E
F
O
N
H
O
S
E
T
E
L
L
E
R
R
O
C
K
D
er
w
a
r
te
u
re
r
a
ls
d
er
.
T
E
L
L
E
R
G
R
A
S
T
H
E
A
T
E
R
G
E
N
E
R
A
L
D
as
g
efi
el
d
em
se
h
r
g
u
t.
T
H
E
A
T
E
R
H
E
R
D
E
T
IS
C
H
P
F
E
R
D
A
u
f
d
em
st
a
n
d
ei
n
g
es
ch
n
it
zt
es
.
T
IS
C
H
B
U¨
H
N
E
T
R
A
IN
E
R
K
L
O
S
T
E
R
D
er
zo
g
si
ch
in
s
zu
ru¨
ck
.
T
R
A
IN
E
R
B
L
U¨
T
E
T
R
A
N
S
P
O
R
T
B
A
U
M
F
u¨
r
d
en
w
u
rd
e
d
er
ze
rl
eg
t.
T
R
A
N
S
P
O
R
T
N
A
S
E
T
R
A
U
M
R
U
IN
E
Im
w
a
r
d
ie
le
ic
h
t
zu
er
k
li
m
m
en
.
T
R
A
U
M
B
R
IE
F
T
R
O
M
M
E
L
B
IL
D
D
ie
ko
n
n
te
m
a
n
a
u
f
d
em
g
u
t
er
k
en
n
en
.
T
R
O
M
M
E
L
H
U
N
D
V
O
G
E
L
O
N
K
E
L
D
er
er
fr
eu
te
d
en
se
h
r.
V
O
G
E
L
H
E
M
D
W
A
L
D
B
IE
R
D
er
w
u
rd
e
m
it
ve
rs
eu
ch
t.
W
A
L
D
T
A
B
E
L
L
E
W
A
S
S
E
R
D
A
U
M
E
N
Im
ve
rl
et
zt
e
si
e
si
ch
a
m
.
W
A
S
S
E
R
K
A
R
T
E
W
E
IN
B
O
M
B
E
D
er
w
u
rd
e
in
d
ie
g
ef
u¨
ll
t.
W
E
IN
S
T
IE
F
E
L
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U
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in
E
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t
1
o
ri
g
in
a
l
re
c
o
m
b
in
e
d
w
or
d
1
w
or
d
2
se
n
te
n
ce
w
o
rd
1
w
o
rd
2
W
IN
D
S
T
E
IN
D
er
b
ew
eg
t
d
en
.
W
IN
D
F
O
T
O
W
IT
Z
N
A
S
E
D
er
h
a
n
d
el
te
vo
n
d
er
g
ro
ß
en
.
W
IT
Z
B
A
U
M
W
O
L
L
E
L
E
H
R
L
IN
G
D
ie
w
u
rd
e
vo
n
d
em
h
er
g
es
te
ll
t.
W
O
L
L
E
T
E
A
M
W
U
R
S
T
Z
IG
A
R
E
T
T
E
D
ie
sc
h
m
ec
k
te
b
es
se
r
a
ls
d
ie
.
W
U
R
S
T
D
U
S
C
H
E
Z
W
E
IG
T
O
N
N
E
D
er
w
u
rd
e
in
d
ie
g
es
ch
m
is
se
n
.
Z
W
E
IG
B
A
L
K
O
N
Z
W
IE
B
E
L
S
T
IC
H
D
ie
w
u
rd
e
so
fo
rt
a
u
f
d
en
g
ep
re
ss
t.
Z
W
IE
B
E
L
L
E
IT
E
R
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A.2 Word Pairs Used as New Pairs in Experiment 1
word 1 word 2 word 1 word 2
FIRMA TASSE JU¨NGER KULISSE
KRANZ LAMPE NACHT FUSS
TA¨TER URLAUB HAUFEN REDNER
REGEL HERZ HALS KNECHT
LICHT KOCH BUSCH KATALOG
RICHTER MESSE HANDEL OPFER
KALENDER HALLE
BUTTER PISTOLE
ARBEITER ERDE
FASS AKTIE
SILBER SCHREIBEN
VATER LINIE
OFEN DIRIGENT
WEIZEN LIPPE
ARZT WOLKE
MALER PFEIFE
FUTTER SATTELIT
SEKT PLANET
ESEL STUFE
REISE HAKEN
SCHLAF KANTE
KUNST POLIZIST
FENSTER KIND
TEMPEL NAGEL
GALERIE PATIENT
KAPITA¨N HUHN
PAKET KLINKE
HAUT PFARRER
PFENNIG DAME
ZAHN BODEN
TROPFEN STUBE
TEST FLASCHE
PREIS LEHRER
LAGER WESTE
STOCK AUTO
KREIS GEBIRGE
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A
.3
W
o
rd
P
a
ir
s,
D
e
fi
n
it
io
n
s,
a
n
d
S
e
n
te
n
ce
s
U
se
d
in
E
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t
2
q
u
ad
w
or
d
1
w
or
d
2
d
efi
n
it
io
n
se
n
te
n
ce
1
M
u
tt
er
R
ei
s
E
in
n
ah
rh
af
te
M
ah
lz
ei
t,
d
ie
st
il
le
n
d
e
F
ra
u
en
g
er
n
e
es
se
n
D
ie
ko
ch
te
o
ft
.
1
A
b
sa
tz
G
eg
en
d
E
in
G
eb
ie
t,
in
d
em
m
an
ei
n
en
si
ch
er
en
T
ri
tt
h
a
t
D
er
b
ra
ch
in
je
n
er
a
b
.
2
B
u¨
h
n
en
P
il
ot
E
in
A
k
ro
b
at
,
d
er
F
lu
gk
u
n
st
st
u¨
ck
e
a
u
ff
u¨
h
rt
A
u
f
a
ll
en
g
la¨
n
zt
e
d
er
.
2
R
in
g
S
ta
ll
E
in
e
U
n
te
rb
ri
n
gu
n
g
fu¨
rs
V
ie
h
,
d
ie
k
re
is
fo¨
rm
ig
is
t
D
er
g
in
g
im
ve
rl
o
re
n
.
3
T
ab
el
le
n
R
oh
r
E
in
A
b
fl
u
ss
,
d
er
in
ei
n
er
U¨
b
er
si
ch
t
ve
rz
ei
ch
n
et
is
t
In
d
en
w
u
rd
e
je
d
es
ve
rz
ei
ch
n
et
.
3
A
ge
n
te
n
K
u
h
E
in
R
in
d
,
d
as
b
ei
S
p
io
n
a
g
et
a¨
ti
g
ke
it
en
b
eh
il
fl
ic
h
is
t
D
ie
b
eo
b
ac
h
te
te
n
d
ie
.
4
F
or
m
el
F
er
ie
n
U
rl
au
b
,
d
er
p
er
fe
k
t
vo
rg
ep
la
n
t
is
t
E
s
g
ib
t
ke
in
e
fu¨
r
d
ie
p
er
fe
k
te
n
.
4
S
at
te
l
F
is
ch
E
in
S
ch
u
p
p
en
ti
er
,
d
as
ei
n
en
F
le
ck
a
u
f
d
em
R
u¨
ck
en
h
a
t
U
n
te
r
d
em
w
u
rd
e
d
er
ze
rd
ru¨
ck
t.
5
S
a¨t
ze
K
on
to
D
ie
M
en
ge
,
d
ie
m
an
in
ei
n
er
b
es
ti
m
m
te
n
Z
ei
t
g
er
ed
et
h
a
t
In
m
eh
re
re
n
fu¨
ll
te
si
ch
d
a
s
.
5
K
op
f
P
fl
an
ze
n
G
ru¨
n
ze
u
g,
m
it
d
em
d
as
H
a
u
p
t
b
ed
ec
k
t
w
er
d
en
ka
n
n
D
er
w
u
rd
e
vo
n
d
en
ve
rd
ec
k
t.
6
H
u¨
tt
en
S
ch
ac
h
E
in
S
p
ie
l,
d
as
in
B
ay
er
n
se
h
r
b
el
ie
b
t
is
t
In
d
en
w
u
rd
e
es
m
it
n
ic
h
t
la
n
g
w
ei
li
g
.
6
W
it
ze
N
as
en
E
in
e
G
es
ic
h
ts
p
ar
ti
e,
d
ie
si
ch
b
ei
S
ch
er
ze
n
ve
rf
a¨
rb
t
D
ie
h
a
n
d
el
te
n
vo
n
g
ro
ß
en
.
7
B
ei
n
e
Z
el
t
E
in
e
P
la
n
e,
d
ie
d
ie
u
n
te
re
n
G
li
ed
m
a
ß
en
a
b
d
ec
k
t
D
ie
sc
h
a
u
te
n
a
u
s
d
em
.
7
F
au
st
M
u¨
n
ze
n
E
in
Z
ah
lu
n
gs
m
it
te
l,
d
as
d
u
rc
h
ei
n
en
H
ie
b
g
ep
ra¨
g
t
w
u
rd
e
D
ie
ve
rf
eh
lt
d
ie
n
u
r
k
n
a
p
p
.
8
B
u¨
ch
er
P
al
as
t
E
in
e
B
ib
li
ot
h
ek
,
d
ie
b
es
o
n
d
er
s
p
ra¨
ch
ti
g
is
t
D
ie
w
a
re
n
in
ei
n
em
u
n
te
rg
eb
ra
ch
t.
8
S
ch
at
te
n
S
p
or
tl
er
J
em
an
d
,
d
er
n
ie
im
L
ic
h
t
tr
a
in
ie
rt
D
er
sc
h
u¨
tz
te
d
en
.
9
K
in
o
In
ge
n
ie
u
r
E
in
B
au
m
ei
st
er
,
d
er
h
au
p
ts
a¨
ch
li
ch
L
ic
h
ts
p
ie
lh
a¨
u
se
r
ko
n
st
ru
ie
rt
Im
a
m
u¨
si
er
te
si
ch
d
er
.
9
S
ch
u
h
F
la
gg
en
E
in
e
K
en
n
ze
ic
h
n
u
n
g,
d
ie
a
n
S
a
n
d
a
le
n
zu
se
h
en
is
t
A
u
f
d
en
w
a
re
n
k
le
in
e
g
es
ti
ck
t.
10
S
es
se
l
S
te
rn
E
in
H
im
m
el
sk
o¨r
p
er
,
d
er
g
u
t
vo
m
S
o
fa
zu
se
h
en
is
t
V
o
m
a
u
s
k
o
n
n
te
m
a
n
d
en
se
h
en
.
10
G
el
d
S
ch
iff
E
in
F
ra
ch
te
r,
d
er
w
er
tv
ol
l
b
el
a
d
en
is
t
M
it
d
em
w
u
rd
e
d
a
s
b
ez
a
h
lt
.
11
V
u
lk
an
e
G
es
et
z
E
in
e
V
or
sc
h
ri
ft
,
d
ie
d
ie
E
va
k
u
ie
ru
n
g
re
g
el
t
D
ie
a
u
sb
re
ch
en
d
en
zw
a
n
g
en
si
e
zu
ei
n
em
n
eu
en
.
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D
e
fi
n
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n
s,
a
n
d
S
e
n
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n
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s
U
se
d
in
E
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t
2
q
u
ad
w
or
d
1
w
or
d
2
d
efi
n
it
io
n
se
n
te
n
ce
11
B
en
zi
n
S
ch
u
le
n
L
eh
rs
ta¨
tt
en
,
in
d
ie
al
le
m
it
d
em
F
a
h
rz
eu
g
ko
m
m
en
D
a
s
ko
n
n
te
a
n
d
en
g
ek
a
u
ft
w
er
d
en
.
12
S
tr
u¨
m
p
fe
T
ea
m
E
in
e
M
an
n
sc
h
af
t,
d
ie
in
S
o
ck
en
a
n
tr
it
t
D
er
w
u
rd
e
vo
m
g
a
n
ze
n
g
es
u
ch
t.
12
S
tu
n
d
en
O
b
st
F
ru¨
ch
te
,
d
ie
sc
h
n
el
l
v
er
ga
m
m
el
n
In
sp
a¨
te
n
so
ll
te
k
ei
n
m
eh
r
g
eg
es
se
n
w
er
d
en
.
13
F
lu
te
n
T
ra
k
to
r
E
in
F
ah
rz
eu
g,
d
as
d
u
rc
h
U¨
b
er
sc
h
w
em
m
u
n
g
sg
eb
ie
te
fa
h
re
n
ka
n
n
D
ie
h
ie
lt
d
en
a
u
f.
13
K
re
is
P
fe
if
en
F
lo¨
te
n
,
d
ie
in
d
er
R
u
n
d
e
u
m
h
er
g
er
ei
ch
t
w
er
d
en
Im
p
a
ff
te
n
si
e
m
eh
re
re
.
14
B
lu
t
H
im
m
el
E
in
H
or
iz
on
t,
d
er
ro
t
ge
fa¨
rb
t
is
t
D
a
s
sp
ri
tz
te
b
is
in
d
en
.
14
W
ol
le
L
eh
rl
in
g
E
in
A
u
sz
u
b
il
d
en
d
er
,
d
er
S
tr
ic
k
g
a
rn
a
u
fw
ic
ke
ln
m
u
ss
D
ie
w
u
rd
e
v
o
n
d
em
h
er
g
es
te
ll
t.
15
K
u
ge
l
K
at
ze
n
E
in
e
R
au
b
ti
er
ar
t,
d
ie
ei
n
e
ru
n
d
li
ch
e
F
o
rm
h
a
t
D
ie
w
u
rd
e
v
o
n
d
en
in
sp
iz
ie
rt
.
15
W
u
rs
t
Z
ig
ar
et
te
n
G
li
m
m
st
a¨n
ge
l,
d
ie
n
ac
h
M
et
zg
er
ei
ri
ec
h
en
D
ie
sc
h
m
ec
k
te
b
es
se
r
a
ls
d
ie
.
16
P
fa
d
A¨
rm
el
E
in
P
u
ll
it
ei
l,
d
as
la
n
g
u
n
d
d
u¨
n
n
is
t
A
u
f
d
em
fa
n
d
en
si
e
ei
n
en
ei
n
ze
ln
en
.
16
K
ol
le
ge
n
F
en
st
er
E
in
A
u
sb
li
ck
,
d
en
ei
n
M
it
a
rb
ei
te
r
g
en
ie
ß
t
D
ie
p
u
tz
te
n
d
a
s
.
17
G
em
u¨
se
B
ib
el
E
in
N
ac
h
sc
h
la
ge
w
er
k
,
d
a
s
H
o
b
b
y
g
a¨
rt
n
er
zu
R
a
te
zi
eh
en
D
ie
se
s
w
u
rd
e
b
er
ei
ts
in
d
er
er
w
a¨
h
n
t.
17
K
u¨
ss
e
K
la
ge
E
in
e
A
n
ze
ig
e,
d
ie
ei
n
e
R
ei
h
e
u
n
er
la
u
b
te
r
S
ch
m
a
tz
er
zu
r
F
o
lg
e
h
a
t
M
eh
re
re
ve
ru
rs
a
ch
te
n
d
ie
se
.
18
K
u
ch
en
S
on
n
e
D
ie
S
tr
ah
le
n
,
d
ie
ei
n
en
im
C
a
fe´
b
eg
lu¨
ck
en
D
er
w
u
rd
e
vo
n
d
er
a
u
fg
ew
ei
ch
t.
18
W
ag
en
B
ei
ch
te
E
in
B
ek
en
n
tn
is
,
d
as
in
ei
n
em
G
ef
a¨
h
rt
g
em
a
ch
t
w
ir
d
Im
w
u
rd
e
d
ie
a
b
g
el
eg
t.
19
B
et
te
n
M
au
er
E
in
e
B
ar
ri
ka
d
e,
au
f
d
er
m
a
n
sc
h
la
fe
n
ka
n
n
D
ie
w
u
rd
en
a
n
d
er
a
u
fg
eb
a
u
t.
19
T
is
ch
P
fe
rd
E
in
D
ek
oa
rt
ik
el
,
d
er
w
ie
h
er
n
ka
n
n
A
u
f
d
em
st
a
n
d
ei
n
g
es
ch
n
it
zt
es
.
20
D
or
f
S
ti
ef
el
E
in
e
F
u
ßb
ek
le
id
u
n
g,
d
ie
in
la¨
n
d
li
ch
en
G
eb
ie
te
n
g
et
ra
g
en
w
ir
d
Im
w
u
rd
en
g
er
n
e
g
et
ra
g
en
.
20
S
tu
h
l
F
ad
en
E
in
Z
w
ir
n
,
d
er
an
ei
n
e
S
it
zg
el
eg
en
h
ei
t
g
eb
u
n
d
en
is
t
D
er
w
u
rd
e
vo
m
u
m
w
ic
k
el
t.
21
F
el
l
S
te
in
E
in
B
ro
ck
en
,
d
er
ei
n
e
w
ei
ch
e
O
b
er
fl
a¨
ch
e
h
a
t
D
a
s
w
u
rd
e
a
u
f
d
em
a
u
sg
eb
re
it
et
.
21
G
la¨
se
r
R
ak
et
en
G
es
ch
os
se
,
d
ie
m
it
D
ri
n
k
g
ef
a¨
ß
en
b
el
a
d
en
si
n
d
D
ie
w
a
ck
el
te
n
w
eg
en
d
er
.
22
E
le
fa
n
te
n
F
ra
ge
E
in
P
ro
b
le
m
,
d
as
vo
n
gi
g
a
n
ti
sc
h
en
A
u
sm
a
ß
en
is
t
D
ie
ko
n
n
te
n
d
ie
n
ic
h
t
b
ea
n
tw
o
rt
en
.
180
A
.3
W
o
rd
P
a
ir
s,
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a
n
d
S
e
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U
se
d
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E
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t
2
q
u
ad
w
or
d
1
w
or
d
2
d
efi
n
it
io
n
se
n
te
n
ce
22
P
ro
v
in
z
P
il
le
n
T
ab
le
tt
en
,
d
ie
g
eg
en
L
an
g
ew
ei
le
h
el
fe
n
so
ll
en
In
d
er
w
u
rd
e
je
d
em
d
ie
ve
rs
ch
ri
eb
en
.
23
F
u
tt
er
A
rc
h
it
ek
te
n
C
h
em
ik
er
,
d
ie
V
ie
h
n
ah
ru
n
g
en
tw
ic
ke
ln
D
a
s
ve
ra
b
re
ic
h
te
n
ih
m
d
ie
.
23
M
on
d
P
fe
il
E
in
an
ge
sp
it
zt
er
A
st
,
d
er
h
o
ch
fl
ie
g
en
ka
n
n
V
o
r
d
em
w
a
r
d
er
g
u
t
zu
se
h
en
.
24
G
it
te
r
S
tu
d
ie
n
E
in
H
o
ch
sc
h
u
la
n
ge
b
ot
,
d
a
s
u
n
v
o
ll
st
a¨
n
d
ig
is
t
S
o
g
a
r
h
in
te
r
g
eb
ra
ch
t
vo
ll
en
d
et
e
er
se
in
e
.
24
F
ed
er
n
S
a¨n
ge
r
E
in
e
ge
fi
ed
er
te
P
er
so
n
,
d
ie
si
n
g
t
D
ie
st
a
n
d
en
d
em
se
h
r
g
u
t.
25
G
ra
b
en
H
er
d
e
E
in
R
u
d
el
,
d
as
si
ch
v
or
w
ie
g
en
d
in
ei
n
er
A
u
sh
eb
u
n
g
a
u
fh
a¨
lt
D
er
w
u
rd
e
vo
n
d
er
m
u¨
h
el
o
s
u¨
b
er
w
u
n
d
en
.
25
B
a¨n
ke
D
u
sc
h
en
N
as
sz
el
le
n
,
in
d
en
en
m
an
si
tz
en
ka
n
n
D
ie
w
u
rd
en
in
d
ie
g
es
te
ll
t.
26
G
u¨
rt
el
K
lu
b
E
in
V
er
ei
n
,
in
d
em
al
le
sc
h
ic
ke
R
ie
m
en
u
m
d
ie
H
u¨
ft
e
tr
a
g
en
w
a
re
n
in
d
ie
se
m
ve
rb
o
te
n
.
26
D
a¨c
h
er
F
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o
E
in
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b
b
il
d
,
au
f
d
em
ro
te
Z
ie
g
el
zu
se
h
en
si
n
d
D
ie
w
u
rd
en
a
u
f
d
em
a
b
g
eb
il
d
et
.
27
H
u¨
ge
l
S
ch
il
d
E
in
V
er
k
eh
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h
in
w
ei
s,
d
er
er
h
o¨
h
t
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n
g
eb
ra
ch
t
is
t
D
er
w
u
rd
e
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h
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s
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d
el
t.
27
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el
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n
,
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ie
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zu
r
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el
t
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ei
n
em
ka
m
en
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r
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el
t.
28
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te
l
S
ch
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e
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ie
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,
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ie
ei
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en
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h
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rz
en
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ck
en
h
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b
en
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er
w
u
rd
e
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u
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h
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ie
ve
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ch
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u
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t.
28
S
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ff
G
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en
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ag
er
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le
n
,
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d
en
en
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ex
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li
en
u
n
te
rg
eb
ra
ch
t
w
er
d
en
D
er
w
u
rd
e
in
d
en
zu
sa
m
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en
g
el
eg
t.
29
M
an
ag
er
F
es
se
l
E
in
S
ch
li
n
ge
,
d
ie
ei
n
en
U
n
te
rn
eh
m
en
sf
u¨
h
re
r
fe
st
h
a¨
lt
D
er
ko
n
n
te
si
ch
a
u
s
d
er
b
ef
re
ie
n
.
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B
u
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h
A
b
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ge
E
in
V
er
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k
,
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as
u
n
te
r
S
tr
a¨
u
ch
er
n
ve
rb
o
rg
en
is
t
D
er
u¨
b
er
w
u
ch
er
te
b
er
ei
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d
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.
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P
os
t
In
st
ru
m
en
t
E
in
e
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ch
tu
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g,
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a¨
ck
ch
en
so
rt
ie
rt
M
it
d
er
ka
m
a
u
ch
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s
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eu
e
.
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T
el
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K
li
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ik
E
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e
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er
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st
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t,
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d
er
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er
n
sp
re
ch
er
re
p
a
ri
er
t
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er
d
en
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s
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el
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o
n
la¨
u
te
te
in
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er
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li
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ik
.
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d
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h
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h
,
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er
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h
r
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ck
en
is
t
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d
en
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b
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fu¨
r
g
ew
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n
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ch
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ei
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en
.
31
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e
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,
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ie
se
h
r
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en
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n
d
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r
d
ie
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te
re
ss
ie
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en
si
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ie
n
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h
t.
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ad
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e
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p
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d
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.
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,
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en
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r
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h
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.
33
R
ah
m
en
T
u
rm
E
in
e
A
n
h
a¨
u
fu
n
g,
d
ie
au
s
B
il
d
ei
n
fa
ss
u
n
g
en
b
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b
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p
e
ri
m
e
n
t
2
q
u
ad
w
or
d
1
w
or
d
2
d
efi
n
it
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b
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te
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.
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b
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b
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.
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b
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.
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ra
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b
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.
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u
rd
e
so
fo
rt
a
u
f
d
en
g
ep
re
ss
t.
36
S
ta
u
b
T
u
rn
ie
r
E
in
W
et
tk
am
p
f,
d
er
in
d
er
W
u¨
st
e
st
a
tt
fi
n
d
et
D
er
b
ee
in
tr
a¨
ch
ti
g
te
d
a
s
.
37
A
k
ze
n
t
K
an
d
id
at
en
B
ew
er
b
er
,
d
er
en
A
u
ss
p
ra
ch
e
n
ic
h
t
p
er
fe
k
t
is
t
E
in
en
st
a
rk
en
h
a
tt
en
a
ll
e
.
37
K
aff
ee
M
ed
ai
ll
en
E
in
e
A
u
sz
ei
ch
n
u
n
g,
d
ie
fu¨
r
d
en
b
es
te
n
E
sp
re
ss
o
ve
rl
ie
h
en
w
ir
d
B
ei
m
p
ra¨
se
n
ti
er
te
si
e
ih
re
.
38
A¨
m
te
r
M
at
te
n
L
ie
ge
n
,
d
ie
v
on
B
eh
o¨r
d
en
b
er
ei
t
g
es
te
ll
t
w
er
d
en
D
ie
st
el
lt
en
n
eu
e
b
er
ei
t.
38
G
ew
it
te
r
M
ot
or
E
in
A
n
tr
ie
b
,
d
er
se
lb
st
b
ei
U
n
w
et
te
r
fu
n
k
ti
o
n
ie
rt
B
ei
sc
h
a
lt
et
e
si
ch
d
er
a
b
.
39
A
u
to
H
ir
te
n
A
n
ge
st
el
lt
e,
d
ie
ei
n
en
P
a
rk
p
la
tz
b
ew
a
ch
en
E
in
g
u¨
n
st
ig
es
er
w
a
rb
en
d
ie
.
39
F
et
t
J
a¨g
er
E
in
W
il
d
er
er
,
d
er
h
in
te
r
d
ic
ke
n
H
ir
sc
h
en
h
er
is
t
D
a
s
w
u
rd
e
vo
m
en
tf
er
n
t.
40
R
os
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b
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d
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.
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.
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b
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.
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b
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b
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h
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te
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u
f
ei
n
em
E
il
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n
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n
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en
is
t
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u
f
d
er
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u
r
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en
.
45
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,
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er
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en
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.
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er
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r,
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t
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H
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m
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h
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47
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er
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,
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n
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t
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w
u
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d
en
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es
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t.
47
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k
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g,
d
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h
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k
te
n
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t
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ie
w
u
rd
en
vo
n
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er
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en
.
48
M
u
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el
Z
et
te
l
E
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e
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ot
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,
d
ie
d
en
K
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w
a
ch
s
b
el
eg
t
D
er
w
u
rd
e
a
u
f
d
em
n
o
ti
er
t.
48
S
ch
ra
n
k
S
ie
d
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n
ge
n
O
rt
sc
h
af
te
n
,
in
d
er
d
ie
B
eh
a
u
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n
g
en
se
h
r
k
le
in
si
n
d
D
er
w
u
rd
e
in
d
en
h
er
g
es
te
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t.
49
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u
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er
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el
P
ri
n
zi
p
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h
d
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M
at
er
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l
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ro¨
se
lt
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d
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a
s
lo¨
st
e
si
ch
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ch
ei
n
er
b
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te
n
a
u
f.
49
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ro
t
H
ot
el
E
in
e
P
en
si
on
,
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ie
n
u
r
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h
e
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o
st
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n
b
ie
te
t
D
a
s
w
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e
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s
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.
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S
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S
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ie
ge
l
E
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e
S
te
ll
e
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f
ei
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er
D
u¨
n
e,
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ie
re
fl
ek
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er
t
D
er
w
u
rd
e
a
u
f
d
em
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es
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m
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el
t.
50
B
er
g
G
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f
E
in
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d
li
ge
r,
d
er
w
ei
t
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en
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o
h
n
t
D
en
b
ez
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n
g
d
er
n
u
r
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h
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m
.
51
T
ei
l
H
el
d
E
in
K
a¨m
p
fe
r,
d
er
n
ic
h
t
im
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er
si
eg
t
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u
ei
n
em
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en
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r
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er
b
er
ei
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te
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.
51
M
o
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e
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n
e
E
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e
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rd
en
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ch
w
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te
r,
d
ie
sc
h
ic
k
g
ek
le
id
et
is
t
F
u¨
r
in
te
re
ss
ie
rt
e
si
ch
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ie
se
h
r.
52
T
ra
n
sp
or
t
B
au
m
E
in
S
ta
m
m
,
d
en
m
an
zu
r
B
ef
o¨
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er
u
n
g
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u
ss
a
b
w
a¨
rt
s
sc
h
ic
k
t
F
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r
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en
w
u
rd
e
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er
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eg
t.
52
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o¨w
en
K
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ot
en
E
in
ve
rfi
lz
te
s
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sc
h
el
,
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er
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n
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t
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.
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l,
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b
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ra
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e
.
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er
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E
in
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ch
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eu
g,
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fa
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ig
b
ed
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ck
t
is
t
D
ie
ze
ig
te
n
a
ll
e
ei
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e
.
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S
p
it
ze
n
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an
E
in
K
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er
te
il
,
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h
st
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is
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n
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en
er
b
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n
g
t
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is
in
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ie
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n
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ch
te
er
se
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.
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Z
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f,
b
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d
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te
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h
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a
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d
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sc
h
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b
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s
.
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er
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E
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e
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o
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ge
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ie
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it
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r
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ei
n
em
W
a
g
o
n
fi
n
d
et
D
ie
w
u
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.
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p
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d
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h
te
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t
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d
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.
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m
H
ei
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ge
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E
in
e
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n
g,
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ie
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ef
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u
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d
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en
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b
g
es
te
ll
t.
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E
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e
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ch
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b
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,
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ie
d
er
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d
en
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.
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eu
er
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u
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E
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d
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s
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u
t,
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h
n
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ra¨
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D
am
p
fe
r,
d
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u
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d
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.
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,
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d
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.
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b
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A.6 Object Pairs Used in Experiment 4
original recombined
set object 1 object 2 object 1 object 2
1 donkey can donkey mushroom
1 dinosaur dime dinosaur can
1 zebra mushroom zebra dime
2 witch telescope witch wolf
2 airplane wolf airplane telescope
3 hat lama hat camel
3 comb camel comb lama
3 shower snowman shower skeleton
3 skipping-rope skeleton skipping-rope snowman
4 baseball cap goat baseball cap gorilla
4 flathat gorilla flathat mouse
4 crown mouse crown goat
5 tomato cup tomato trophy
5 onion trophy onion cup
6 skunk skateboard skunk sled
6 beaver sled beaver skateboard
7 monkey motorcycle monkey saddle
7 rabbit saddle rabbit motorcycle
8 seahorse hanger seahorse medal
8 hook medal hook hanger
9 sheep rug sheep ladder
9 fox ladder fox rug
9 watering-can dustbin watering-can boot
9 teapot boot teapot bowl
9 ball bowl ball dustbin
10 razor bricks razor ashtray
10 toothbrush ashtray toothbrush bricks
11 fishing-rod cherry fishing-rod strawberry
11 ostrich strawberry ostrich cherry
12 pliers pitcher pliers vase
12 drill vase drill pitcher
13 hammer peanut hammer towel
13 ax carrot ax peanut
13 saw envelope saw carrot
13 pitchfork towel pitchfork envelope
14 egg wagon egg ironing board
14 candle ironing board candle wagon
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A.6 Object Pairs Used in Experiment 4
original recombined
set object 1 object 2 object 1 object 2
15 radio barrel radio stool
15 glas stool glas barrel
16 telephone dresser telephone chest
16 wine glass chest wine glass dresser
17 umbrella cat umbrella cowboy
17 light bulb cowboy light bulb cat
18 nail jar nail piggybank
18 ring piggybank ring jar
19 bottle bag bottle basket
19 water-tap basket water-tap bag
20 boat road boat railroad
20 canoo railroad canoo road
21 clock coat clock wheelbarrow
21 apple wheelbarrow apple coat
22 banana hammock banana fire
22 feather fire feather hammock
23 tape plate tape desk
23 iron desk iron plate
24 plaster turtle plaster frog
24 balloon frog balloon turtle
25 cigarette hippo cigarette snail
25 whistle snail whistle hippo
26 trumpet tiger trumpet sphinx
26 harmonica giraffe harmonica tiger
26 bugle sphinx bugle giraffe
27 doll drum doll steering wheel
27 panda steering wheel panda drum
28 wreath cannon wreath gun
28 tire gun tire cannon
29 screwdriver ear screwdriver lock
29 corkscrew lock corkscrew ear
30 squirrel broom squirrel piano
30 penguin piano penguin broom
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A.6 Object Pairs Used in Experiment 4
original recombined
set object 1 object 2 object 1 object 2
31 screw pencil-sharpener screw button
31 tweezers watermelon tweezers pencil-sharpener
31 arrow button arrow spiderweb
31 torch light spiderweb torch light watermelon
32 tennis racket hamburger tennis racket sandwich
32 scissors sandwich scissors hamburger
33 fan dog fan duck
33 tv duck tv dog
34 plug lips plug knob
34 syringe knob syringe lips
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